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IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCES

THE ROLE OF MEMORY, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY IN PERSONAL IDENTITY

Yumi ISHIGE

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University of Durham

Department of Philosophy

2005

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D.



15 MAR 2006

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Yumi ISHIGE

ABSTRACT

The main issue of this thesis is to analyse what kind of concept we have of 'personal identity.'

The concept of personal identity is basically examined in relation to memory in this thesis. Recalling memory is supposed to make an intelligible account between experiences. It gives meaning to what is remembered in accordance with the context of that person's life. This work is compared to a narrative understanding of memory. The unity of a person over time, which relates to the unity of personal identity, assumed to be formed through making this narrative account (Chapter one and the first half of Chapter two).

However, there arises the question of whether all of our experiences can be managed by the narrative account. Two issues are examined at this point: The insufficiency of that narrative approach (the latter half of Chapter two) and the historical transformation of the concept of personal identity (Chapter three). The transformation is specifically studied with influences of the media through time. The particularities of the modern period of time are specifically considered as the age from which the study of personal identity has developed.

Today, however, the credibility of the modern concept of personal identity seems to be in doubt. This doubt is summarised in the term 'postmodern.' The characteristics of and the discontinuity between the modern and the postmodern are described in Chapter four. Finally Chapter five investigates the particularities of the concept of identity in the postmodern age

I conclude that the modern concept of personal identity has been effective in organising society, but it has arrived during a time at which its boundary needs to be reconsidered. Differences of a person, which are not identified within the narrative consistency of a life, are a key-term in this thought.

University of Durham

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
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Declaration

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Yumi Ishige', with a stylized, flowing script.

Yumi Ishige

2005

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
Lastly I should thank my family. Their mercy and tolerance made this thesis possible. I want to thank my parents for being very patient with me, very understanding and very supportive. With their generosity, I could complete this work.

Yumi Ishige
Durham, 2005

INTRODUCTION

The two main issues of this thesis are shown in the title. One is the matter of *Identity*. Although this word can suggest various meanings such as a logical connection between A and A' or the sameness of an object at different times, I focus on its reference to the temporal continuity of a person, namely, the issue of personal identity. Within that topic, I consider the method by which we grasp ourselves as relatively continuous and coherent existences through time. The other matter to consider is *Differences*. They are assumed to be elements that deviate from that coherence. We tend to give an order to our experiences through which a consistent relation is made, but I propose that there are some things that cannot be settled in this manner. They are aberrations from the organisation of identity, and I call them differences. I shall add more explanation to this term later in the Introduction. I will examine the work of these two different concepts on forming ourselves in this thesis.

The issue of personal identity is first considered in the relation to memory. To present my conclusion in advance, I determine that our concept of personal identity consists of memory that arises when we grasp our experiences from a certain perspective. It is the method by which we understand the past by ourselves, and how to remember experiences will be discussed. In this survey, I specifically pay attention to the work of making experiences unified within the framework of a person. It is the act



of giving an intelligible elucidation of memory in accordance with the context of other memories. This is the topic in the first half of this thesis, in which I will develop this view in connection to identity, memory, and narrative. Then, I will reconsider the validity of that assumption, and take notice of the fragmented aspect of identity in the latter half of the thesis.

If we bear one point in mind, it will help to catch the tenor of our discussion. It is that a person thus described is presupposed to be an existence that can undertake an action as his or her own, and this presupposition is inseparable from the ideal of a person arising from the modern age. I broadly define the modern period as from the seventeenth century onward, originating in Western culture.¹ A prominent characteristic of that ideal is the awareness of human reason. Charles Taylor counts the following as facets of nascent modern individualism and modern identity: 'self-responsible independence,' 'recognized particularity' of the inner self, and 'personal commitment,' in which one's will is thought to be one's own, and only one person can give consent to a commitment.² On these modern ideals, a person is described as a rational agent, responsible for his or her own actions, and able to gather the threads of his or her life story in undertaking the actions. My basic presumption about the above described agent as a subject of my discussion, is that of an adult who has more or less common sense of belonging within a community.

This type of understanding of individuals has been discussed in the context of personal identity by, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Paul Ricoeur.³ Their particularity is to treat the issue of identity by the use of narrative. The continuity of a

¹ This notion will be specified further in chapters three and four.

² Taylor (1989, p. 185).

³ MacIntyre (1984), Ricoeur (1981).

person in their view resides in the ability to give a congruous account of episodes through life. Even if there is a great gap between description A (e.g., a wealthy noble) and description B (a miserable mendicant), they would be thought of as descriptions of the same person as long as a reasonable explanation of the connection (the occurrence of revolution and the fall of the aristocracy) between the two can be given. This is defined as a narrative understanding of life which puts episodes in the context of long-term intentions, through which the episode is provided with an adequate meaning. This relation between episodes forms the framework of our concept of personal identity as a particular person and none other. I will pursue the issue of identity in line with this narrative approach, by which memory is reconstructed and a comprehensible view of the past is offered .

That is a basic understanding of a person as a unitary existence over time presented in this thesis, but I also ask if it enough for studying the matter of identity. I suggest that there are occasions on which we find inconsistency in ourselves. They, at least at that moment, cannot be settled by the consistency of that person's understanding of him/herself, and I regard such moments as the generation of differences. They can appear in various ways in our lives. For instance, I see their symbolic cases in episodes recounted by Ernest Mach, and Sigmund Freud. Mach describes his incident: One night, he got into an omnibus 'just as another man appeared at the other end. "What a shabby pedagogue that is, that has just entered," thought I. It was myself: opposite me hung a large mirror. The physiognomy of my class, accordingly, was better known to me than my own.' The man who was in the mirror appeared as a stranger to him. He immediately realised his mistake, but it must have given him a strong impression to let

him cite the experience in his writing.⁴ Interestingly, Mach-in-the-mirror is accepted as an unpleasant man by him. That is why Sigmund Freud is attracted by Mach's episode and cites it in his article on the 'uncanny'.

Freud also mentions the case of his own adventure: He was in a *wagon-lit* compartment when the door of the washing-cabinet was opened by violent swing and 'an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling cap came in.' He thought this man had come into his compartment by mistake. However, he soon realised that 'the intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door.'⁵ I mention these episodes in order to denote what I regard as differences: There are occasions on which we find 'others' in ourselves, and it may be an uncomfortable experience for us. Something which is different, strange, or unfamiliar to us is often accompanied by a feeling of insecurity, because they may have the potential to throw a peace made by identity into disorder. The disturbance of coherence is a characteristic of differences, and Mach and Freud's episodes intimate this aspect. I interpret this idea of disturbance as a heterodoxy to the modern ideal of a person as a consistent and unified existence. This leads to discussion of the minimum of the modern concept of personal identity.

Though not as strongly as in Mach's episode, we also experience meeting our own image in daily life. The media are influential methods for propagating this experience by which we are often shown 'ourselves' in recorded information.⁶ When we face the

⁴ Mach also adduces another of his own misunderstandings of himself: He saw a young man whose face was 'very displeasing and repulsive to me.' Then, he realised that it was his own face reflected by mirrors in a shop (1914, 4n).

⁵ Freud depicts the uncanny as 'something which is secretly familiar [heimlich-heimisch], which has undergone repression and then returned from it' (1985, p. 368).

⁶ I use the term the 'media' to mean methods that store, send, and exchange information between people. Any method of human expression is treated as the media

media, we might feel alienation from the person who is interrelated with the media. Besides, it is the age in which a huge variety of images are dispersed by the development of technology. Not all information in the media gives rise to a sense of estrangement of selves from ourselves, but it presents the possibility of finding differences in our sense of identity. I see that as a reason why the matter of differences is specifically observed in this period more than before.

I assume that if our concept of personal identity is reconsidered due to such external influences, it can lead to the question of whether that concept is a universal idea throughout history, or if it arose in a particular culture and era. I take the side of the second view, and insist that this concept is a modern discovery in Western culture. For a confirmation of this point, I will follow its temporal changes along with transitions in the methods of communication, which focus on in chapter three. Moreover, in the last two chapters, the decline of the concept of personal identity, which is supposed to occur in accordance with the fall of the modern ideal, is discussed in the context of the postmodern. In order to clarify the notion of the postmodern, I mainly refer to Jean-François Lyotard's discussion in which the conflict between the modern and the postmodern is keenly analysed. This is expected to disclose distrust of modern ideas and the diffusion of our concept of identity today. On this view, it is not supposed that either identity or differences is generated from the collapse of the other, but that both are necessary to form the concept of a person. However, the modern discussion seems not to pay enough attention to the aspect of differences, and I want to consider this problem in the context of the postmodern.

Before we tackle the problem of personal identity in the body of the thesis, I

in this thesis.

should make clear five points in this discussion. First, I shall explain more the idea of differences that has been mentioned above. This term is sometimes used in postmodern arguments with specific meanings, but I do not use it in accordance with a particular philosopher. For instance, this term often advocates how Jacques Derrida uses it. He makes the term 'difference' from 'différer' in order to argue the domination of logocentrism, in which speech is thought to represent interior and writing is exterior. Derrida however criticises this confrontation between speech and writing but asserts that it is a play between interiority and exteriority and none of them has a priority to another.⁷ In Gilles Deleuze's discussion, difference is compared to identification, and he tries to annul the distinction between the origin and the replica.⁸

Although I am influenced by discussions that are seen in postmodern literature, I do not restrict the use of differences only in that manner, neither in the relation to logocentrism nor the differences that may appear in repetition like Deleuze proposes. The aim to employ the term is not to analyse its use in specific texts, but to examine insufficiency of the concept of identity — if there are any. For the issue of identity, I employ the conception of 'narrative,' which makes a comprehensible story through locating one's own experiences in the context of that person's life. Thus, it is a sort of system that possesses order. The system however, holds a shortage that it cannot present something that strays from the order. I call it differences from the identification of things, and discuss how they appear in the concept of personal identity.

Second, the identity that I will discuss is the identity of human beings. Since my

⁷ For more arguments, see Derrida (1974).

⁸ 'That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 41).

topic is 'personal' identity, I omit the study of the identity of things, animals, or artificial intelligence. This may give the impression that the identity of those is constructed differently from personal identity, but we need further discussion to analyse this problem, so I will not mention it further.⁹ Some philosophers present arguments about the identity of things, and I will cite them if the need arises, for example, Joseph Butler's tree-problem and John Perry's instance of a baseball game. As long as the argument contributes to research into personal identity, there is no reason not to take it up for discussion. Nonetheless, I should first confirm the point that the general interest in this work is the identity of persons, not that of other things.¹⁰

Third, our discussion deploys the point that we grasp our continuity by ourselves, so its concern is the method by which we organise a life story from our own perspective. For this reason, our discussion is mostly conducted from the first person's viewpoint. There are occasions on which I examine the third person's viewpoint, but I principally seek the way that we know ourselves as the agents of our own actions.¹¹ For that reason, I use the expression 'the concept of personal identity' in my discussion.

Fourth, I elucidate the reason that I occasionally use the expression the 'concept' of personal identity. When we deal with our understanding of personal identity, or consider its transformation, the subject of the discussion is that concept, which means how we understand the matter of 'personal identity'. In addition, in the case of its

⁹ For a summary of views on the identity of animals, see, e.g., Noonan (2003, pp. 196-213).

¹⁰ More precisely, the subject of our discussion is the identity of adults, especially in post-industrial society. The identity of children might be different from that of adults, and some cognitive science investigates the development of the self in childhood. It is interesting to consider children's sense of identity, but it is too big an issue to treat in this thesis. Therefore, that point is not included in my discussion.

¹¹ There is an opinion that even though a story is told from a particular person's viewpoint, we still must make a distinction between 'internal perspective' and 'external perspective' (Peter Goldie, 2003).

transformation, we do not ask if 'personal identity' changes (I cannot really understand what would be meant by that question), but rather if the concept that we have of personal identity changes. The subject of the above question is the transformability of our account of what personal identity is for us, so that concept is the target of research. Thus far this does not hit the same point that is argued by the traditional study of personal identity in philosophical literature. The latter study usually asks criteria of a continuity of a person over time, and a number of arguments develop concerning this subject. This type of investigation seeks an absolute solution by which the identification of a person at a different time is explained. However, my interest is more inclined to the method by which we make an understandable connection between our own experiences from the present perspective.

Scholars who are specifically interested in the relation between personal identity and the narrative account sometimes indicate this difference. For instance, Marya Schechtman stresses the necessity to make a distinction between what she calls the 'reidentification question' and the 'characterization question.' The former corresponds to the criteria-arguments of personal identity, and the latter relates to the conditions of which 'beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the person she is.'¹² The latter subject in her discussion is somehow concerned with the narrative account in this thesis. This issue will be discussed in chapter two.

Fifth, I will mention the sense of individuality, especially in chapter three, but its use does not refer to so-called individualism. I shall explain this point here. Although individualism holds diverse meanings in its use, its political and social philosophy is usually depicted as the opposition to the idea that locates the whole in the superior

¹² Schechtman (1996, pp. 1-2).

position to an individual. An agent in that individualism is counted as the primary unit of society, so society is the accumulation of individuals but not something that transcends that accumulation. This thought thus stresses the priority of individual's status to that of a group of people such as families, communities, or society to which an individual is attached. In philosophical literature, for instance, methodological individualism maintains the notion that social developments can be regarded as a collection of individuals' actions and decisions. It therefore implies that a large clump, such as societies or nations, can be reduced to small constituent elements, namely individuals. It is true that there are various theories that belong to a sort of individualism, but we do not have enough space to analyse them. To mention the point shall be enough for our discussion that the main idea of individualism is that an individual is the factor that founds the collective, but not the reverse.¹³

Compare individualism and individuality, I use the latter term as the consciousness of independence from circumstances to which the person belongs. This independence does not indicate that an individual is superior to the whole, though neither does treat the individual as the result of the whole. I will not enter the sort of discussion that asks whether an individual or the whole holds superiority to another. I, however, use the term as the consciousness by which we objectively grasp ourselves somehow keeping distance from social influences, and by which we see ourselves as an independent agent of our own actions. As one of its instances, the development of human rationality can be counted as starting with the expansion of Enlightenment from the beginning of the modern period. Enlightenment is characterised by the reliance on rationality, the evolution of humanity, and freedom from authority, and those features

¹³ For more information, for example, see Watkins (1957), Elster (1989), Udehn (2001).

have a relation to the awareness of independence. For example, a positive self-image that is cultivated by Enlightenment can be depicted thus: the image 'is of a civilization founded on scientific knowledge of the world and rational knowledge of value, which places the highest premium on individual human life and freedom.'¹⁴ I employ 'individuality' as such awareness of one's own independence and singularity that are supposed to be necessary for the advent of the concept of personal identity.¹⁵ This notion of individuality is used without relying upon the context of individualism in particular studies, but suggests the awareness of inner-self as an individual compared with the collective sense of belonging within a community.

It may be objected that the above question is not quite a philosophical issue, because philosophers often pursue theories that can be applied to multiple situations beyond local conditions. In the study of personal identity, this frequently takes the form of an investigation into the criterion by which all human beings under any circumstance can be proved to be continuous existences through time. The inquiry into a permanent theory is an important task for philosophy, but I insist that it is also important to ascertain the flexible aspects of the concept of identity. In our case, it is the question of whether or not our concept of personal identity is temporally limited, whether or not it is transformable dependent upon external factors. My opinion is that the concept of personal identity can alter in accordance with socio-cultural conditions, and I will examine this flexibility of our concept of identity in this thesis. It is valuable to study external influences in order to acknowledge what presuppositions we have in the study of personal identity. Therefore, I insist that research into this concept's mutable side can

¹⁴ Cahoone (2003, p. 9).

¹⁵ For more discussion of Enlightenment, see Chapter three.

provide a contribution to the philosophical discussion of this issue as well as to the traditional criteria-arguments of personal identity.

Main Topics in Each Chapter

I will discuss the role of memory in relation to personal identity in chapter one. I assume that when we recall our own experiences, we grasp them from the present standpoint. At that time, we have a certain understanding of the past, and I indicate that the framework of personal identity is generated by this work. Our concept of personal identity is thus described as a clump of remembering that is produced from a particular perspective.¹⁶ In addition, it is my view in this thesis that remembered events are not the events as they just happened, but their meanings and/or structures are reconstructed according to the present perspective. Our understanding of the past changes if our later experiences give an enough information to re-interpret the meaning of some events, so to recall memory is to revise experiences for the sake of making a coherent relation between them. Our past is not a collection of fixed events, but can be recombined corresponding to an interpretation. I call the process of making an intelligible account of experiences the ‘reconstruction of memory’.¹⁷

Memory plays an important part in this understanding of personal identity. Nevertheless, I should caution that I do not participate in the discussion of the psychological criterion well-known in the study of personal identity. That study relates

¹⁶ Charles Taylor discusses this point in relation to morality (1989, p. 27).

¹⁷ The idea that the past is reconstructed is examined particularly in psychology, e.g., Neimeyer and Metzler (1994).

to the question of what the continuity of a person consists in, and in the case of memory, it is condensed to what description we can give of the psychological continuity and/or connectedness of a person over time as the criterion of personal identity.¹⁸ Although the criteria-arguments are common in this subject, I will not undertake this type of investigation. It is not our concern to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the continuity of a person, but I ask from what operation we form the concept of personal identity. A concise answer is memory, because the question of personal identity presupposes time distance in which at least one of the existences is only found in memory. If we did not remember anything, we, to begin with, would not be able to develop the concept of personal identity, and I would like to consider this work of memory. I will consider those issues in the first half of chapter one, and then cite some instances of the reconstruction of memory and examine their characteristics.

The relation between a narrative approach and the concept of personal identity is a main topic in chapter two. The narrative approach is employed in order to examine the organisation of the reconstruction of memory. If experiences were always randomly connected with each other, we would not be able to make any sense of the past owing to the impossibility of understanding the relation between them, and consequently would not be able to form personal identity. Complete chaos is beyond our comprehension, and we tend to put memory in a form from which we can take its meaning. Hence, the reconstruction of memory must have order in its formation as long as it makes an intelligible account. This account of memory presents two issues. First, we infer that the structure of the reconstructed memory can be compared with the narrative form, which gives a meaning to an event in the context of life. The necessity of the narrative form

¹⁸ For example, see Nozick (1981), Shoemaker (1970).

and its connection to identity are stressed in the work of MacIntyre, who states that the unity of an individual is 'a unity of a narrative embodied in a single life.'¹⁹ Actions become comprehensible when they are located in a proper context, and the narrative form is used to provide that context.

I presume that there are two standards according to which experiences are ordered in the narrative form.²⁰ One is concerned with time, since the act of recalling experiences must contain a sense of time. Experiences are, nevertheless, not only constructed in temporal order, but they can be organised by a different standard. I propose a causal relation as another standard in which the connection between at least two events is made in the relation of cause and effect. This use of 'causal relation' may sound inadequate, since causality is usually understood as regularity that event A and B are in causal relation if A is immediately followed by B and like kinds of events of A and B are always followed by the similar manner.²¹ Thus, there can be a criticism that if I introduce the causal relation into the order of the narrative form, any experiences would be automatically arranged, so there is no room for human intention in actions. I insist that this problem results from the different notions of causality between philosophical literature and narrative theory, and I will discuss this issue in 2.5. The narrative account of a person is thus the work by which an intelligible explanation between events is produced with the reference to one's own life-story.

Second, although the narrative understanding of experiences serves to form the unity of personal identity, I wonder if there is a minimum to this understanding when dealing with our experiences. I will focus on this question through observation of

¹⁹ MacIntyre (1984 p. 218).

²⁰ MacIntyre (1984 p. 208), Ricoeur (1984, p. 53), Wollheim (1980).

²¹ For instance, John Stuart Mill's defines causation as 'the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which [a given phenomenon] is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent.' (1874, p. 245).

experiences that seem to escape the consistency of the narrative form. We first look at psychological instances that cannot be expressed in the existing form of narrative. I also mention Lyotard's discussion of narrative in which he argues that there are elements that cannot be located in the organisation of society. He calls these 'residues,' which do not belong to the unity of life but slip through.²² I interpret residues as factors that reveal the minimum of the narrative approach for organising experience, because their very existence indicates that there are some things that cannot be explained by that approach. This view will finally bring about the discrediting of the idea that individuals are unified beings.

In chapter three, we will consider if the concept of identity is historically transformable. If the necessity of the unity of a person, which is the basis of the narrative approach to the concept of personal identity, is doubtful, it is worth considering the background against which the ideal has been fostered. Since if it is grounded in particular socio-cultural conditions in a certain age, it might reach the point at which its adequacy should be reconsidered. We will thus consider the period from which the study of personal identity arose, and the period before and after that. I count the media as methods of keeping and exchanging knowledge in a society, and assume that changes in these methods must have an influence on what concept people have of a person, society, and knowledge at a particular time. As Friedrich Kittler states in his research into modern media, 'Media determine our situations, which – in spite or because of it – deserves a description,' so examining the influence of the media will be

²² Similar to the case of differences, 'residue' is also used in several meanings in postmodern thought. Although some uses seem to influence each other, I here focus on Lyotard's use of this term. For another discussion, for instance, see Lacan's idea of the residue in relation to desire (2001, 'The Freudian Thing').

help us to contemplate what concept people have had of the identity of a person.²³ I divide media history into four parts; the medium of oral, the medium of writing, the medium of printing, and electric and/or electronic media, and consider the concept of 'identity' in the era of each medium.

The following is an outline of media history and its relation to identity. In the media of oral and writing, although there were indications of personal identity, people could not become aware of this issue by themselves. The distance between people and their community was too close to generate the awareness of the inner-self through which a sense of independence and self-consciousness is established. Therefore, I define the age in which the first discussions of personal identity appeared as in the late seventeenth century, especially from the time of the publication of the work of John Locke. In this period, people were encouraged to acquire a sense of individuality, which is powerfully represented by the spirit of the Enlightenment. The medium of printing is thought to have been helpful in expanding that sense. The concept of personal identity has developed on this foundation, so it is essentially rooted in what people regarded as the conditions of a person from the modern era onwards.

This modern idea certainly laid the groundwork for the development of current Western societies, nevertheless, their credibility has started to be doubted in the age of electric and/or electronic media. I call that period the 'postmodern,' but the term needs to be defined. Hence, I will devote chapter four to examining the characteristics of the postmodern, and discuss particularities of the concept of identity today in chapter five. I use 'postmodern' as a general term that represents socio-cultural conditions somehow beyond the scope of the modern, roughly starting from the latter half of the twentieth

²³ Kittler (1999, p. xxxix).

century. I examine the characteristics of the postmodern mostly using Lyotard's ideas, because the relation between narrative, technology, and the concept of a person is eagerly analysed in his thought.

In Lyotard's idea, his term 'meta-narratives' is compared with the modern, and 'little narratives' are the postmodern. Their comparison is also found in his use of the narrative (which refers to the modern) and phrases (the postmodern). The narrative understanding of personal identity is studied in chapter three, so I shall discuss the work of phrases in relation to the concept of personal identity in this chapter. A person on the postmodern understanding tends to be reduced to transient actions at a particular moment rather than regarded as an agency that undertakes the whole life story. I surmise that this postmodern understanding of a person is comparable to Lyotard's notion of the linkage of phrases. In his opinion, every action can be described as a phrase, and how to link to another phrase. This is a great concern for us. I contrast phrases, which are short and temporal expressions of experiences, to narrative, which is a comparatively unified and structured story, in order to depict today's features of a person.

In addition, Lyotard also mentions the status of general knowledge in comparison with the modern and the postmodern, and I define that type of knowledge as classics and feature its particularities. Those ideas, the postmodern, the modern, and the classics, are first examined in the context of periodical events, but Lyotard stresses them as different movements of thought as well. We finally analyse them in the context of the non-chronological order, and seek their differences in their own legitimacy. The main topics in chapter four are twofold; one is the conflict between the modern and the postmodern, and the other is doubt about the concept of a person and identity as a unified existence.

In the final chapter, I deal with electronic media as an example of persons as more dissolved and multiple, in the present era. Today people interact with each other through highly computerised media in which they usually do not know others' conditions in the actual world. This invisibility and the abstract relation are supposed to promote the differences of a person more than before. In this new technology, people are often described as spaces to which messages are sent and forwarded again. This kind of view is specifically found in recent studies including works by Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Lyotard. I pick up their notion of a person and try to put across their thoughts on the point of identity and differences. In relation to the concept of identity in the postmodern age, we also ask what the significant problem would be if the modern concept of personal identity collapses. This is converted into the enquiry into whether we can understand responsibility for others without using that concept. Derek Parfit's construal of personal identity will be suggestive in deliberating this problem, though again, I will not enter into the traditional debate over the investigation of the criteria of personal identity.

I conclude that the concept of personal identity is not an absolutely universal idea through all spatio-temporal conditions, but it is rather a periodical notion that arose in early modern times in Western traditions. According to the decline of the modern, the concept of personal identity also faces dissolution. The modern understanding of a person was once effective in maintaining society, but it may have arrived at its limitation and we have already met the need to reconsider its credibility. The target of our criticism is so to speak the modern concept of personal identity, in which a person is regarded as an existence that manages life stages with reason and intelligence. This view is cast into doubt by the postmodern, in which the integration of a person becomes

weak, but differences, which escape from the consistency of the unity of narrative, act in a more lively way.

I undertake to depict the matter of identity and differences of a person from several angles concerned with the reconstruction of memory, narrative, media history, and the postmodern. 'Personal identity' is a curious word. It already includes questions as to what a person, identity, and personal identity is. We will consider these problems specifically from the side of personal identity, and the advent of that concept and its collapse are sought in this thesis.

Chapter 1

MEMORY

The Reconstruction of Memory and Personal Identity

1.1 Without Memory, No Personal Identity

One evening a boy of five years had already lain down on his bed. His father came to say good night and meanwhile told of the death of his cousin. The cousin was a grown man who had a distant relationship to the little boy. His father explained the cause, which was a heart attack, and answered his questions with details. At that time the boy had not fully understood the explanation and the meaning of the comparatively unusual attitude of his father, but later he thought that the picture of his room and bed must have been engraved in his mind on that evening. He remembered them when he was in his adulthood, when he knew the real name of cousin's illness, which was syphilis.

This episode comes from Walter Benjamin's memory of his childhood in Berlin. The interesting point in this story is that the memory of his room and bed was assumed not really to have had any impact on the evening concerned but they were stored in his mind. They were vividly recalled later, when he learned the actual cause of his cousin's death and why his father had hidden it from the little boy. Whilst Benjamin did not know of his father's deception, he may not have had any special impression of his cousin's death, but that episode became a distinctive memory when he knew the exact

name of the illness.

We can see two steps in Benjamin's episode. One is when he first heard the news in his childhood, and the other is when he recalled his memory of the evening with a new understanding of the event. Although the boy did not take in much of the meaning of his father's explanation, he memorised his room and bed that evening in 'the way you observe with great precision a place when you feel dimly that you'll later have to search for something you've forgotten there'.²⁴ That memory was recalled later and his room and bed were given a special significance at that later time, not at the time when Benjamin, in his room, had only vaguely felt something strange. The first episode is given significance by the later experience and its meaning is modified by the impact of remembering. This is the reason why I quote this episode here. It depicts the way in which our memory is affected by our new understanding and reconstructed from the present point of view. Since, if Benjamin did not know the cause of the death, his memory of that night would not be worth writing about for him.

There are two assumptions in this chapter. First, I propose the idea that the work of remembering is a fundamental condition for forming our concept of personal identity. No past means no personal identity: If we did not remember anything, to begin with the continuity of a person over time would not become a question, because that notion could not be one we were conscious of. Remembering the past is essential to this point. Any question about personal identity, particularly based on the first person's viewpoint, begins from the premise that we possess the past to some degree.

Second, it is assumed that whilst remembering is the method by which we grasp our past, what we evoke are not events that were once perceived, but events which are

²⁴ Benjamin (2002, p. 635).

recalled later, possibly with some modification. In general, people tend to believe that the past is a collection of fixed events which are recalled exactly as they were. However, as Benjamin's case indicates, I assume that the past is always influenced by the later understanding.²⁵ We may add more information to an event that was not known when it happened, or a change in our thought may give a new interpretation to an event, so the remembrance can be transformed by the way we see things. The past is not static but dynamic, and this is the basic view of memory in this thesis.²⁶ We shall call the act which revises past events from a particular person's perspective the 'reconstruction of memory,' and pursue the relation between that act and the concept of personal identity.

A brief view of this chapter is as follows: we will first consider the issue of perspective that we have when our remembering is recalled. It is an assumption that memory is not recalled from an absolutely neutral position but recalled from a specific view of that person at that time. In that section of perspective (1.2.), I propose my basic understanding of a relation between memory and the concept of personal identity. However, the view is not on the side of traditional discussion of personal identity, and we will see those differences next.

Indeed, this point should be made clear before starting a discussion of memory, or otherwise it may lead to unnecessary confusion. Thus, I shall give an account of this

²⁵ There is an opinion that memory, or at least some types of memory, is recalled without reconstruction (e.g., Ehrenberg, Barnard, and Scriven, 1998, Bettman, 1979). In addition, in psychology, flashback memory is defined as memory which is 'very hard to restructure' (Robinson, 1995, p. 207). Although I do not deny the existence of that type of memory, I do not deal with it here. On the types of memory which are treated in this thesis, see Section five of this chapter.

²⁶ From a neuroscientific perspective, Gerald M. Edelman's 'Theory of Neuronal Group Selection' is suggestive of this point: 'Recall is not stereotypic. Under the influence of continually changing contexts it changes, as the structure and dynamics of the neural populations involved in the original categorization also change.' (1992, p. 102). See also, Bartlett (1932).

view here. Philosophical arguments concerning personal identity often discuss the investigation of the criterion in which personal identity consists. There are various discussions in this area, and according to this tradition, it may be expected that I will talk about the psychological criterion of personal identity. However, that type of discussion is not my intention, or at least, not a discussion that seeks the criterion of personal identity. I ought to offer a reason for this avoidance. In order to explain, it is necessary to mention that I regard personal identity as the framework of experiences that is organised from a person's perspective. Having elucidated this view, I will briefly outline the traditional arguments about personal identity, and compare them to my view for the sake of examining the differences between them.

After we have confirmed that point, we will move to an analysis of memory in which its role and types are determined. Our basic view is that the framework of personal identity is formed through the reconstruction of memory, so our understanding of experiences is not fixed but more transformable. In the latter half of this chapter, I will cite examples of this notion, and demonstrate the method by which the reconstruction of memory works to form our concept of personal identity. The necessity of memory and the transformability of that memory are thus main targets in our discussion hereafter.

1.2. The Matter of Perspective

The traditional discussions of personal identity can be condensed into a question about the continuity of a person over time. In other words, philosophers have sought the criterion by which person P1 at time t1 and person P2 at time t2 can be counted as the same person.²⁷ The interesting point in this question is that we compare two possibly identical subjects in order to examine the continuity of a person, so we assume that the subjects may contain some differences that cannot be fully identical.²⁸

How can more or less different subjects be identical with each other? I will consider this problem by means of the idea of understanding the past from one's own perspective. First, we shall examine the way in which the traditional study of personal identity deals with this matter, and then move to the issue of perspective. The discussion of differences between the identity of a person and the identity of things will be an adequate way into this topic.

The strictest theory of the sameness of things is proposed by Joseph Butler in his criticism of Locke's opinion. That is presented by the example of a tree at different times: Tree X2 fifty years ago and tree X1 at present neither show the same appearance nor possess the same particles, so in what sense can we say they are the same tree? Butler's conclusion is that 'in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, nor any thing, can be the same with that, with which it hath

²⁷ For example, Noonan summarises this issue: 'The problem of personal identity over time is the problem of giving an account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at another' (2003, p. 2).

²⁸ It may evoke a Humean view in which the unity of a person is reduced to a bundle of perceptions. A revised and recent version of the Humean view is found in Derek Parfit's discussion of personal identity that will be mentioned in chapter five.

indeed nothing the same'.²⁹ An absolutely same thing does not have any 'identical' object, because it exists only at one moment in three dimensions, so apart from at that moment there is nothing to be identical with it (though whether or not we can grasp 'the moment' is another issue). Butler uses this tree-problem to argue that personal identity includes the identity of substance that is somewhat inscrutable in Lockean terms.

This problem is partly explained by Thomas Reid. He makes a distinction between the identity of a person and the identity of a thing, and determines that the latter variety is not 'perfect' identity but that we for the convenience of speech call it identity: Identity of things can allow subjects to include a great change, and 'the changes which in common language are made consistent with identity differ from those that are thought to destroy it, not in kind, but in number and degree. It has no fixed nature when applied to bodies'.³⁰ Things can change in kind but not in number and degree, and if we introduced this definition of identity, differences of a thing would be explained as changes in its kind within a permissible range.³¹

Up to now, Reid's discussion designates a promising direction for the view presented in this thesis, but he asserts that the identity of a person is perfect identity, so 'wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a *monad*, and is not divisible into parts'.³² It is clear that the unity of a person cannot be dispersed in his thought, and this is also what Butler concludes; personal identity is beyond the succession of materials. Reid can explain the changes of things by the inclusion of changes in the concept of identity, but he refuses to include change in the concept of personal identity.

²⁹ Butler (1975, p. 101).

³⁰ Reid (2002, pp. 266-267).

³¹ For a similar view of the identity of things, see Swinburne (1984).

³² Ibid.,

Personal identity in this view is indivisible, and 'personal identity is somehow more real or genuine than the identity of other things,' as Noonan puts it in his study of Butler, Reid, and Shoemaker.³³ I part from Butler and Reid when they start analysing personal identity. I do not take the position that personal identity is an immaculate and invariable existence. I insist that its concept can admit changes. I search for the ground of my insistence in the matter of perspective.

When we look back over our past, we grasp our experiences from the current understanding. This makes a relation between them, and I suppose this is the time at which the framework of personal identity is formed. The experiences are not identical with each other, but they are elements that form our concept of personal identity through making that network. To recall memories is to make a certain connection between them, and different aspects of temporally distant subjects are resolved in this act. This notion will be made more understandable if we refer to the 'unity relation' suggested by John Perry, which also deals with the problem of personal identity in relation to experiences.

To explain the 'unity relation,' Perry uses an instance of a man who does not know the rules of baseball at all. If the man went to a ground in which several games are simultaneously being played, he may not be able to distinguish which event belongs to which game, or even how many games are being played on the ground. He might think that to hit a ball and to tread on the base are different events in different games, or that events in three games are a set of plays in one game. However, if he learns the conditions of a baseball game, he would know which event belongs to which game, and would say 'this action and that action are events which happened in the same game.' This relation, in which two or more events are categorised in the same framework, is

³³ Noonan (2003, p. 63).

called the 'unity relation'. Therefore, although baseball events belonging to one game are mostly dissimilar to each other (throwing a ball, hitting a ball, running to a base, changing the position from batting to fielding), they are regarded as in the unity relation in the same game.³⁴

Perry applies the unity relation to the study of personal identity. He supposes that a theory of personal identity is answering the questions; what relation is obtained between simultaneous person-events (and person-stages) that are events (and stages) belonging to the same person?³⁵ According to him, the answer is the unity relation; if and only if the person to whom event/stage A belongs is the same person as the person to whom event/stage B belongs, A has the unity relation to B. A and B are not identical but the unity relation obtains between them in the framework of a person, in a 'personal history' Perry says. For instance, a newly-married man, we shall call him P, and a widower, P', are not identical in their status, but if the unity relation can be made between P and P' in one's personal history, P and P' are regarded as the same person. Furthermore, the unity relation cannot obtain between that person's personal history and events in it. The events of A and B are elements that form the framework of P's personal identity, but they are not the same as the framework itself. Thus on this theory, even if A and B were not exactly the same, identity of a subject would be able to be kept.

Perry pays attention to the relation between elements belonging to a person, and differences between elements are supposed to be settled in the framework of identity. He makes an interesting suggestion concerning the study of personal identity. I adopt his

³⁴ Perry describes the unity relation thus, 'E [event] has R [relation] to E' [event] if and only if the game in which E is an event is the *same baseball game as* the game in which E' is an event. I shall call R the unity relation for baseball games' (1975, p. 9).

³⁵ A person-stage is defined as a set containing all and only those person-events which belong to a given person at a given time (Ibid., pp. 9-11).

thought except for one point, which is the matter of perspective. In his theory, each event is dealt with non-perspectively, or in his words, events can be described 'tenselessly'. This term, 'tenseless,' is used in Perry's criticism of Butler's tree-problem that we saw above. Perry re-describes Butler's tree-problem, suggesting that both trees 'have "tenselessly" the property of being large *in 1972*, and of being small *in 1920*'.³⁶ In the history of the tree, the tree has these tenseless properties, and nothing is lost or gained in terms of the properties on this view. Thus, the small tree and the tall tree can be identical with each other.

This seems to be a persuasive explanation of the identification of events, but I wonder from which point of view this relation is formed. Our discussion concentrates upon the issue of personal identity, so we will replace this tree problem with a human case. A woman who is now seventy was once six-years-old, and in Perry's opinion, the old woman and the girl must have tenselessly the property of being six-years-old and of being seventy-years-old. However, I would insist that the relation between the old woman and the girl only arises when these subjects are compared from one perspective. When I recall my past, this *I* stands at a peculiar position and the past is evoked from this position. In the example of the little girl and the old woman, we can compare the time when she is six-years-old and the time when she is seventy-years-old, because the woman survives until the age of seventy.

From the first person perspective, the position in which she is seventy must be considered distinctive, because from the little girl's point of view, the perspective of being seventy cannot be obtained but only from that of the old woman. The girl may dimly imagine her old age, but the girl's framework cannot be the same as that produced

³⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

later by the old woman. Even though she has the property of being a little girl and being an old woman, the perspective that includes both conditions would not be possessed until she becomes seventy.

Thus, the view in which both ages are included is not tenseless but only belongs to the later perspective. As a matter of physical properties, a little girl may genetically possess the possibility of being the old lady, but it is only one possibility (for example, she might die in an accident before being seventy). Moreover, as a matter of the network of experiences, the understanding of the six-year-old girl can change, for instance, between her twenties and her seventies. The young woman may think that her childhood was miserable because of the lack of her mother's love, and that she was a thin and drawn child. Later, she finds that her mother actually loved her very much, but that there was misunderstanding between them. In her seventies, she may think she was brought up in a good environment, and that she was not awfully skinny but just undersized for her age. The account of one's life stages is thus transformable, dependent upon the position at which we locate the perspective.

To tell a life story is to reconstruct past experiences from one person's perspective, and this perspective is crucial for personal identity. The concept of personal identity in this notion is fluid depending upon the construction of events at one time, so it is not a concept that exists apart from one's own personal history but rather a concept that is generated from the interaction between experiences and the network of experiences. Therefore, I insist that personal identity is not a fixed concept but is always under construction, and due to this understanding I do not side with Butler and Reid. I regard personal identity not as monadic but as that which arises when events are grasped from one's own perspective. In addition, an absolutely neutral position is not obtained in a

personal history for we always occupy a specific position in our lives. From this viewpoint, the framework of personal identity is also thought not to be tenseless.

This is the basic view of personal identity in this thesis. I try to describe the method by which we can, by ourselves, give an explanation to our own continuity over time. That explanation covers experiences at different times, so the work of memory is inseparable from this concept. Does this view appear to be a sort of psychological criterion of personal identity? My opinion is that it is not. We shall refer to criteria-arguments in the study of personal identity, and consider the dissimilarity between these arguments and ours.

1.3. Three accounts of the Criterion of Personal Identity

I should make clear that the issue which will be focused upon in this thesis does not assume the psychological criterion of personal identity, much less the physical criterion. In order to confirm this point, we shall first observe typical issues in criteria-arguments in philosophy, and compare those to the view of personal identity in this thesis. I understand that criteria-arguments with regards to personal identity start with John Locke's discussion, so we will mention theories which arose after the late seventeenth century and will not include pioneering works in this discussion.³⁷

There are representatively three criteria of personal identity in the philosophical literature. They are the so-called physical criterion, psychological criterion, and value

³⁷ I mention the rise of the modern discussion of personal identity in chapter three.

theory. These are also divided into a number of branch theories and puzzle cases. On the physical criterion, the identity of a person is thought to be attributed to physical continuity. The bodily criterion is one of the accounts in which it is suggested that the continuity of our bodies is a necessary and sufficient condition for explaining in what personal identity consists. This may appeal to our ordinary understanding of personal identity, but even if we were to lose part of our body, it would not mean that we lose our personal identity. If the amputation of a leg does not affect our concept of personal identity, how is the body concerned with the continuity of a person? In a thought experiment, the bodily criterion is, for example, questioned in this way; if person A's brain is exchanged for person B's, which one we shall call A, A's body with B's brain or B's body with A's brain?³⁸ Most modern philosophers appear to accept that we should regard a person who has B's body with A's brain as A, and A's body with B's brain as B. The continuity of the body is not looked upon as essential for personal identity, and so the bodily criterion is rejected. This rejection, nonetheless, introduces an argument for another physical criterion, which is the brain criterion; can we regard the continuity of a brain as the criterion of personal identity?

Our brain seems to occupy a special position for our understanding of a person. We feel that the brain is not exchangeable, because our personality is supposed to rely on it. There are accounts which support the brain criterion as at least a necessary condition of personal identity,³⁹ but philosophers have produced a number of puzzle cases against these accounts: Our brain has a left hemisphere and a right hemisphere which are connected with a bundle of fibres. However, division of the corpus callosum,

³⁸ This is a simplified version of Sydney Shoemaker's discussion of personal identity, the Brown/Brownson problem (1963, pp. 23-24).

³⁹ Bernard Williams (1970), Nagel (1971).

cutting of the brain fibres, is used as a treatment for epileptics. In an experiment, some patients whose fibres were cut behaved as if they had different consciousnesses in each hemisphere; 'each hemisphere seems to have its own separate and private sensations...its own separate chain of memories that are rendered inaccessible to the recall processes of the other.'⁴⁰ This case may imply that both hemispheres are not always necessary for our subsistence, so consequently, some researchers argue that the continuity of the whole brain is not a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity.

Further, although this problem can be re-described as to which part of the brain is necessary for personal identity, we still face puzzle cases. If one's brain is divided into two pieces and put in different bodies, what kind of relationship will there be between the original person and the later persons? If all information was extracted from A and B's brains and their brains were wiped of all memory, and then A's information was placed in B's brain and B's information was in A's brain, the continuity of the brain would be broken off but information would be kept.⁴¹ If these thought experiments are worth considering, we would need to rethink the validity of the brain criterion in accordance with these puzzles.

The latter example, in which personal information would be kept even though the brain's continuity was broken, also relates to another account, which is the psychological criterion. On this theory the continuity of psychological factors is examined to see whether it can be the necessary and sufficient condition of the continuity of a person. The role of memory is discussed most in this account. A simple

⁴⁰ Sperry (1968, p. 724).

⁴¹ Bernard Williams (1970).

version of the memory criterion is that the continuity of person P1 and P2 at different times can be confirmed if and only if P1 possesses memory which is had by P2. This type of discussion began with Locke and various counterarguments and revised versions of Locke's theory have arisen. One popular counterargument is that because we cannot remember every experience which we have had, the continuity of all memory is impossible. Imagine that person P1 has a memory of experience X, and person P2 has memory of experience X and Y, and person P3 has memory of experience Y and Z. P1 and P2 remember the experience X and P2 and P3 remember the experience Y, so these two pairs can be identical, but P1 and P3 are not. Accordingly, P1 and P2 are regarded as the same person and P2 and P3 are also the same, but P1 and P3 are not.⁴²

As a solution to this problem, a distinction between psychological continuity and psychological connectedness is introduced. Psychological connectedness is the direct connection of memories between temporally distant subjects, and psychological continuity is the overlapping chains of direct memories. We do not need to remember everything that happened before in this version. P2 at t2 and P1 at t1 can be regarded as the same person if and only if P2 at t2 is linked by continuity of memory to P1 at t1.⁴³ Questions about this account have, as for the other criteria, arisen. One such question arises from the fission case .

The fission case demonstrates the possibility that two or more subsequent persons might have a psychological relation to one original person. The divided brain case which I mentioned above is an example of this kind of account. Another puzzle case is, for example, described thus: If the whole physical data of a person is copied and

⁴² See Thomas Reid's Brave Officer Paradox (2002, pp. 262-266).

⁴³ Noonan (2003, pp. 9-10).

reproduced, which one would have the right claim to be the original, one of them, both of them, or none of them? A number of interpretations of the fission case are discussed in considerations of the psychological criterion, but I will not enumerate them here.⁴⁴ Instead, we will turn to another account which analyses this issue from a different angle from that of the physical and psychological criterion. This is the third account of personal identity, so-called value theory.

Value theory is concerned with personal identity's significance for us, with our survival, ethics, and welfare.⁴⁵ It is a recent movement in the study of personal identity, developed mainly by Derek Parfit. He propagates his radical conclusion that personal identity is not what matters to survival. Basically, we presuppose that the continuity of our own existence and welfare is the most urgent matter for us. Parfit denies this. He insists that the continuity of our own existence is not important, but that the existence of those people who have psychological links to us in the future is weighty for us. After our death, nobody will be us, and no chain of direct experiences as we have now will exist, but 'some of these future experiences may be related to my present experiences in a less direct way.' I will not have any direct relation to anyone after my death, but I will have various relationships to others. My death will not destroy all sorts of relationship to others in the future, but is the destruction of such relationships. Thus, my death is described: 'there will be no one living who will be me.'⁴⁶ The value theory indicates the advantage of changing our view of personal identity not as an essentially necessary

⁴⁴ As the paper that comprehensively discusses the fission case, I cite Parfit's *Reasons and Persons*, especially Part Three (1984).

⁴⁵ What I have called 'value theory' is also called some other name, for example, the Determinacy Thesis (Noonan, 2003, p. 17). Whatever its name, the discussion of personal identity concerned with its value for our survival I call the value theory in this thesis.

⁴⁶ Parfit (1984, p. 281).

concept for our existence. Although there are arguments both for and against Parfit's opinion, it is certain that a new type of discussion is introduced by value theory.⁴⁷

Additionally, it is true that philosophical considerations of personal identity are not only reduced to those three patterns but are researched from various angles. In logic, it is concerned with the status of 'is'; the conditions on which a thing can be described 'A is A'. In some political theory, it is dealt with as the problem of how we are taught to identify ourselves with images that are established in the existing social system. Although I do not directly debate these aspects of identity, their purport can be linked to our discussion to some extent. For instance, Gillian Howie focuses upon the intersection between representation and identity, and examines its meaning in terms of three functions of identity; the logical principle of simple identity; its role within judgement; and its epistemological function.⁴⁸ This approach treats the matter of identity more inclusively than the discussion in this thesis, but this intersection does relate to the issue discussed here. We will later search for the point at which the narrative approach to the concept of personal identity reaches its limits. In Howie's argument this limit is described as the 'insufficiency, or inadequacy, of any given identification'. This suggests the idea that 'the object will not be in an identical relationship with its concept'.⁴⁹ That implies that things may not be fully identified with their representation, so that the work of identification is to some extent insufficient. I will also focus on this point, particularly in chapter five, but it is too early to discuss the

⁴⁷ We will consider the role of morality in Parfit's discussion in chapter five as well.

⁴⁸ More precisely, Howie defines these three functions as: 'its formal function as the logical principle of simple identity; its role within judgement (which is the subject's attempt to identify what a thing, identical to itself, is); and finally an epistemological function, where by the identification of a thing occurs but only through its concept' (2003, p. 168).

⁴⁹ Howie (2003, p. 168).

matter here, so we shall omit this issue at present.

We have briefly reviewed the kind of issues that are discussed in the study of personal identity. It seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions by which the continuity of a person over time is logically determined. The first two criterion, the physical and psychological, are concerned with the formulation of such conditions, and value theory presents questions about the relevance of investigating the criterion. I appreciate the achievement of these studies, but I do not attempt to answer the criteria-problem of personal identity: I do not ask what personal identity necessarily and sufficiently consists in, but ask from what operation our concept of personal identity arises. A concise answer is memory, because the study of personal identity presupposes time distance, and we need memory to examine subjects at different periods of time. In not intending to be involved in criteria-arguments and stressing the work of memory, my position is close to Richard Wollheim's: 'Mental connectedness is indicative of personal identity because it is creative of it.'⁵⁰ It is creative, because experiences are re-understood by the operation of reconstruction.

We need to remember the past in order to form the framework of personal identity, and I would like to discuss this remembrance. This notion of memory is probably a minimum condition required in order to produce the framework of personal identity. In an extreme case, if we only remember anything occurring within thirty seconds, the notion of our continuity would not be the same as the one that we possess. The criteria-arguments are, that is to say, the further study that defines the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity. I deal with remembrance as the work of recalling and

⁵⁰ Wollheim (1980, p. 305). However, when Wollheim insists on the necessity of the unity of a person for forming personal identity, we need to reconsider that necessity. We will return to this topic in the latter half of chapter two onward.

reconstructing one's own experience according to the network of other experiences, and this notion does not fit into the place of memory in the psychological criterion. There, memory is one of the psychological factors that is inspected to see if it can be the criterion of personal identity. Hence, the work of remembering and to explain this remembrance does not really become a question in that study, but they are the concerns of our discussion. I consider the method by which we describe ourselves in accordance with our memory, but how to describe oneself is usually not the great issue of traditional psychological criteria-arguments.⁵¹

The meaning of 'memory' is thus not the same in the criteria-arguments and the discussion in this thesis. I do not place memory on the same level as other psychological factors such as will, desire, and aim, but look upon it as basic in order to give any account of the continuity of a person. For this reason, I deny the view that this discussion belongs with the psychological criteria-arguments, and the physical criteria-arguments are also rejected in the same manner. The value theory attacks the necessity of personal identity for our survival, so it is also not suitable for the consideration of the reconstruction of memory. I do not claim that personal identity does not matter, at least in the present argument. I will consider the minimum of the concept of personal identity in the latter half of this thesis, and that discussion might bear some similarity to value theory. I will not therefore attempt to refute that view, but I stress again that our discussion does not belong with the criteria-arguments.

In this difference between the concept of personal identity and the criteria-

⁵¹ There may be a counterargument that although I presuppose the work of remembering, children need to 'learn' the use of the past tense, so the sense of the past is not naturally established but the result of education. It may lead to an interesting point, but as I mentioned in Introduction, I do not intend to argue the identity of children, so I shall leave this issue to further study.

arguments, the former might seem to refer to a sort of personhood, which is, simply to say, a manner of viewing oneself, to some extent, as a unitary person. It will be helpful to consider what kind of relation we can find of the sense of personhood to the concept of personal identity, so we examine this point in the end of this section. Personhood holds various characteristics in its use such as the matter of agency, of rationality, of emotion, of self-consciousness, and so on. I use this term as the sense through which a person establishes a feeling of who he or she is, especially as a continuous being over time. Schechtman describes this type of personhood thus: 'Thinking of oneself as persisting through time and of the different temporal parts of one's existence as being mutually influential is a minimal requirement of the state we call personhood.'⁵² This sense may appear to show similarity to the concept of personal identity as a way to understand the existence of one's self, but I do not intend to include one with the other. I propose three conceptions here; the criteria-arguments of personal identity, the concept of personal identity, and the sense of personhood. We shall next see the distinction between them, and clarify the characteristics of the concept of personal identity further.

In the three terms, the difference between the criteria-arguments and the sense of personhood is obvious. As we have seen here, the former asks the question of what are the sufficient and enough conditions to make a person at time₂ the same one as a person at time₁, but the latter does not ask such criteria-problems. It is however the sense by which a person realises as that person through life. The study which asks sufficient and enough conditions is usually not the issue for that sense, but circumstances by which the person is surrounded, and particularities of the sense in specific circumstances (e.g.,

⁵² Schechtman (1996, p. 102).

society, culture, under oppressive situations, and so on), are more discussed.⁵³ This interference of external factors can be a fundamental distinction between that sense and the criteria-arguments.

Then, in the case of the concept of personal identity, we have just observed its difference from the criteria-arguments in the above section. I shall stress the point again that the study of personal identity already holds the conception of a person in its basis. I assume that if the conception were permanent in any spatio-temporal condition, the concept of personal identity would not become a question. Nonetheless, it is my insistence that the conception is not stabilised between exceedingly different conditions. For instance, Taylor refers to a possibly different view of a person between a Homeric description and ours: A hero in the Homeric world seems to behave with the 'greatest heights of action' as well as making 'some of his great mistakes.' His behaviour may appear to be in confusion in today's sense as a single agent, but 'contrary to our modern intuitions, this doesn't seem to lessen the merit or demerit attached to the agent.'⁵⁴ His sublimity and insanity are convincing characters as a great hero who is chosen by a god in a Homeric sense even though we may see the hero's follies as his blemish. I cite that as an example that a general view, shows that what a person should be, is transformable between greatly different situations. This inclusion of the changes, by which the understanding of a person may alter, is a characteristic of the concept of personal identity compared to the criteria-arguments.

⁵³ The following opinion that is made by Bernard Williams can be interpreted as an indication of this sense of personhood: '[H]uman beings have an inconstant mental constitution that needs to be steadied by society and interaction with other people. Different people, and people in different circumstances, are steadied by these forces to a greater or lesser degree' (2002, p. 191).

⁵⁴ 'To the modern, this fragmentation, and the seeming confusion about merit and responsibility, are very puzzling' (118).

The above mentioned features of the concept of personal identity might seem to overlap with the sense of personhood, so we consider their distinction now. I determine that having the sense of personhood means obtaining a particular understanding of one's self, and this sense is largely cultivated in accordance with the circumstances, of the common sense of belonging within a community. Namely, since the sense of personhood is a sort of practical sense, people who live in those circumstances do not suspect its legitimacy. On the contrary to that sense, what I propose by the concept of personal identity is a question about such unconditional belief of the understanding of a person. One of my aims is to investigate particularities of the concept of personal identity in different situations, so the legitimacy of the sense of personhood is questioned in that study. This doubt of presumption that people have of their existence in society is a distinctive point between the concept of personal identity and the sense of personhood.

To mention the plan in this thesis in advance, we will deal with historical transformations of the concept of personal identity from chapter three onwards. That transformation is supposed to be influenced by the way in which people understand their existence at that time, in other words, what type of personhood they hold. In this manner, the concept of personal identity and the sense of personhood are somehow interactive, and I will use the term, the sense of personhood, when I refer to a common understanding of a person. However, I should make clear the point that the main issue in this thesis is conditions and transformations of the concept of personal identity, and that concept is not reduced to the sense of personhood.

If this insistence, that criteria-arguments are not the exact issue in this thesis, is acceptable, we shall move to the consideration of the reconstruction of memory. The

work of memory is crucial for this topic, so I first emphasise the relation between the work of memory and personal identity, and clarify the types of memory that we deal with. Then, we will examine the way that the reconstruction of memory is performed in order to form the framework of personal identity.

1.4. Our Use of Memory Concerned with Personal Identity

As I pointed out before, in the study of personal identity we compare subjects at different times in order to consider their identity. In this comparison, at least one of the subjects is in the past (or in the imagined future), because things which exist at the same time in different places are not physically the same. I believe that the moment at which we perceive something and the moment that we envisage the past do not involve the same operation. Thus, the things which are not experienced at the moment must be recalled from our memory.

The work of memory, by which things that we do not face at present are recalled, has been considered by a number of philosophers from several angles.⁵⁵ Bertrand Russell also pays attention to the impossibility of having past and present sensations at once: 'How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past sensation? ... We think we can know that they are alike or different, but we cannot bring them together in one experience and compare them.' Even though we can think of features of subjects in the past and at present, it does not mean that the subjects are

⁵⁵ E.g., William James (1890), Bergson (1911), Ryle (1949).

presented now, but we have to use our memory. Russell concludes, 'everything constituting a memory-belief is happening *now*, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer'.⁵⁶ This recollection of memory is often discussed in psychology as well, for example, Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides write, 'Remembering an experience involves reunderstanding that experience'.⁵⁷ These views advocate the idea that to recall the past is to re-interpret experiences from the present position. It happens 'now,' and we do not bring forward the shadow of the past by remembering but always re-describe it in accordance with the latest understanding of our lives.⁵⁸

For the relation between memory and personal identity, I cite two instances in which people have lost their memory but seem to keep personal identity. Oliver Sacks discusses his patient, Jimmy, who suffers amnesia and cannot remember recent events: 'whatever was said or shown or done to him was apt to be forgotten in a few seconds' time.'⁵⁹ Jimmy is a forty-nine-year-old, but his memory stopped at nineteen, and he could not keep his memory thereafter. Additionally, the film, *Memento*, though fictional, treats the same problem of memory-loss.⁶⁰ In each instance, although they do not possess constant memory, they appear not to doubt who they are, but feel that something is strange in their circumstances. These cases offer much to consider, but here I note only that they do not lose their entire memory but that there is a point from which they

⁵⁶ Russell (1951, p. 159).

⁵⁷ Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides (1986, p. 119). For more discussions in psychology, see Jenkins (1979, pp. 429-446), Tulving (1983), Brewer (1986).

⁵⁸ The sense of time has been a crucial issue from classical discussions of memory. Thus, for instance, Augustine depicts time and memory thus: 'there are three times; 'a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future' (1995).

⁵⁹ Sacks (1986, p. 25).

⁶⁰ After the hero had an accident, he could preserve his memory only for ten minutes, though his memory until before the accident was intact. Every morning he does not know where he is, and after running for more than ten minutes he starts wondering why he must run (*Memento*, 2000).

lose their memory. Therefore, they can manage a language, have common sense, and can communicate with others. They do not lack memory from the beginning of life, so even though their personal identity is somehow kept in those conditions, it does not count against this discussion. However, if their amnesia encroaches on every memory, I assume that they will not be able to manage their concept of personal identity through time.

In addition, as regards keeping information, I should indicate that the past is not only stored in our memory but there are a number of methods by which we refer to it. The oldest method is oral communication. Through talking to others, we refresh our remembering, correct our misunderstanding, or obtain new information which we did not know before. Expressions that refer to remembering are common ('Do you remember...?', 'I might have told this before, but...'), and we renew our memory in such daily conversation. Other methods are recorded media such as writing, pictures, photographs, tape and video tape recording, web sites, and so on. These media are popular today, and we repeatedly stimulate our memory through contact with them.

In this consideration, we should keep in mind that the use of recorded media is a historically new movement for ordinary people. Although it is certain that pictures and other artistic works were used for recording people's images, those who could use the media were limited to the higher classes for a long time. Writing was relatively widely utilised by a larger number of people earlier than most other media. We can, for instance, sketch a brief profile of an ordinary man in the eighteenth century by referring to his correspondence; he was a man who lived in France, was a bourgeois merchant, loved

reading, and was an ardent admirer of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.⁶¹ Nonetheless, writing was not frequently used for describing private lives until literacy obtained prevalence and writing tools were easily acquired. Personal things were recorded in the media only at special opportunities throughout history. Thus, the media have not been a receptacle for storing personal information for a long time.

However, the situation of recorded information has dramatically changed today. It may now be difficult to find people who have never made records in any medium in so-called post-industrial societies. In the case of photographs, the use of this medium has gradually increased since around the middle of the nineteenth century.⁶² A number of media, which people once needed special skills to operate, can be used by amateur people easily and cheaply in this century. We now live in a computerised society in which a variety of personal information is recorded second-by-second, as we use our credit cards, mobile phone, passport, and access the Internet. We are flooded with images made by the media more than ever before.

In this regard, the reconsideration of the work of the media may suggest interesting issues for our discussion. That will be the main topic of chapter three, so I only stress the following point here. Recorded information in the media certainly helps us to refresh our memory, but it does not become an element of personal identity until we locate it in the context of our lives. Recorded information is the data, and evaluation of it is still left to us. The mere data themselves cannot carry any personal significance. The recorded past shows us some details of the event, and when a person accepts and interprets that description along with other experiences, it becomes that individual's

⁶¹ Darnton (1984).

⁶² For example, see, Neuman (1996).

particular memory. Hence, the media only give the data and we need to locate it in our lives in order to make them elements of our identification through time. Memory on this conception is not the same as information stocked in the media, but it is supposed to work to interpret the meaning of events and to arrange them in accordance with one's own personal history. It is the particularity of memory compared to the media, which do not include any interpretation in the process of replay.

Although I refer to 'memory' without any qualification, it is classified into categories depending on its performance. Of the different works or performances of memory, psychology gives us a comparatively systematised definition. That categorisation is useful to understand types of memory that are concerned with the reconstruction of memory, so we will follow the relevant arguments in this field in the next section.

1.5. Types of Memory

I use 'memory' as a term to generalise our remembering, but if we turn our eyes to the study of memory, we see that it can be divided into several types. Some of them are concerned with the reconstruction of memory and others are not, so it will be useful to consider which types of memory we are discussing. There are a number of theories that define the types of memory, and not all researchers employ the same terminology. Thus, we need to specify the field that we consult, and I refer to the psychological categorisation of memory. The main reason for my choice of categorisation is that it

treats the types of memory comprehensively, we would like to obtain its inclusive view. This is an important point, because if I choose the term 'autobiographical memory' for our discussion, it may cover most areas of memory that are examined in this thesis, but I cannot mention those types of memory that I do not apply to the reconstruction of memory. I want to designate not only which memory is employed but also which memory is omitted. For this purpose, I reckon that a basic theory in psychology is useful for offering an outline of memory.

First, psychologists divide memory into two types, short-term memory, more recently called working memory, and long-term memory. This two component model is traceable to William James in 1890. He distinguishes between events which have just been experienced within seconds (he calls it primary memory) and events which are stored after the experiences and may be recalled later (secondary memory).⁶³ His component model has been influential in psychological discussions of memory with some modifications.⁶⁴

Short-term memory consists of two sub-categories, sensory registers and short-term storage. Information first stimulates sensory organs, and is stored in sensory memory in a few seconds.⁶⁵ The retained information is then forwarded to short-term memory, which temporarily stocks and recalls information. We use this capacity when we remember the spelling of a name, retain a telephone number while dialling, calculate

⁶³ William James (1891, chapter XVI).

⁶⁴ Waugh and Norman proposed the two-component model, which was an expansion of the original model of primary and secondary memory (1965, pp. 89-104). That model was developed by Atkinson and Shiffrin, who suggested three buffers of memory, sensory registers, short-term store, and long-term store.

⁶⁵ Gregg (1986, p. 91).

numbers, and understand the meaning of a word which consists of a number of letters.⁶⁶

This type of memory can be excluded from our discussion, since no reconstruction occurs at this stage. Further, the concept of personal identity presupposes continuous existences at different periods of time which are longer than a few seconds. From this point, we also conclude that working memory is not the ability which we discuss.

Any information which is stored longer than a few seconds is retained in long-term memory. Long-term memory is divided between procedural memory and declarative memory.⁶⁷ Procedural memory is related to our procedural actions, which are described as 'how to do' something. It is mostly linked to skills which are repeated almost automatically, (e.g., how to ride on a bicycle or how to play musical instruments), so this type of memory is hard to explain consciously. We also remove this from consideration, because it refers mostly to kinds of skill and is unrelated to reorganisation and re-interpretation of the past.

Declarative memory is the general term covering episodic memory and semantic memory.⁶⁸ All memories which are concerned with personal events, episodes, and phenomena are called episodic memory, in which 'personal experiences are not limited to externally observable events but include private events such as dreams, thinking through problems, and emotional experiences'.⁶⁹ Episodic memory refers to the capacity to remember one's personal and specific incidents.

⁶⁶ The capacity to store information is limited. According to Miller's experimentation, a typical adult can remember 7 – plus or minus 2 – items in the short-term stock. (1956, pp. 81-97). The capacity of the short-term store is also measured by a length of time, which is less than thirty seconds without rehearsal.

⁶⁷ Terms that are used in this section such as 'declarative' and 'semantic' follow a general psychological glossary, so they do not imply any particular grammatical or philosophical meanings.

⁶⁸ Tulving (1972).

⁶⁹ Gregg (1986, p. 24).

On the other hand, knowledge in connection with the world belongs to semantic memory. It does not need to relate to personal events but contains general knowledge. Languages, social rules, and historical events can be included in this type of memory. For example, the following concepts are representations of semantic memory: What is the capital of Peru?; What is a typical breakfast in Hong Kong?; Who was the first person to go to the moon? Semantic memory is encyclopaedic knowledge essentially connected with the use of language, and freely recalled without private experiences, though it does not exclude personal information. We cannot have memories of when we were born, but we know our date of birth because it is an objective event. In this case, the answer includes private information but is not a case of episodic memory but semantic memory.

In declarative memory, it is obvious that episodic memory is involved in the reconstruction of memory, because without any personal episodes we cannot construct and reconstruct our life story. Then, the question is whether or not semantic memory is concerned with the reconstruction of memory. I assume that semantic memory can be the target of our discussion, and the reason for this lies mostly in the difficulty faced in dividing semantic memory from episodic memory exactly. For instance, to answer the question 'how long does it take from here to city X by car?', some people may check the distance between two places and calculate the average time (using semantic memory), while other people may remember their experience of going to the city and reckon the time (using episodic memory). Then, if a person had both varieties of knowledge, the distance between two places and his or her own experience of going there, the division of these memories would become difficult. In another case, if your answer to the question 'where did you go on your summer holiday last year?' is 'I had a wonderful

time in the beautiful capital of Y country,' this answer contains both a private event and general knowledge of geography.⁷⁰

Therefore, episodic and semantic memory are considered to be concerned with the reconstruction of memory. We might not accept semantic memory unconditionally, because some such memories seem not to relate to the discussion of the reconstruction of memory.⁷¹ Nonetheless, there is a grey area in which we cannot definitely say whether this memory is episodic or semantic, and I only mention that on occasion even semantic memory can be reconstructed.⁷² Hence, for the above reason, I include semantic memory as a type of memory which can be concerned with reconstruction.

This understanding is, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, only one of the categorisations of memory popular in psychology, and there are other theories which sort types of memory differently. For instance, episodic memory is sometimes called personal memory and semantic memory is called factual memory in philosophy. These terms are mostly used with similar meanings to those of the terms I used before, so personal memory relates to experiences of which the person was an agent or the witness, and factual memory relates to the facts of past events. Several researchers prefer to use other terms convenient to them, so Richard Wollheim employs 'experimental memory' in the explanation of his view of personal identity that is similar to what I call episodic

⁷⁰ Alan Parkin mentions this difficulty as follows: 'One particular problem is that people may often use semantic memory as a basis for answering a question that appears to address episodic memory... Conversely, episodic memory can sometimes be used to answer questions that appear to rely on semantic memory' (1999, p. 8).

⁷¹ Jérôme Dokic discusses the roles of and confusion between episodic and semantic memory (2001).

⁷² An instance of semantic memory being reconstructed might be a man, who had believed the geocentric theory, but now accepts the heliocentric theory. His understanding of the world must change dramatically. This may lead to changes in the view of his past and he may describe the meaning of events in his life differently.

memory here.⁷³

However, there are arguments over definitions and suggestions of using other terms instead: Charles Hartshorne argues that “‘impersonal memory’ would be analogous to the physical pole of Whitehead’s prehensions, and ‘personal memory’ to the mental’.”⁷⁴ Andy Hamilton emphasises the necessity of distinguishing between personal memory (personally experienced events) and merely factual memory (events which have been told). M. J. Eacott criticises his use of these terms: Hamilton contrasts personal memory and merely factual memory, but ‘Psychologists do not make a comparable distinction. Although Hamilton mentions the distinction between episodic and semantic memory, this is not really equivalent’.⁷⁵ There are both points in common and of difference in their arguments. To consider this problem more, I would need to enter into specific discussion of the categorisations deeply involved in research into memory. But that is not exactly our concern. Hence, I do not step further into this topic except to briefly discuss ‘autobiographical memory’, which seems to have similarities to the reconstruction of memory, so it will be beneficial to mention the reason why I do not employ that term.

The use of the term ‘autobiographical memory’ has been defined in a number of theories, and I suppose that its gist is described in the phrase: ‘autobiographical memory is concerned with the capacity of people to recall their lives’.⁷⁶ This type of memory may overlap with reconstructed memory for the greatest part, because it is the memory of events that happened to and are recalled by one person, but I do not use

⁷³ Wollheim (1980).

⁷⁴ Hartshorne (1972, p. 210).

⁷⁵ Hamilton (1998), Eacott (1998). Shoemaker (1970) and Malcolm (1963) also participate in the discussion of personal and factual memory.

⁷⁶ Baddely (1992).

‘autobiographical memory’ instead of reconstructed memory. The reasons are that the term does not express sufficiently well that recalled memory is re-structured experiences. In addition, there is also a difficulty in terminology.

On this matter, Brewer’s provides an example. He confesses that he once used the terms ‘personal memory’ and ‘autobiographical facts’; the former refers to the phenomenally experienced aspect of memory for information relating to the self, and the latter refers to ‘the nonphenomenally experienced aspect of these types of memories.’ He, however, abandoned the former term ‘given the total lack of agreement concerning the technical terminology in this area’ and in its stead adopts ‘recollective memory’ as a technical term.⁷⁷ This is the labyrinth of terminology we face, and I am not a memory theorist, so I shall stay within this broad definition of memory and this will be enough for our discussion: The type of memory that can be involved in the reconstruction of memory is episodic memory and partly semantic memory, both of which roughly cover the sphere of our life stories. The latter variety of memory may be hard to reconstruct, and I do not insist that all such memory is dramatically altered each time we recall it, but I indicate rather the possibility that such memory can change.

The next question concerns in what circumstances we reconstruct our past. We cannot enumerate all patterns of it, but can grasp a general idea of it through observing instances. My insistence is that the reconstruction of memory does not only occur in extraordinary situations but also occurs in our ordinary lives, and we shall confirm this point from the next section onwards.

⁷⁷ Brewer (1995, p. 20; p. 33).

1.6. The Reconstruction of Memory as Organisation of our Life Stories

I have mentioned the relation between the reconstruction of memory and the concept of personal identity, but the work of this reconstruction may be still unclear. Hence, it will be helpful to refer to some cases in which people modify their past in their minds. We will first look at extreme cases, since these vividly depict the peculiarities of the reconstruction of memory. Then, we will move to more general instances which will be closer to our ordinary lives. The following reveals the occurrence of personal remembering and its modification.

Remembering is dissimilar to recorded information, so the video tape recording can be played back as it was at any time, but our memory does not work in the same way, as I mentioned before. When we recall our past, there is always the likelihood of reconstruction. I count Ian Hacking as one of the researchers who reflects on this idea of memory along with the issue of personality from both philosophical and psychological perspectives. His basic view of the reconstruction of memory is that:

New meanings change the past. It is reinterpreted, yes, but more than that, it is reorganized, repopulated. It becomes filled with new actions, new intentions, new events that caused us to be as we are. I have to discuss not only making up people but making up ourselves by reworking our memories.⁷⁸

Our remembrance of experiences can be modified by our most recent perspective, and this act has an influence not only on the meaning of experiences but also on our

⁷⁸ Hacking (1995, p. 6).

awareness of who we are.⁷⁹ Although subjects in his research are mostly people who are suffering from, what he calls, 'multiple personality,' these can be cited here as examples that depict the idea of rewriting and reproducing the past.⁸⁰

In Hacking's research into multiple personality, two types of operations are considered; one is the recovery of memory in relation to multiple personality, and the other is the inducement of false memory.⁸¹ Recovered memory is studied in the context of traumatic experience which is usually regarded as the cause of multiple personality; in his discussion it is chiefly considered in relation to child abuse.⁸² Trauma is primarily a symbolic experience which cannot be faced squarely by the subject of the experience, because its stress overwhelms the patient's ability to cope and that is why it becomes trauma. The patient's re-awareness of the experience as the cause of the trauma is important for his or her treatment, so psychiatrists and therapists undertake cooperative work with their patient in order to excavate the patient's hidden memory. According to Judith L. Herman, the fundamental stages of recovery are threefold: 'Establishing safety,' 'Reconstructing the traumatic story,' and then 'Restoring the connection

⁷⁹ Wollheim also has a similar view: 'The present is tied to the past, a new past is thus constructed under whose influence the future may then be brought, and so the diachronic expansion of the person, his life, gets its unity' (1980, p. 305).

⁸⁰ Hacking prefers using 'multiple personality' instead of other terms. 'Multiple personality disorder' is rarely used, since for him 'disorder' appears as 'code for a vision of the world that ought to be orderly.' He also avoids 'MPD' and 'DID', because 'there is nothing like an acronym to make something permanent, unquestioned'. Thus, I use 'multiple personality' when I refer to Hacking's discussion. (1995, pp. 16-17.)

⁸¹ There are arguments as to whether multiple personality is real, a kind of fabrication, or the symptom of different disease. Hacking does not get involved in that discussion, because his interest is in what has been caused by the expansion of the concept of multiple personality today.

⁸² 'Trauma' is defined as having many subcategories. I use this term to mean the psychological trauma caused by both physical and psychological damage and having long-lasting effect: The individual's ability to integrate his/her emotional experience is overwhelmed, or the individual experiences (subjectively) a threat to life, bodily integrity, or sanity (Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995, p. 60).

between the survivor and his/her community.’⁸³ If patients face their traumatic experiences, they may be able to restructure their life stories from different angles, and they may then reorganise the relation between them and the external world. Recovered memory will in this manner help patients to recover from the harmful effects of traumatic experiences.

This is a simplified and idealised view of recovered memory, but it sometimes leads to problematic situations due to the difficulties involved in treatment. One of the frequent problems is the inducement of false memory. A significant number of people who have multiple personality insist that they ‘remembered’ something, for example, that they were maltreated by family members when they were children. Some abuse must have actually happened to them, but there are those who warn against believing the recovered memory without examining its accuracy. Robert F. Belli and Elizabeth F. Loftus point out the danger of inducement in which ‘misinformation’ sometimes makes people remember events that had not occurred in their lives and so were not ‘recovered’. In treatment, therapists may employ ways to ‘recover’ patients repressed and distorted memory. This may heal patients, but Belli and Loftus also warn that such healing techniques ‘may also be, if there was actually no history of abuse, a potent source of misinformation’.⁸⁴ Inducement is not always the reason for false memory, but if professionals such as therapists or psychiatrists are influenced by preconceptions about the cause of the symptoms, in this case the suspicion of child abuse, their treatment might become the source of false memory.

In addition, not only therapists but also patients themselves introduce false

⁸³ Herman (2001).

⁸⁴ Belli and Loftus (1995, p. 173).

memory unintentionally. Hacking cites the case of a woman who revises her past: She 'remembered' during treatment that she was raped by a stranger when she was eight years old. She believed that it had happened several hours after her father's death, and told that to her therapist. Nevertheless, the therapist believes that her trauma was actually caused by her father's death and the experience that followed, in which she was confined to a room alone for three hours. The therapist concludes that the rape itself seems not to have happened, but that she made the false memory for her protection, so 'The abuse was real, but cloaked in fantasy'.⁸⁵ This shows that without strong and direct inducement, the reconstruction of memory can be operated by a person for a particular reason. There are a number of cases in which people have rewritten their past, and after this rewriting the memory becomes plausible for them.

The conditions of recovered memory and false memory are, of course, different. The former case involves the abuse actually having happened but patients being unable to endure remembering the experience. In this former operation, people lose their memory of a particular experience, and later recover it within a new context. The other involves 'memory' of something not having happened in their lives, and being 'recovered' incorrectly. The recovery from trauma and the occurrence of false memory must not be confused in medical treatment, and I certainly understand this necessity. I, nonetheless, cite them as examples which indicate the work of the reconstruction of memory, in which memory can be greatly changed by a person depending on the perspective of his or her life. Both of them are included in the reconstruction of memory, though the latter operation may be more difficult to accept than the former one owing to its falseness. We will return to the reliability of reconstructed memory later.

⁸⁵ Hacking (1995, p. 120).

Recovery from trauma must be a difficult experience, and people who have such experiences may think that the meaning of their lives is totally changed and that they have a deeper understanding of their past. There is no reason to deny this view, but we should not forget that that understanding of the past is only its latest version and it is not necessarily the final interpretation of their life stories. The reconstruction of memory is never complete but is always in process, as Hacking describes:

I am pursuing...the way in which the very idea of the cause was forged. Once we have that idea, we have a very powerful tool for making up people, or indeed, for making up ourselves. The soul that we are constantly constructing we construct according to an explanatory model of how we came to be the way we are.⁸⁶

During the re-understanding and reorganisation of memory, people construct their present view of themselves. Hacking does not ask the exact cause of multiple personality but considers the way in which people think about the reasons for multiple personality and how that understanding is correlated to circumstances in which memory is reported and examined. His research is, in this point, suggestive for the study of the reconstruction of memory. The above are significant cases in which people dramatically reconstruct their memory, so some people may feel that such memory is fictitious and not reliable. Therefore, we will examine one more extraordinary pattern in order to settle this problem, and then move to more ordinary cases.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 95.

1.7. The Reliability of Reconstructed Memory

In the previous section, I used the term 'false memory' to refer to cases in which people 'discovered' a past that had not actually happened. One's memory is usually defined as false if it is inconsistent with external facts for the most part. Such facts may include a third person's opinion, recorded information, and common. However, people usually must not accept an event as true if they sincerely know it is false. Barclay indicates this point in his study of autobiographical memory: 'truth in autobiographical memory is preserved as one conveys the meaning of life events through plausible reconstructions of those events.'⁸⁷ Memory must be credible for that person as long as no contradiction to the remembering occurs, and in addition we in general do not ask others' judgement on things that we have no doubt of.

The point is that the reconstruction of memory does not reflect the raw data of past events but interprets them in the light of the present understanding, so the first person viewpoint is fundamental in this operation. However, it must not be that that reconstructed memory is a total invention. The reconstruction of memory may appear as if it can be made in complete disregard of the accuracy of memory, but it is not. The truth of events for a person is examined by his or her judgement that includes not only a dogmatic view but, in general, also the common sense that is produced through interaction with society. Because of this interaction, we usually learn that the accuracy of memory should accord with the external world.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Barclay (1988, p. 293). For more discussion, see Barclay (1986): Swinburne (1984, section 4, 'The Evidence of Personal Identity').

⁸⁸ See Ludwig Wittgenstein's instance of colour: Suppose we paint a particular colour "C", which is made by the chemical substances X and Y combined. If one day C strikes

Therefore, the idea of the reconstruction of memory does not suggest that we make up our memory based on what we want to believe. Instead, it is supposed to organise experiences by, so to speak, the practical sense of the environments by which that person is surrounded. In this manner, the reconstruction of memory cannot occur based on which a person is totally unreliable. The reconstruction of memory is not the claim that we always ignore the third party's opinion. The point emphasised in this discussion is that memory of events must be first reliable for the person whose memory it is in order to be accepted as true by him or her.⁸⁹ After the acquisition of a view of the past, we may realise it is not exactly correct through other people's remembering, and modify our memory according to this. First person accuracy does not disturb that change.

Besides, there can be an indistinct zone in which memory might or might not be precise, but even if the accuracy of memory is doubtful, we can still comprehend our past based on the present understanding. Let us imagine that our past is wiped away and a completely false memory has been induced. Even if we are informed that our present memory is totally wrong, we will have to start our consideration from our 'remembering'. If someone tells us our 'true' past and it is far from our understanding, it may be difficult to accept this past instantly. In this respect, once established 'self-narratives are very hard to change' by means of external information.⁹⁰ The following

us as brighter than before, we would say we must be wrong and that 'the colour is certainly the same as yesterday' (1958, section 56).

⁸⁹ As regards the plausibility of memory from the first person's viewpoint, Freyd's opinion can be helpful: 'Often each author or researcher thinks his or her position is balanced and that other (different) viewpoints are extreme. (It would be fairly strange if you heard someone say "my own position is an extreme and unbalanced one.") For this reason I like to say "Balance is in the eye of the beholder." In this case you are the beholder' (2003).

⁹⁰ Neisser (1994, p. 6).

instance, which depicts a conflict between the past and the present memory, may help us to grasp this view. It is an extreme story borrowed from a science fiction film, but it can be accepted as a thought experiment concerning memory.

There was a man who has been happily married to a beautiful wife for eight years. One day he was told that all his present memory was false, implanted after the erasure of his former memory; the woman who he thought of as his wife had only met him six weeks ago; his work, colleagues, past experiences, and everything surrounding him were arranged to make him believe the implanted memory to be true. After being informed of this news, he watched a screen on which a person, who looked exactly like him, was talking. The man on the screen ('Hauser' is his name in the story) indicated that it had been recorded before he who is watching the screen (his name is 'Quaid') was implanted with the present memory. Quaid was not the person who he believed himself to be but was, rather, Hauser. Later, the recorded Hauser said that implantation of memory was necessary to complete a particular task and that Quaid had succeeded in it, so Hauser wanted to take his body back. This meant the erasure of all Quaid's memory and the re-implantation of the former memory. Quaid was against this plan, because he thought that deleting Quaid's memory would be the same as the death of Quaid.⁹¹

I do not mean to determine which one, whether Quaid or Hauser, is the personality which should take over the body, but the interesting point is this: Even though Quaid recognises the fact that his past was artificial, he wanted not to be Hauser, but to have a future as Quaid. Hauser actually had a double existence, one as a resistor of the dictator

⁹¹ Taken from the film, *Total Recall* (1990). Recent films, I believe, sometimes provide interesting issues for the thought experiments regarding personal identity. For other examples that deal with identity and memory, see *Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind* (2004), *Being John Malkovich* (1999).

and the other as the dictator's spy (the latter role is real for Hauser). Quaid accepts his existence as a resistor but refuses to obey the dictator, because he, due to his present intentions, empathises with resistance's ideology.⁹² Quaid chooses his position according to the present viewpoint. For this decision he needs to use his judgement based on his present policy, will, and morality, but their reality is not essential for him. Even though he knows his past is invented, there is no other way to act but in compliance with his present understanding of his life, and this understanding cannot be separate from his present perspective.

Robert Pirsig's biography may support this view. Pirsig was a highly educated man, but because of his mental illness, he was given Electro-Convulsive Shock Therapy in the 1960s. As a result, he almost lost his personal memory, and he starts his 'new' life haunted by the shadow of his former self (he seems to be able to possess ordinary knowledge after the treatment). He always dreads the return of his former personality, named 'Phaedrus,' because it might mean a relapse into his mental illness. Besides, his denial seems to have other reasons; for Pirsig, the evaluation of Phaedrus may mean the denial of his present self. Although he does not totally reject Phaedrus and tries to understand Phaedrus's thought through writing, he wants to establish his own status (actually, he is exasperated by seeing his son when he misses Phaedrus).⁹³

What I try to indicate by these examples is the idea that we make a decision on the accumulated past, and even if the credibility of memory is suspicious, we have to judge things based on our present perspective. In this account, I want to repeat the point that I

⁹² If Quaid returns to the dictator's organisation, his memory will be deleted. This is a reason for his denial of the dictator, but even though if it were proposed to Quaid that his memory would not to be deleted, it would be doubtful that he would want to accept the dictator's offer. Quaid's view is totally against the autocratic government's.

⁹³ Pirsig (1974).

do not suggest that the accuracy of our memory is needless. For instance, if a customer insists that he had deposited one thousand pounds in his bank account but that it had disappeared, a banker would check the account and say there is no record, and suggest that the customer may misunderstand something. The customer may realise his mistake — that he actually used a different bank for the money — when he found another bank account in which his money was transferred. In most cases, objective fact is the foundation according to which people correct and modify their memory. However, it is also said that even if there was a conflict between our remembering and external information, the method by which that conflict is resolved is left for that person's judgement. Accuracy is important for the reconstruction of memory, but in order to regard an event as accurately remembered, we need to use our judgement on things that are formed based on the present understanding of the past. Therefore, the first person's viewpoint is given priority in this discussion of personal identity.

This suggests that the reconstruction of memory is not intended to bring about a dogmatic view, because inconsistency with the external world can be a cause of serious problems for what we remember. The point here is simple; we do not sincerely and truly and with awareness invent our memory when memory is reconstructed. I have so far discussed extreme cases, so next we will turn to more ordinary instances, which will show how we reconstruct our experiences in our daily lives.

1.8. More Ordinary Cases

We shall start from a story in which a boy was punished for stealing fruit from an

orchard. He may have felt miserable himself at that time because of the punishment. Later he became a brave officer, who was admired for his achievement in taking a standard from the enemy. He finally got the position of general in advanced life.⁹⁴ If the general remembers his boyhood, he might regard his stealing of fruits as a premonition of his seizure of the enemy flag, and furthermore he might be proud of the act without remembering his young misery. The event, the stealing of fruit, is not changed in the story, but his evaluation of the event is different in his childhood and in his manhood. The general reinterprets his act and rewrites its meaning unconsciously. The subject of memory at present (the personal history which is believed by the general) and the subject in the general's memory (flogging, but now understood as a courageous act) are made to coincide by the operation of reconstruction.

This exemplifies the occurrence of the reconstruction of memory, and for more factual cases, we shall look at an example involving married couples that shows a change of feeling towards events at two different times. Several couples are interviewed about their feelings about some impressive events concerned with their partner, and later they are asked to recall a number of these events. People whose relationship with their partner is deteriorating tend to describe their formerly positively-viewed events negatively and their negatively understood events more negatively; while people who have kept a good relationship do not show a significant difference between now and before. Therefore, it is concluded that 'people may rehearse prior interactions and integrate them into their model, altering or maintaining the affective dimensions. Secure spouses may be reminded more often of prior unpleasant interactions as another occurs,

⁹⁴ Characters in this example are borrowed from Thomas Reid's Brave-Officer problem with my own modifications.

and regard that as evidence that reinforces their negative stance'.⁹⁵ An event can be interpreted both positively and negatively by the those who experience it, and this interpretation is changeable depending on the perspective on the past had at that time.

These cases may be easy to accept as reconstructions of memory, because they demonstrate a change in the evaluation of events, the structure of which does not alter. The following Chinese proverb, 'Saiou's horse,' also presents the same pattern, in which only the meaning of events is reinterpreted: There was an old man whose name was Saiou. One day a horse escaped from him. People felt pity for Saiou, but Saiou did not think he should be pitied. The horse later came back with a fleet steed. People at this time were pleased with his luck, but Saiou said 'it may turn to disaster.' The rest of the story is the same; when people thought Saiou had misfortune, he refused their pity, and he regarded the general fortune as his ill luck. (Saiou's son was fascinated with the fleet steed and loved riding it, but he fell off the horse and broke his leg. However, the son was not enlisted because of the fracture, and did not die in the battlefield.) The truth of this proverb is that we cannot predict at the time it happens whether an event is fortunate or not, because our evaluation might be altered in a later context.

In that proverb, although people's views of an event are altered in accordance with other, later events, the structure of events is not reconstructed. Thus, it might be objected that even though the meaning of past events is not fixed, their structure is kept in ordinary situations. A change in the structure of memory rarely occurs to any degree, and we need to distinguish rigidly between normal and pathological occasions. I take issue with this opinion, and now discuss a case in which a change of memory-structure seems to occur without pathological symptoms. I cite the so-called 'affaire Aubrac' as

⁹⁵ John A. Robinson (1995, p. 208).

an instance of this view. I refer particularly to the report by Susan Rubin Suleiman in which she deals with the works of memory. The example is a story about the role of those who were concerned with the arrest of the Resistance leader Jean Moulin and his associates including Raymond Aubrac in 1943. These people were arrested by betrayal, and another resistant, Rene Hardy, was suspected as the betrayer. Moulin died as the result of torture which was carried out by the Gestapo chief, Klaus Barbie, while Raymond Aubrac escaped from the Gestapo and survived. This is the background of the affaire Aubrac.

In 1984 Lucie Aubrac, who was also a member of the Resistance, published her memoir on the affair, in which she played the crucial role of setting Raymond Aubrac free from the Gestapo.⁹⁶ After the book was published, the Aubracs came to fame and they became prominent public speakers. Barbie died in prison but left a document, the so-called 'testament de Barbie'. In the document he designated Raymond Aubrac as the true betrayer of Moulin. Although it was thought to be unreliable and received little response, Gerard Chauvy, who was a journalist and pointed out several contradictions in the Aubracs' testimonies, restored Barbie's statement in his book of 1997. Suleiman writes: 'Although he [Chauvy] finally concludes that there is no documentary evidence to support Barbie's accusation, Chauvy clearly insinuates that the Aubracs were guilty of not telling the "whole truth."' ⁹⁷ The reaction of Raymond Aubrac to this criticism and its result make this case complicated. He asks historians to attend a meeting in which they can ascertain the truth of the matter.

⁹⁶ Lucie Aubrac (1994). This book was later made into a film as well.

⁹⁷ All quotations concerned with the affair Aubrac are cited from Suleiman (1999, pp. v-xiii).

[T]he historians grilled them about the inconsistencies reported by Chauvy and about the hitherto unexamined documents published in his Appendix. The Aubracs were unable to clear up the inconsistencies. Instead they invoked the failures of memory, the exigencies of simplifying a factual narrative for the sake of greater coherence and readability..., and finally even their own puzzlement.

Even though the Aubracs won a case in which they accused Chauvy and his publisher of libel; as a survey of memory, historians in the meeting 'concluded...that "areas of shadow remain" in the Aubracs' story.' I do not aim to investigate the historical truth of this affair, but I would like to bring it forward as a kind of thought experiment about the reconstruction of memory. If one of them, the Aubracs or Barbie, intentionally told a lie, this case would be simple. However, we can also think that both sides believe the validity of their stories, and we pursue this possibility irrespective of this affair's authenticity.

I treat this affair as a conflict between two sides' remembering, not as a simple misremembering, misunderstanding of details, or intentional lying. Can two sides have different memories about the fact of an affair without lying? From the first person's viewpoint, the answer is yes. If a person repeatedly thinks and talks about a particular view of an event, the person might believe that it is not his or her own opinion but the fact about the event. Even if in the first instance the person did not completely believe it to be true, it is possible that he or she might come to regard the view as factual.

This does not occur only in pathological cases, and several researchers report that ordinary people have 'remembered' events which did not happen to them. For example, Ira Hyman and his colleagues conducted an experiment in the inducement of false memory. Subjects were presented with actual events together with a false experience, for instance, attending a wedding party in boyhood (a true event) in which one's parents

spilled a punch bowl on the bride's parents (a false event). During the first interview, no subjects remembered the false event, but 18 per cent 'remembered' the false event in the second interview, and 25 per cent remembered in the third interview.⁹⁸ As similar sorts of experiments show, people do sometimes create memories of events which did not happen to them.⁹⁹

In addition, Neisser and Harsch's report demonstrates that even without experimental inducement people create false memories. They asked students to record the source by which they first knew of the explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger* in 1986. Then, forty four students who were still on campus were asked the same question three years later.

About a quarter of those accounts, including many reported with high confidence, were entirely wrong...[One subject] who had actually heard the news from friends at lunch in the cafeteria, remembered how "some girl came running down the hall screaming 'The space shuttle just blew up.' "...Even then they [the subjects] were reluctant to abandon their incorrect memories: "Yes, that's my handwriting—but I still remember it this other way!" ,¹⁰⁰

If the students had not left a record, they would have had no doubt about their memory of the first source of information about *Challenger's* explosion. I assume that this minor change of memory can happen at any time. Most such changes may not be socially important, so tend to be overlooked. Our present perspective on the past will not be dramatically different from tomorrow's in ordinary circumstances, but this does not

⁹⁸ Loftus (1997, pp. 70-75).

⁹⁹ Spanos (1996).

¹⁰⁰ Neisser (1994, p. 6), Neisser and Harsch (1992).

entail the invariability of the structure of our memory.¹⁰¹

Therefore, I insist that even in non-pathological cases, people on occasion rewrite not only their memory's meaning but also its structure. There must be obvious cases that can be categorised as pathological but not all patterns that show a dynamic change of remembering are counted as unusual symptoms. The contradiction of the affair Aubrac can be interpreted in this manner. Thus, it is possible for both the Aubracs and Barbie not to have lied though their testimonies are in discord. We also do not need to understand one of them to be pathological, and in accordance with this understanding, discrepancies between the Aubracs and Barbie can occur without suffering mental illness. I do not insist that this is the fact of the affair Aubrac, but suggest that the conflict between two parties may well be understood in this way. It is the conclusion of this section that not all cases, in which the structure of events is modified, are caused by extraordinary conditions. We reconstruct our memory in order to make sense of experiences to a greater or lesser degree, and this act is the source of the framework of personal identity.

In conclusion, I propose that our concept of personal identity is formed when we recall the past from the present perspective. This perspective is not fixed but adaptable to

¹⁰¹ As another example of false memory, I count my experience: My family had a dog when I was a child. I believed that he had escaped from my house at night and never come back. One day, when I was an adult, I casually asked my parents what would have happened to the dog after he escaped. They were surprised and told me that he died in a traffic accident, which I had witnessed. I had cried and cried, and did not move from holding him, they said. I did not remember the accident at all. Later, I thought that I might have remembered the scene in which the dog was hit by a car, but I still wonder if it came from my own memory or I just created the scene according to my parents' tale. I do not think this accident has become some sort of traumatic experience for me. I still like dogs, am not extraordinary afraid of cars or of crossing the road. However, I deleted and added episodes to my memory unintentionally, and believed that the modified memory was true.

circumstances, so our memory can be re-interpreted and re-organised depending upon the current perspective on the past. This is the reconstruction of memory, which includes change in the meaning of our remembering as well as change in its structure. This reconstruction is usually not operated fully intentionally, otherwise we could create our past as we wish. I do not take that solipsistic position and regard social and cultural interaction as necessary factors for the judgement of our memory.

It is we who form the framework of personal identity, but the source of this operation relies not only on the individual but also on circumstances which encircle us. As George Kelly notes, 'Since an absolute construction of the universe is not feasible, we shall have to be content with a series of successive approximations to it.' This phrase represents his theory of 'constructive alternativism' which indicates the relation between our understanding of the universe and its alteration: '*all of our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision or replacement...there are always some alternative constructions available to choose among in dealing with the world.*'¹⁰² Every interpretation of the world contains the possibility of alteration, but this does not indicate that we create all our views from the beginning.

External factors can influence our conception of ourselves, and because of this work memory is always possibly reconstructed by the introduction of new information. That information must be mediated by our interpretation so as to grasp its meaning in the relation of other memories, and we are supposed to operate that work from a specific perspective in our lives. We have confirmed those points through the discussion of this chapter. Moreover, if, as I have argued, memory is reconstructed from the current perspective, the way to organise memory is an important issue in terms of the

¹⁰² Kelly (1963, p. 15).

framework of personal identity. I suspect that if our experiences were not organised at all, our past would be without perspective but would be a mere enumeration of events. The relevant issue is the order of memory, and this shall be our topic in the next chapter, where we will look at 'narrative,' which gives a story to an understanding of one's actions in the context of one's life.

Chapter 2

NARRATIVE

The Narrative Approach to the Reconstruction of Memory

2.1. The Relation between Narrative and Life

To look back upon the past is to make a connection between memories in accordance with the present perspective. Our experiences become comprehensible through being put in the context of other experiences, and this is what we have determined to be the framework of personal identity. This is the gist of the previous chapter, and what we have not yet examined is the manner in which experiences are arranged in intelligible form. If experiences were just haphazardly connected with each other, we would not be able to make any sense of the past. Based on this assumption, I will in this chapter examine the order of the reconstruction of memory.

Corresponding to this insistence, the opinion that disorder of experiences is an adequate explanation of human beings might arise. This is typically found in Humean discussions, and our consideration might be counted as a counterargument against them. However, I do not think that it is a criticism of Hume, since Humeans and I deal with a different notion. To seek order in the reconstruction of memory is not to ask if there is a definite theory by which things in the universe are ordered, or by which causation in the

world is proved. Instead, it asks if we give order to our experiences in terms of comprehending their meanings. It is the method of arranging experiences as if there is a relation between them for the sake of making sense of the past. In this regard, the issue in this chapter does not become an attack on the Humean view, though neither does it imply Hume's theory, since the discussion of the real existence of causation is not our issue.¹⁰³

To start with, we will discuss the interaction between the narrative form and our life, and ask how the former organises the latter. It is my assumption that absolute chaos is beyond our comprehension, and we need to organise memory in some way in order to understand it. I will first examine the framework associated with narrative, which I will discuss as a form that gives an understandable explanation to experiences. The past acquires meanings through being organised in intelligible connections, and it is this that is called the narrative form here.¹⁰⁴ As characters in Samuel Beckett's drama say, to have lived and to be dead are not enough for us but we 'have to talk about it'.¹⁰⁵ We do not just breathe and spend our time but live with the past and an outlook on the future. We often talk about, look back upon, and envisage our actions in order to make the figure of life. Life in this view is, I insist, understood in a narrative form; experiences are located in the context of a life story.

Second, we will turn our eyes to the organisation of the reconstructed memory. We

¹⁰³ Hume advocates three systems that deal with philosophical problems differently; the false philosophical system; vulgar system; and the true philosophical system. On this understanding, our discussion is close to the vulgar view. For more discussion, see Donald W. Livingston's survey of Hume (1998).

¹⁰⁴ From a sociological standpoint, Vivien Burr mentions the relation between the narrative form and memory in that way: 'Memory allow us to look back on our behaviours and experiences, to select those that seem to 'hand together' in some narrative framework,' and this framework provides 'us with the impression of continuity and coherence.' (1995, p. 30).

¹⁰⁵ Beckett (1965, Act II).

tend to narrate our lives in an intelligible style by which a series of events become understandable. This is a narrative approach to our lives. The necessity of the narrative approach is precisely analysed by Alasdair MacIntyre, who argues for the role of narrative in structuring memory. According to him, we should consider the method by which past events are organised if we regard that life is 'more than a sequence of individual actions and episodes'.¹⁰⁶ He contends that if life is to be meaningful for us, it should be grasped as a whole, because the significance of an action should be interpreted not on its own but in its role in the longer-term perspective of a person.

The same sort of view is also found in the work of Peter Goldie, and Bernard Williams. Goldie defines narrative not as a mere sequence of events but as interpreted in one's own way, 'thereby giving coherence, meaningfulness, and emotional import to what happened'.¹⁰⁷ He puts emphasis on the point that the narrative of life needs to be re-organised in order to be significant for us. Williams makes a similar point. He insists that elements of events must be accurate and consistent if they are to be intelligible for us, but that is 'not enough'. More, 'the sequence of events has to make sense to us, and make sense of the outcome. Such a story is one kind of narrative'.¹⁰⁸ These remarks are deeply concerned with our discussion of the reconstruction of memory which must not be a mix-up of disordered events but takes an understandable form. Grounded on this assumption, we will consider what kind of order can be applied for that form if memory is not a mere miscellany of experiences.

The preceding is a summary of the first half of this chapter in which the relation between the narrative account and our understanding of a life will be considered. I

¹⁰⁶ MacIntyre (1984, p. 204).

¹⁰⁷ Goldie (2003, p. 203).

¹⁰⁸ Bernard Williams (2002, p. 233).

should, however, mention that we will not only follow the usefulness of that account. It is certainly important to discuss the effect of the narrative account in order to analyse the organisation of the reconstruction of memory, but I also insist that only that account may not be enough to deal with the reconstruction of memory. The narrative account could be effective if we focus on the identification of a person through time, but it may not be suitable for our other notion, differences. In order to examine this point, I will also ask if there is the minimum within this narrative account. The fragmentation of identity will be the key theme in the latter half of this chapter.

It will be better to emphasise the point that I mentioned in the Introduction: I assume that there are two tendencies when we grasp our experiences over time. One is towards making a unitary understanding of a life by which experiences are harmonised with each other, and the other deviates from that harmonisation. The narrative account is used for considering the way to make coherence between one's own episodes according to the context of that person's life, so it is concerned with making our concept of identity. This relation between narrative account and a person is, for example, described thus: 'the identity of the character is comprehensible through the transfer to the character of the operation of emplotment, first applied to the action recounted.'¹⁰⁹ A unity of a person over time is formed through narrating one's own experiences, namely, the narrative approach performs to make a bridge between experiences when they are recalled by that person. This is a basic view of the relation between the narrative account and the concept of personal identity in this chapter. In this understanding, we will also examine what kind of order we can find in the narrative form.

The issue of the narrative account will be centred upon first in this chapter. Then,

¹⁰⁹ Ricoeur (1994, p. 143).

as the minimum of this account, I will indicate that there could be experiences that are not put into that coherence but are still important for that person. This will be examined in the second half of this chapter. I insist that those two tendencies show different points of the conditions of a person, but do not necessarily eliminate each other.¹¹⁰

2.2. Our Lives in the Narrative Form

We first consider the necessity of the narrative form for grasping the meaning of life. MacIntyre describes modern life as divided into several segments; we separate leisure from work, private from public, the personal from the corporate, and each segment possesses its own principles and behavioural character. For example, being a good teacher is measured by a different yardstick from being a good mother and being a good author, and every role holds up a different aim. MacIntyre argues that if this separation were achieved to a great extent, we would lose our view of life as a whole and would consider our existences as based on each segment on each occasion. This is the situation in which we find ourselves today, but he states that the life of virtue, which is the subject of his discussion, is achieved through the unity of life in which each episode is dealt with in the prospect of making a consistent life. Human behaviour is understood not only in terms of the outcome of an individual action but also by the relation of each action to the rest of a life. Hence, in his notion any shorter-term intention should be properly described by reference to the longer-term intention.

¹¹⁰ This point will be discussed more in chapter four and five as different tendencies of modern thought and postmodern thought.

MacIntyre uses the following example to explain his discussion of intention; if there was a man in a garden who was doing something, the answer to the question as to what action was being performed could be described in a number of ways, 'Digging,' 'Gardening,' 'Taking exercise,' 'Preparing for winter,' or 'Pleasing his wife'. The primary intention defines the meaning of the action, so if the primary intention is to prepare for winter, it would imply a particular life-style, that of those who understand gardening as a seasonal event in a household 'setting with the peculiar narrative history of that setting.' In the case of pleasing his wife, the act is located in the context of a relationship between a husband and a wife 'in the narrative history of a marriage.' These instances show that the intention relevant to an episode is properly described only if it is put in the context of the longer-term intention.¹¹¹

Moreover, to put an episode into the context of the longer sequence of behaviour is understood as to narrate episodes according to a personal history. As George C. Rosenwald and Richard L. Ochberg strongly insist, 'Personal stories' do not only show the structure of one's life, but 'they are the means by which identities may be fashioned. It is this formative...power of life stories that makes them important'.¹¹² Moreover, the meaning of an event can be changed depending upon the context of other events as well. For this instance, I cite an episode in *The Leopard*. A man invented a rude story and told it to a lady. The lady believed it and got angry, and kept away from him. Fifty years later, his friend told her that it was an invention. She then knew that that man did not behave as badly as in the story, and this fact greatly changed her view of the past. She now remembered his warm side, and thought that he might have loved her (though the truth

¹¹¹ The topic of intention and action may evoke Anscomb's discussion. MacIntyre in another context mentions that his argument is influenced by Anscombe in some points. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 53, Anscombe, 1957, 1958).

¹¹² Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992, p. 1).

is still ambiguous), and thought that it was her who killed her future by avoiding him due to pride. This is a new interpretation of her life that she never imagined before. The sequence of events is the same, the man told a story, she was offended at that, and they did not marry. Nonetheless, when the event is shown in a different context from that of what she believed, the understanding of her past in the last fifty years is totally changed, and she is shattered by that new view.¹¹³ In narrating experiences in the context of a whole life, they are recounted as a personal history and acquire an irreplaceable position in that person's narrative.

The making of personal history is applied to resolving the problem of personal identity in MacIntyre's discussion. He regards a person as a character who lives his or her own narrative from birth to death. A person at different times is hence identified by the consistency of their character. A person's character may change over time, but MacIntyre would not think this to be a problem as long as a comprehensible explanation is given of the change. A man under description X would be the same man under a very different description Y if he could give an elucidation by means of which we can understand 'how he could at different times and different places be one and the same person and yet be so differently characterized'.¹¹⁴ If the explanation was acceptable enough, the person would be thought of as keeping a consistent character, so the person possesses unity of character through his or her life story.¹¹⁵ What MacIntyre stresses is that personal identity cannot be discussed separately from this work of narrative,

¹¹³ Lampedusa (1960, pp. 184-186).

¹¹⁴ MacIntyre (1984, p. 218).

¹¹⁵ I wonder to what degree MacIntyre's account can be applied to the study of personal identity. He does not offer a thought experiment, but if, e.g., Margaret Thatcher's memory was gradually exchanged with Marquis de Sade's memory, would it be in the range of an acceptable change, or not? If we strictly applied MacIntyre's theory to this case, the answer would be positive as long as one can make an intelligible narrative of the relation between these personalities.

intelligibility, and the account of a life. A study which treats personal identity independently of these factors will turn out a failure. In MacIntyre's notion, to possess the sense of personal identity, which can be compared to the sense of personhood, is to be able to give an intelligible account to changes in one's character through time, so the continuity of a person corresponds to the unity of a life story through which the gaps between different stages are explained.

It is not only MacIntyre who has made the connection between narrative and life. There are researchers who have also indicated this connection within the context of making personal identity. For instance, Paul Ricoeur deals with human action using the notion of narrative. He asserts that to determine the identity of a person is to answer the question 'Who did it?' He assumes that there is a person who undertakes the action, and the identity of the person through time is confirmed by a narrative account which describes the agent of the action: 'To state the identity of an individual or a community is to answer the question, "Who did this?"...What justifies our taking the subject ...as the same throughout a life...? The answer has to be narrative.'¹¹⁶ There is the doer who undertakes actions, and the continuity of the doer is proved by putting actions into the narrative form in which an action is explained in relation to other actions. This is what Ricoeur calls 'narrative identity': A story consists of what the person has done, and the unity of the person thus relies on the unity of narrative in which diverse experiences are ordered. In his opinion, we possess the ability by means of which self-constancy is achieved, and this ability inheres in being a narrator of one's own life story.

Moreover, the work of narrative in giving a certain account to events is, though from a very different angle to that of MacIntyre and Ricoeur, also mentioned by Jean-

¹¹⁶ Ricoeur (1988b, p. 246).

François Lyotard as an evaluating system of discourses. He supposes that science is always in discord with narratives such as myths, legends, and folklore. For science, these narratives are mere fables that cannot be equal to logical and rational thought, which are but the yardstick of science. However, Lyotard asserts that science also needs to adopt the narrative form 'to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game'.¹¹⁷ For the sake of an insistence on the superiority of scientific truth over 'fables', science nonetheless needs to adapt a sort of narrative which demonstrates this legitimacy. Narrative is thus described as a system of estimation by which the genre (in this case, science) is provided with the significance and the meaning of its discourse. Narrative in this view is used as an explanation of how people are provided with a way to grasp events from the genre's particular perspective.¹¹⁸

As a counterargument to Lyotard's understanding of narrative, I cite the opinion of Jerome Bruner. He asserts that there are two modes of thought: the paradigmatic or logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode, and they are inconsistent with each other.¹¹⁹ In Lyotard's discussion, the logico-scientific mode is also included in the narrative mode. This difference is that while Bruner's logico-scientific mode points to scientific theory itself, Lyotard's narrative indicates the mode by which science proves the necessity and legitimacy of its theory. If science constructs a paradigm, in Lyotard's opinion, it must include the problem of legitimacy in terms of appealing to its authority over other thoughts. Thus, Lyotard insists that science also has its own narrative mode

¹¹⁷ Lyotard (1984, p. xxiii).

¹¹⁸ Lyotard does not only approve the work of narrative but criticises it so as to forcibly make the subject coherent. This problem will be examined later in this thesis.

¹¹⁹ Bruner (1986, pp. 12-13).

as long as it participates in the discussion of evaluation.¹²⁰ If a set of episodes and events is more than a list of independent descriptions, we need to be able to identify that by which its significance is declared. To secure the meaning of an action is to clarify its value, and this is acquired not through the mere itemising of performances but by making a narrative account of them. In this respect, the narrative approach is necessary for the reconstruction of memory, which makes experiences comprehensible.

Although we have already used the term 'narrative form,' it must be added that the relation between experiences must not be randomly made. Instead, there should be some order if the relation is reasonable for us. I will next discuss this assumption in terms of analysing standards of order. We will first observe the case of inconsistent description through which the inevitability of order will be realised, and then consider what types of order can be applied to the narrative understanding of memory.

2.3. The Necessity of Order

Disorder is a difficult topic for us to grasp, because it slips through the comprehensible description of things. Languages are more or less ordered according to their rules, so it is not surprising that it is hard to delineate a thought that lacks arrangement. The following sentence is an instance of such an incoherent description. It was written down by an erudite man who excelled in language: 'There we waited on the ladies—Morville's. —Spain. Country towns all beggars. At Dijon he could not find the way to

¹²⁰ Lyotard (1984, p. 8).

Orleans. —Cross roads of France very bad. —Five soldiers. —Women. —Soldiers escaped. —The Colonel would not lose five men for the sake of one woman. —The magistrate cannot seize a soldier but by the Colonel's permission, etc., etc.'¹²¹ We may be puzzled by this fragmented description due to the lack of a proper connection between phrases. It is hard to guess its proper meaning since the phrases do not leave enough clues for us to make a comprehensible story.

The above description is quoted by MacIntyre from Samuel Johnson's record of his travels in France in the eighteenth century. MacIntyre cites it as a counterargument to the opinion that to represent our past in a narrative form is nothing else than to deceive ourselves by giving life a false form, because it gives order to events which did not exist when the events happened. If we neatly tell our life stories, it is sometimes suggested the lives described would be always artificial; they are already reorganised in our minds, so they are not the experiences as they were.¹²² MacIntyre disagrees with this claim, because he supposes that it is impossible to understand our life without following the narrative form, without which it becomes a mixture of events with no connection. The only picture which he can draw which escapes a narrative understanding is 'the kind of dislocated sequence,' which is exemplified by the above quotation from Johnson. MacIntyre's insistence is that any attempt to characterise actions prior to the narrative understanding ends in failure, because we will only obtain 'disjointed parts of some possible narrative' that elude our understanding.¹²³ According to MacIntyre, the order of narration is necessary for acquiring an intelligible account in

¹²¹ This sentence is quoted from Philip Hobsbaum's book by MacIntyre (Hobsbaum, 1973, p. 32, MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 214-215).

¹²² This discussion is specifically of Jean-Paul Sartre's argument in *Nausea*, in which Sartre regards human actions as unintelligible occurrences (Sartre, 1965; MacIntyre, 1984, p. 214).

¹²³ MacIntyre (1984, p. 214).

which life is unified.

Our difficulty in understanding inconsistent sentences seems to reflect our tendency to try to make events coherent. We want to give an elucidation of events by ignoring a little contradiction, or even by creating a bridge between apparently unrelated descriptions. In a wide sense, this tendency is evident in various fields in which the narrative understanding is used.¹²⁴ In order to grasp episodes and events, we tend to see a relation between them, which means we put them into a certain context, in a certain structure. In this respect, 'man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal,' as MacIntyre declares.¹²⁵ To grasp experiences from one's own perspective is to tell them as events that relate to others. Narrative works to make the past coherent, or we would be at a loss in a chaotic world of experiences.¹²⁶

To tell a life story in the narrative form also relates to the possession of a specific position from which events are narrated. If there was no point of view that could give a particular understanding to experiences, there would only be a collection of descriptions that could not be in any way related. We denied the possibility of an overarching standpoint as the 'tenseless' approach to experiences in the former chapter, and we shall consider this aspect further in reference to Arthur C. Danto's discussion of history. He uses the image of an Ideal Chronicler who is presumed to be able to know of anything that happens in the world as it happens, the way it happens, including that which occurs

¹²⁴ For instance, in some myths, phenomena are personified in order to 'read' the law of the nature (e.g., the stormy seas are due to the anger of the Sea God, so we have to offer a sacrifice to the God). In addition, if this tendency were not highly developed, some literature which is almost incomprehensible in common reading would be never written and read, for example, James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 216.

¹²⁶ This is a strong view that pushes forward the narrative understanding. In MacIntyre's opinion, it is a 'good' way to establish virtue in life. However, it can be questioned whether such an understanding is always 'good' (see e.g., Galen Strawson, 2004). We will return this problem in the latter half of this chapter.

in other's minds. Could the Ideal Chronicler make a perfect description of history? Danto declares that even this is not enough for making history, because the entirely neutral position cannot make any connection between events.

The Ideal Chronicler cannot even make the sentence 'The Thirty Years War begins now' in 1618 'if that war was so-called because of its duration'.¹²⁷ It is necessary to fix a certain point in order to interpret events as a particular state of affairs. The Ideal Chronicler, who cannot fix such a point, may describe the events in the Thirty Years War: 'Ferdinand of Styria is elected as king of Bohemia'; 'two members of the royal council are thrown from a window'; 'Johan Tzerclaes Tilly's army defeated the Bohemians'. There is no explanation of the connections between events, since the Ideal Chronicler only can record occurrences individually. This is an example of a mere list of events, and what is lacking in the Ideal chronicler is the way of comparing, temporally, by means of which the status of an event is defined in terms of its place in a longer sequence. Thus, although we can say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo causes the First World War, the Ideal chronicler only mentions that assassination and cannot relate it to the peace conference at Versailles in 1919.¹²⁸ A perspective is necessary to give a meaning to events, and it cannot be provided by the omnipresent viewpoint but needs to be arranged from a particular position.

A similar point is indicated by Bernard Williams, who notes that any narrative includes a chronicle 'which is simply a list of happenings in chronological order,' so it is necessary for the narrative form to include a temporal understanding. He also insists that 'A chronicle does not try to make sense of anything' but what we need to 'make

¹²⁷ Danto (1985, p. 152).

¹²⁸ We cannot even call the period of this war the First World War, because it is so named only after the occurrence of the Second World War.

sense' of events is some explanation of them.¹²⁹ William mentions the necessity of the narrative form and of a person's own position in order to understand the meaning of events. Danto also considers that this is the task of narrative, through which independent episodes are comprehended as part of an intelligible event: 'Narrative sentences refer to at least two time-separated events, and describe the earlier event.'¹³⁰ This is his definition of the narrative form. The ability to explain the significance of the former event in connection with the latter is hence necessary to narrate history. He believes that narrative plays the role of locating at least two events within a certain perspective in which specific meanings can be added to them. The narrative form is relevant to the reconstruction of memory in this way, since it is that through which episodes and events are ordered and become comprehensible.

The above is the reason why narrative order is important for our comprehension of experiences, and I will next discuss the precise variety of order. I assume that there are two standards by which experiences are systematised. First, there is the standard of time, since memory presupposes temporal differences, and as Danto suggests, the meaning of an event is given by the context of other events occurring at different times. Second, experiences are nevertheless not only ordered in a chronological sense, or we would have to recall all memories from the beginning of an event when we want to refer to a specific episode in it. I propose therefore that experiences are also arranged in a causal relation in which episodes and events are connected as cause and effect.¹³¹ This account of causality is a characteristic of narrative theory more than that of

¹²⁹ Bernard Williams (2002, p. 238).

¹³⁰ Danto (1985, p. 159).

¹³¹ MacIntyre writes that intentions 'need to be ordered both causally and temporally' (1984, p. 208). Ricoeur also argues that to make a plot is to mediate between time and narrative (1984, 53-54).

philosophical literature. This thought will be mentioned more in section 2.5.

In respect of the structure of narrative, E. M. Forster's definition shall help our understanding. He defines the novel as consisting of a story and a plot; a story is 'a narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence'. A plot is defined as a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. "The king died, and then the queen died," is a story..."The king died, and then the queen died of grief" is a plot.'¹³² The same event is described differently according to each standard.¹³³ In my discussion, following Forster, a story corresponds to the temporal order, and a plot is the causal order. These are regarded as the main methods of organising our own experiences in the narrative form.¹³⁴

2.4. The Temporal Order of the Narrative Form

Objective Time and Subjective Time in the Narrative Account

First of all, to have a sense of time is necessary in order to compose memory. James William defines memory as '*the knowledge of an event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we have thought or*

¹³² Forster (1927, p. 116).

¹³³ There are various debates about the issue of the structure of narrative in narrative theory, and this discussion only indicates points concerned with the reconstruction of memory. We do not have enough space to focus upon this wide area, but for further consideration of narrative theory, see H. Porter Abbott (2002).

¹³⁴ The chronology of narrative is a huge issue in narrative theory. For this debate, see, for example, White (1987).

experienced it before'.¹³⁵ By this means we distinguish the present from the past, and because the reconstruction of memory is the operation that ties together events that happened on different occasions, the sense of time must be essential for the order of memory. Our view of life is thought to be influenced by this temporal order. This is seen strongly in our presupposition that any person follows the chronological sequence that people are born as babies, become adults, and arrive at their senescence. A life might come to an end early but this order does not change nor go backwards.

This preconception about the sequence of life has an influence on the structure of reconstructed memory. For instance, if we write our autobiography, the descriptions will not be a random collection of episodes without any relation between them. We may start it from the present and go back to childhood, or may intentionally shuffle episodes that happened in different times and order them not according to the temporal sequence. However, there is a general expectation that readers can re-arrange episodes within the passage of the author's life in chronological order, at least when they reach the end of the book. To see this matter from another angle, consider that if we can make sense of divided and seemingly disconnected episodes, it means that we can envisage their sequence by reshuffling. It is also seen in stories such as novels and films in which an episode seems not to connect with the plot at the beginning, but we eventually understand its meaning when we can relocate it in the web of other episodes. It is true that there are kinds of autobiographical writing which do not fit the above pattern. Nonetheless, apart from literary works that designedly stray from the ordinary writing style, we can say that to be able to rearrange episodes according to the temporal order is

¹³⁵ James Williams (2001, p. x).

to make a story more intelligible.¹³⁶

The sense of time can be divided into two types. When we recall an event, we may note its calendar time, the date of its occurrence, (I met the girl in summer in 1980), or we may try to evoke the time at which it happened in our personal history (I met the girl when I was only a small boy). I call the former sense objective time, and the latter sense subjective time. Steen F. Larsen, Charles P. Thompson, and Tia Hansen discuss the differences between these in their research into autobiographical memory. The former variety of time is calculated by physics and shared publicly in the form of the calendar, clock, or the cycle of seasons. The latter is an individuals' sense of time which consists of the past, present, and future.¹³⁷ Subjective time is described from one person's perspective, so it does not unfold according to the physical calculation of time, but it can offer a certain sense of time. The phrase 'When I was a child, I was afraid of the darkness' does not correspond to an exact time in the physical world, but it is sufficient to inform us of what the phrase means.

In addition, to have subjective and objective time is a characteristic of human beings, because it is only us who want to give an explanation to actions in reference to temporal order. This view is described by MacIntyre as an account of action; through establishing that account, an action acquires its own meaning in relation to other actions.¹³⁸ A similar point is also found in Hannah Arendt's contention that through speech and action human beings distinguish themselves from other beings: 'In acting

¹³⁶ There are a number of writings which take an autobiographical style but include contradictions. They are not mere wrong descriptions, but the resolution of contradictions may spoil the writing's literary value. Thus, I do not insist that all kinds of autobiographical work can be understood in terms of chronology, but these intentional works can be counted as exceptions to our argument.

¹³⁷ Larsen, Thompson, and Hansen (1995, p. 136).

¹³⁸ MacIntyre (1984, p. 209).

and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world.'¹³⁹ In her opinion, people appear as human beings through showing what they have done, and this discloses one's identity as a unique person. This type of identity is not required for the continuity of mere physical things but is required for existences that can act with responsibility. Additionally, Arendt claims that the other-ness between things resides in their kinds, and organic existences have variety even in the same kind, but only human beings have the ability to distinguish themselves from others by themselves through their account of their own actions. Therefore, human life is described as a unique life story through which the agent of the story is disclosed.

However, in Arendt's opinion, although the agent is the protagonist of the life story, he or she is neither the author nor the producer of the story. A person is the outcome of the action, and the evaluation of the action is always given after it is completed. The individual who performs the action never knows how the life story is assessed, but the narrative of the action is invariably told by someone else. Thus, it is known who a person is when the life story is interpreted in relation to other people, when the actions are settled in the context of history.

This may appear to conflict with our view of the reconstruction of memory, because a doer cannot be a narrator of his or her own narrative. Nonetheless, I infer that Arendt's opinion should not be seen as a criticism of the idea of the reconstruction of memory, because Arendt does not treat the same issue that we do here. The main differences between Arendt's opinion and ours lie in the standpoint from which the story is narrated; whether it is told from the third person's perspective or the first person's one.

¹³⁹ Arendt (1958, p. 179).

This insistence will need to be explained more, and further, to note this difference will be helpful in order to confirm the characteristics of the reconstruction of memory, the different viewpoint of narrating between third persona and the first person. For those reasons, we first look further at Arendt's description of a person and narrative, and consider the difference between her view and ours. Then, we shall discuss the way to depict life in the narrative understanding. The second issue is particularly considered by means of a comparison between the view of narrative of MacIntyre and that of Louis O. Mink.

The Different View of Narrative and Life

The reason why Arendt denies the idea that an agent is a narrator of their own action can be gathered from her discussion of the philosophy of history. She asserts that history is comprised of a series of events, and the subject of an event cannot manipulate the future relating to it but only acts in the stream of occurrences. People are certainly active elements in an event, but they neither fully control the event nor exactly know the outcome, being always involved in the process. Why cannot subjects of events be the directors of these events? She determines that the resolution of this problem distresses modern philosophers of history: 'although history owes its existence to men, it is still obviously not "made" by them.'¹⁴⁰ Without people, there would be no human history, but people cannot be the intentional authors of their actions who know the result of a series of events. One approach which settles this problem is to suppose an 'invisible hand' which conceals the background of settings and manipulates history like God, but Arendt disagrees with this due to it 'corresponding to no real experience.' Instead of the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 185.

invisible director behind history, she introduces the notion that a doer is not an author of events but that posterity makes a narrative of events.

Arendt's view of a life story is condensed into the phrase: 'The only "somebody" it [a life story] reveals is its hero, and it is the only medium in which the originally intangible manifestation of a uniquely distinct "who" can become tangible *ex post facto* through action and speech.'¹⁴¹ The person concerned cannot know the meaning of action, because he or she does not know what future the action brings. Life which is chronologically restricted in its extension is eventually grasped when the outcome is known, which means when a series of actions finishes, sometimes after the person dies. Thus, Arendt investigates the method by which one's action is narrated from the third person's viewpoint, especially in the context of history. For Arendt, narrative means an established story from the third person's point of view. The question 'who the person is' does not refer to how we consider ourselves, but refers to how life is evaluated by others. Hence, a life story for Arendt is not a mere result of one's behaviour but is connected to the uniqueness of a person as the only subject of the action. This uniqueness always links to the question 'who did it,' and the answer relies on the public understanding of the action. Arendt's concern is with the way to reveal who the person is through disclosing his or her action.

Contrary to Arendt, I ask for the way to understand one's life from one's own perspective, that is, from the first person's viewpoint. The account of an event which is given before it is completed might be wrong according to the later understanding, but I allege that the possibility of change does not prohibit making an account of our experiences. It is true that Columbus cannot declare that he discovered the American

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 186.

continent, but that statement is only made by posterity. Arendt is correct in this sense, but I insist that Columbus still can declare that he discovered a new route to 'India,' because he believed that the islands that he arrived at were parts of India. Even though the personal narrative is not the same as the later narrative which is defined by the third person, the person concerned has no other way but to keep constructing their own perspective of the event.

In short, Arendt analyses the outcomes of individuals' actions in history as estimated by the third party, and I consider the process of reconstructing memory from the first person's viewpoint. That is to say, Arendt examines the conditions of the description which discloses the conclusion of a person's life, in the context of history. Thus, for her, the answer to the question 'who is Columbus?' is 'The man who discovered America.' I, however, ask about conditions in which Columbus himself thinks 'I discovered India.' I assume that if Arendt is asked if she accepts that a person can establish a life story through his or her own perspective, she would not reject that but would merely say that her interest lies elsewhere. However, that is the point that I want to present as the perspective of the reconstruction of memory in this thesis. In this regard, I shall mention again that Arendt's writing and this thesis treat different aspects of the issue of identity.

This is the way in which one's experiences are understood in accordance with the chronological order, especially in relation to the context of life. One more point that should be considered is whether or not to arrange the beginning and end in a life story is wrong, because it is impossible to experience our final parting from life. A typical disagreement is found in the work of Mink, so we next examine his discussion in comparison to that of MacIntyre. An outline of Mink's view is that from the first

person's position we cannot recall both the beginning and end of life, because they are not remembered or experienced by us. Thus, it is impossible to narrate a whole life as an experienced story from the first person's position. The end is only told in a story which is made after life finishes. The claim 'stories are not lived but told' depicts well his view that the narrative understanding is a kind of production of events which have already occurred.¹⁴²

Mink's opinion would be appropriate to our discussion if we strictly applied the work of remembrance to the structuring of the life story. However, MacIntyre takes issue with this by asking 'But have you never heard of death?'.¹⁴³ We know that everyone who now lives came into being in the past and will meet their end in the future, and there is no exception to this fate. Hence, in his thought, we have lived our own narratives even before they are told, so we include our imaginary birth and death in our perspective of personal history. Additionally, MacIntyre's view of the three steps of life, the beginning, middle, and end, is discussed in the context of his idea of a virtue. A virtue is practised not by the achievement of individual goals at different stages in life but through the whole of life, which comprises a consistent narrative from birth to death. For this reason, MacIntyre stresses the unity of narrative from birth to death in his discussion. Even though we cannot narrate the end of life after we have experienced it, we can think about our death and organise our lives towards this imaginary end. This is the way in which we comprehend life, and the inclusion of birth and death is not inadequate if they are understood as elements that are part of the perspective of personal history.

¹⁴² Mink (1970, pp. 557-558).

¹⁴³ MacIntyre (1984, p.212).

In the understanding of narrative, I take a position close to MacIntyre's that it can include three steps of life even though some of them are imaginary. Although Mink denies this view due to the impossibility of having these as actual experiences, I reckon that MacIntyre's opinion can be adopted as the method of constructing one's view of life. I, nonetheless, do not accept his opinion entirely, and reconsider the necessity of making a short-term intention connect to the context of a whole life (this point will be discussed later in this chapter). Whilst, as a matter of whether we can include the beginning and end in our narrative account of life, I affirm MacIntyre's insistence rather rejecting it. We may not always reconstruct our memory according to our far distant future, but it is *possible* that the narrative understanding of life involves birth and death in its structure as imaginary but definitive periods.

In short, the temporal order is a standard that is used when memory is reconstructed. The sense that our existences spread over time is essential for this order, and narrative is used to construct it. Ricoeur understands the necessity to this operation that we read our end into the beginning and the beginning into the end, and this repetition makes the perspective of experiences in memory.¹⁴⁴ It is called 'narrative time,' which consists of a temporal structure that is not only made from the physical measurement of time but also made from the inner sense of time.

Although we cannot know the outcome of life by ourselves, we still produce an account of our actions. This account can be a standard by which one's own experiences are ordered. Thus, a person is an agent, a narrator of his or her own experience, whose concept of identity is shaped through the organisation of his or her actions. As I emphasised before, I mainly concentrate on a way to give order to experiences from

¹⁴⁴ Ricoeur (1981, p. 181).

one's own perspective, so this is the concept of personal identity made from the first person's viewpoint. It is our nature to be restricted existences in time, so the narrative form of memory is partly chronologically organised. We assumed two standards of order before, and the other was causation, which works to give relations of cause and effect to events, so we will next discuss this work.¹⁴⁵

2.5. The Causal Order of the Narrative Form

The Matter of Intention

The causal order of the reconstruction of memory is defined as that by which an experience is arranged in the relation of cause and effect. It helps to make sense of events through putting them in an intelligible context. I suppose that this account may introduce two arguments: If it is really called the causal order; it fails to lead to a teleological aspect of one's own actions. Therefore, I shall first consider those points, and then move to the discussion of the causal order in a narrative account of life.

For the consideration of the former point of view, it should be mentioned that the causal order that is examined here leans towards studies in narrative theory. Its typical example is Forster's distinction between a story (which is contrasted to the temporal order in this chapter) and a plot (which is contrasted to the causal order) that we have seen at the end of section 2.3. The causal order of this use works for connecting one event to another by locating them in the relation of cause and effect. Hence, it is the

¹⁴⁵ For further discussion of chronological explanation of narrative, specifically concerned with history, see White (1978).

method of making a comprehensible account between events within the framework of causality. What I will examine in this section is the sort of causality that is often used in narrative theory.¹⁴⁶ It thus does not always match the study of causality in philosophical literature, for instance, as Kant discusses that any event in the universe must necessarily have a cause, and attempts to theorise causality as a prior conception.¹⁴⁷ We do not ask whether or not the causal order is really applicable for the law of the universe, but it is more concerned with the manner through which we organise our memory in reference to our experiences.

The second question of causal order can be described thus: if the causal order can be regarded as a standard that makes connection between events, there might not be any room for our intention when we describe human actions. In this case, the causal order may seem to lead to a systematic conjunction by which events are mechanically located, so it fails to include any aim, prospect, or emotion in human actions. In this case, the problem lies in the use of 'causality' between philosophical arguments and narrative theory. I propose that the intention of actions shall not necessarily conflict with the causal order of the narrative form. This notion may appear to be against a common view of causality that is usually opposed to teleology (which briefly means that agents have a goal-directed intention in their actions). However, as I mentioned in the first question, the causal order in this thesis is to give an intelligible account to actions in accordance with the context of one's own life.¹⁴⁸ If we stand at this viewpoint, I would suggest that the causal order and teleological view are not necessarily against each other.

¹⁴⁶ For example, Roy Jay Nelson defines causality in narrative as '*a readerly hypothesis about a relationship of derivativeness between two observed phenomena*.' Nelson (1990, p. xxv).

¹⁴⁷ Kant (1963).

¹⁴⁸ This sort of causality can be found in some research of narrative theory. For the arguments of causality in narrative theory, for instance, see Chatman (1978, pp. 45-48).

Since it is the matter of the judgement of experiences, it is not an absolute theory by which everything is ordered in the same manner, but there is scope for including intention. This view is partly influenced by the work of George Henrik von Wright. In his discussion, he defines 'quasi-causal explanation'. This definition will be used to help clarify the use of causal order in this section.

According to von Wright, the quasi-causal explanation is used to show the reason why an event occurs: 'They [the quasi-causal explanations] help us to understand what something *is* (e.g. pain, and not horror) or for which reason (e.g. oppression) it happens.' The explanations that belong to this type are often depicted as to '*why* something happened *necessarily*.'¹⁴⁹ He defines this notion as the investigation of the method by which human intention is inserted into the explanations of actions, especially in history and social sciences. For example, a description 'There was an uprising among the people, because the government was corrupt and oppressive' can be regarded as causal, because it refers to the past event (the governments' tyranny) in order to show the reason of the later event (the uprising). However, von Wright suggests that this could also be regarded as a kind of teleological explanation, since that situation can also be explained 'The aim of the uprising was obviously to get rid of an evil from which the people had been suffering.'¹⁵⁰ In this version, the event of the uprising is interpreted as an emancipation of the people from the atrocious situation, and it could be said that the quasi-causal explanation is modelled in order to unify this type of causal (or von Wright also depicts it as 'nomic') explanation and the teleological explanation.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ The quasi-causal explanation is compared to another type of that which is described as to 'how something is or became possible' (Von Wright, 1971, pp. 84-85). For more discussion of this notion, see (Ibid., especially chapter III).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁵¹ One of the characteristics of the quasi-causal explanation by von Wright is that the

I suppose that the quasi-causal explanation by von Wright can be compared in relation to the causal order in the narrative theory that has been mentioned above. That causal order is the organisation of events through which a plot is made, and in this notion it does not necessarily eliminate the intention of an agent from its order. Ricoeur discusses this sort of causal explanation in his thought of history and narrative in reference to von Wright: Ricoeur indicates that if we think about the unity of the nomic and teleological explanation, it will lead us to ask 'Whether a guideline from the order of understanding is not lacking for holding together the nomic and the teleological segments of a quasi-causal explanation.' Ricoeur's answer to this question is that 'this guideline is plot, insofar as it is a synthesis of the heterogeneous.' He describes a plot as to make an intelligible view between events, which holds intention, motivation, or aim of an agent.¹⁵² I thus consider that if we accept this kind of view of causal explanation, the causal order in this section will not necessarily be opposed to the teleological aspect, but it can include the intention of an action in its use. Based on that idea, the term 'causal order' is employed in this thesis. If this account is acceptable, we shall next see its work through which the order of events is given in relation to one's life.

The Thought of the Causal Order

As an instance that shows the importance to give an intelligible explanation between events, I first mention MacIntyre's idea. He presents the example of an unknown young man who turns to us at a bus stop and says, 'The name of the common wild duck is

validity of a nomic connection is not the problem. In the example of the uprising, the question whether or not the intention of the uprising is right is not the matter, but how that event can be described is taken into question.

¹⁵² Ricoeur (1984, p. 142).

Histerionicus histerionicus histerionicus.' This sentence is not itself incorrect, but the problem is the difficulty faced in guessing what he wants to mean by the utterance and how we can answer it. MacIntyre gives possible explanations of this sentence, and claims that the discovery of a proper cause makes the sentence reasonable. For example, the man might mistake us for the person who asked if he knew the Latin name of the common wild duck yesterday; A psychotherapist encouraged him to talk to unknown people, whatever the topic, in order to overthrow his shyness. In each case, we can give an acceptable reason to his utterance. This is the work of putting a sentence into its proper location in an intelligible story. Thus, whatever the cause of the young man's utterance, the act of utterance is comprehensible if we can locate it in an intelligible context, namely in a narrative understanding.¹⁵³ Human actions are thought to be reasonable if they are provided with a proper account, and I suppose that the causal order is a method of making this account as well as the temporal order.

The work of interpreting an experience in the context of one's conditions is often observed in the process of psychoanalysis. Ricoeur understands the work of psychoanalytic treatment as replacing fragmented episodes with a consistent and intelligible narrative: 'the very goal of the whole process of the cure...is to substitute for the bits and pieces of stories that are unintelligible as well as unbearable a coherent and acceptable story, in which the analysand can recognise his or her self-constancy.'¹⁵⁴ If inconsistent episodes are placed in the context of cause and effect, they become explainable pieces of a life story. This has been a method in psychoanalysis from its earliest time, so what Freud does for his patients is to analyse and extract symbolic

¹⁵³ MacIntyre (1984, p. 210).

¹⁵⁴ Ricoeur (1988a, p. 247).

meanings from their fragmented statements in order to reorganise these into an accountable story. Under his interpretation, Dora's hysteria is retold as the censure of her father, and Rat man's obsession is explained as his mental conflict with his father.¹⁵⁵ The case histories show the way in which Freud attempts to give a narrative consistency to subjects' statements.¹⁵⁶

This causal order of memory is applied to the more general recollection of memory. The process of remembering our own past is, for example, examined by Brian J. Reiser, John B. Black, and Peter Kalamarides.¹⁵⁷ In their research, subjects are asked several questions which relate to their own experiences, and the type of strategies of recollection they use are analysed. The retrieval of an event is considered as a process of re-understanding it, in which the event is first recalled based on its general context, and then specified in terms of more particular features. In an interview, a student is asked to think of a time when he went to a public library and of what came to mind. The subject remembered one public library which was a mile away from his house, but did not recall any particular event. Then, he tried to remember when he had been studying, because it must have been in such a situation that he needed some books. He finally specified an event when he went to borrow a book on running but did not have his card, so could not take the book out.

This interview is analysed such that the subject narrows his thought down from the general knowledge of 'a library' to a specific library, and then focuses on his reason

¹⁵⁵ Freud (1949).

¹⁵⁶ Some believe that narrative in psychoanalytic treatment does not only simply work to relocate experiences in terms of making a reasonable story, but that we need to ponder the form of narrative deeply. There is not enough space to discuss this topic, but for further discussion, see Slavoj Žižek's analysis of Lacan (1997, '3: The narrative occlusion of antagonism,' pp. 10-13).

¹⁵⁷ Reiser, Black, and Kalamarides (1986, pp. 100-121).

for going there in order to recall a particular experience. This is a strategy of recalling memory relevant to the causal relation, and this 'entails asking the question, "Why would I have performed that activity?" ' An intelligible experience is also an experience accountable by the person who remembers it, and enquiring after the reason for the experience brings us to an answer concerned with its causal relatedness. Besides, in order to make a causal relation between events, the matter of perspective becomes essential too. Goldie puts emphasis upon the necessity of considering the position of the narrator in organising a life-story, and claims 'A narrative can report or otherwise indicate the perspective or point of view...of one or more of the characters internal to the narrative, of whom one might be the internal narrator'.¹⁵⁸ His 'internal narrator' can be applied to what I regard as 'the person who organises his or her own narrative by oneself'.¹⁵⁹ Thus, as Danto's indication suggests, a particular point of view is unavoidable when composing the causal order of our experiences.¹⁵⁹

It is true that not all questions of memory, 'why it was done in that way,' always have certain answers. There are experiences of which no account is given due to forgetfulness of the details, lack of enough knowledge to judge it, or ignorance of the events. Nonetheless, I consider that we can say that we grasp our past if the largest part of memory is consistent, so the causal order and/or the temporal order are essential in terms of the reconstruction of memory as long as the greatest part of experiences can be explained in the context of long term intentions. It is the work of making a context, and we have thought of the way to gather experiences comprehensibly. If we cannot find out the meaning of an action, we may ask what the purpose of the action is or why it was

¹⁵⁸ Goldie (2003, p. 203).

¹⁵⁹ It indicates that we sometimes narrate our stories from a quasi-third person viewpoint. Nicola King's analysis of a self-narrative that is told by a survivor of Auschwitz is also effective for the consideration of the narrator's standpoint (2000).

done in that way, and the answer starting from 'because' roughly belongs to the causal explanation of that action.

This view might cause questions that whether or not a person is actually reduced to a narrative, and who is the narrator of that narrative. For those questions, I indicate again that our issue is not to investigate the criteria of a person, but is to depict the manner by which the experiences of a person are given to an intelligible account that is arranged from a certain perspective. It is the issue of the manner, so I do not claim that human beings are actually and truly narratives. What I however insist on is that the narrative understanding makes intelligible connection between experiences, and our perspective of life is structured based on that connection. We live and tell our own narrative.

Moreover, as I already pointed out before, our memory is reconstructed in accordance with the present perspective of life, so the narrative as a life-story is not already defined but always transformable. It means that the relation between the understanding of that narrative and the person who organises the narrative is interactive. The perspective can modify the description of the experiences, and the perspective can be influenced by the accumulation of experiences. In this respect, the narrator of a life-story is thought to be that person, and even though the narrator does not know the conclusion of that narrative, it does not prevent that person from being a narrator. To put it differently, that narration never finishes at least whilst that person is alive, but still a narrator can make a narrative from the perspective at that time. The narrator is involved in the narrative, but it does not become a real problem in order to tell a life-story from the first person's perspective. The act of narration forms the comprehension of experiences and the sense of personhood of that person is shaped through narrating what

happened in the life.¹⁶⁰ Hence, I see that the framework of personal identity resides in the performance by which experiences become intelligible by narrating them.

In conclusion, the reconstruction of memory is organised according to the narrative form which is constructed by two standards, the temporal order and the causal order. The meaning of our experiences is determined by reference to the context of life, and I have worked to elucidate the necessity of this account of actions. The framework of personal identity resides in this performance by which experiences become intelligible through narrating them. This is the notion of order in the narrative account in this thesis, but there is still anxiety that the term 'causal order' may sound too strong to represent the above mentioned idea. The matter of whether or not the causal order and teleological explanation can coexist in the account of the narrative approach possibly needs more study. It is a considerable point to examine but requires more research, so I would like to leave it as my further study.

Then, although I have demonstrated the adequacy of the narrative account as the manner to form the concept of personal identity, I hesitate to push forward the idea that only explainable experiences deserve to constitute life. Is there any experience which does not fit in the narrative form but still has influence on one's life? This is a question of the minimum of the narrative approach in analysing the concept of personal identity. I do not deny the need for the narrative approach in terms of understanding the past, but still feel it necessary to ask if this approach is applicable to every case. This will be the consideration of elements which may not be described in the existing narrative form but are still concerned with making the concept of personal identity.

¹⁶⁰ This sense of personhood is, for instance, described thus: The question of personal identity as the continuity of characters 'seeks to define a relation that holds between a *person* and *particular actions, experiences, or characteristics* that are hers' (Schechtman, 1996, p. 77).


2.6 Replacing the Ambition of the Narrative Approach with a Qualified Narrative Approach

We have considered the work of the narrative understanding in the reconstruction of memory, and the concept of personal identity is thought to acquire consistency through that work. However, in the latter half of this chapter, I will consider the extent to which this understanding is applied to the organisation of experiences. We have examined MacIntyre's arguments in the former sections, which emphasise the inevitability of narrative for the unity of life, so I shall also begin the discussion of its extent with a question of his making.

A main purpose of MacIntyre's writing is supposed to seek the life of virtue, and the practice of virtue in his argument must not be divided into segments in terms of one's roles but consists in 'the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life'.¹⁶¹ Life is thus envisaged, or should be envisaged, as an individual narrative which is lived towards the quest for virtue. This is an ideal which is acquired with effort, that means it is not always naturally constructed. Moreover, this is the reason why MacIntyre discusses contemporary life as to which the importance of the unity of life is neglected. However, I want to reconsider the need for life to be consistent.

It is certain that we often connect short episodes in order to make a longer story of

¹⁶¹ MacIntyre (1984, p. 218).



them, but I first claim that the extent of the story does not always need to spread from birth to death. In this view I do not suggest that the narrative understanding does not work at all. This was already rejected as an improper approach to the reconstruction of memory with the help of Samuel Johnson's example. The occasion that we will discuss is that in which the narrative form of life is kept to some extent, but that may not be extended through the life, and in which there are difficulties in putting some experiences into that form. The following discussion is in two parts, the first is about experiences which have sought their proper explanations but have not yet obtained them, and the second is about the method by which we grasp the inconsistent experiences mentioned in the first part. Therefore, it deals with some of the defects of the narrative form, though I would say again that it is not the insistence of a total collapse of the narrative account, but it points out its insufficiency in order to depict the interrelation between one's episodes and the life.

We shall start with the study by Craig R. Barclay in which the characteristics of experiences which cannot be settled by the existing narrative form are investigated. Barclay focuses on the difficulties faced in making a coherent narrative of specific events in his research. He allows that it is natural for people to establish a consistent narrative structure of their memory, and it makes their lives steady and comprehensible. However, he also claims that there are cases in which the narrative accounts do not work well to make an 'idealised ecological model of autobiographical remembering' that he defines as a structure organised by the purpose, process, and products of remembering.¹⁶² He specifically analyses those who have experienced traumatic events, because they often lack a consistent view of the events through which the significance

¹⁶² Barclay (1995, p. 97).

of a particular event is explained.

The main reason why their narrative accounts are apparently incoherent is thought to lie in the problem of presenting their sentiment towards the traumatic episodes in the existing form of expression. Through the analysis of interviews of survivors of the Holocaust, Barclay states his opinion of why traumatic experiences slip through the organised narrative form:

[T]hey [the survivors of the Holocaust] have the embodied experiences of atrocities that cannot be conveyed to others in a descriptive language. This claim may generalize other victims of trauma, who lack a coherent autobiographical narrative of the traumatic experiences. They...cannot explain why they were traumatized and frequently lack the language to describe what happened to them – a language of victimization.¹⁶³

The statement of traumatic experiences is not dissolved in the common framework of narrative, because it does not prepare a language by which these experiences are described. He argues that this is the reason why such people struggle to find the words to express past events. A film, *Gothica*, may help to understand this situation. At the beginning, a woman, who is a patient in a hospital for criminally insane women, tells a psychiatrist that she has been raped by a devil. The psychiatrist wonders why she repeatedly mentions this, and thinks she may just be reiterating the story of her stepfather who she killed. However, finally it is discovered that she was actually raped by a prison officer in that hospital. The patient cannot talk about that fact using words that people usually use, but can only approach it in her own manner.¹⁶⁴ In my interpretation, I would say that this is a case in which an accomplished expression is not

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁶⁴ *Gothica*, 2003.

effective, and in which people struggle to find a representation of their mind.

These cases indicate a criticism of the existing narrative approach to the analysis of autobiographical remembering as well, since there are experiences which are embodied but cannot be told intelligibly. I understand that this is not a total denial of the narrative understanding of personal memory but a suggestion of the minimums of this approach. Barclay imagines that victims who share similar kinds of traumatic experiences might be able to create their own idioms and narratives which are comprehensible only in their group.

Although Barclay tries to prove the shortcomings of the narrative approach in his article, he concludes that even though narrative accounts of experiences are limited, they still provide 'a useful but incomplete methodology for explaining the creation, use, and meaning of autobiographical memories in the construction of self'.¹⁶⁵ One's life will be meaningful, he says, if experiences are put in the comprehensible structure of personal history. The narrative approach does not cover all experiences, but there is a possibility of creating a new narrative style by which unexpressed sentiment may be realised.

Barclay's discussion hints at the consideration of the minimums of the narrative approach, and I will focus on the idea that there is something which cannot be represented in the existing narrative form. His subjects are restricted to traumatic experiences, but we shall extend the range of the discussion. We have previously concentrated only on the point that not all of our experiences are expressed in the unified structure of narrative, but I would say that this thought is applicable to more ordinary situations. For example, as a prominent thought that pursues a new discourse

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 123.

that did not exist before, I want to count some feminist theories which disclose the minimum of the authorised narrative approach.

I centre our topic here upon the opinion that there is an insufficient social system in order to recount female subjectivity. This criticism is often directed towards the authority of the existing manner of narrative, so it can be interpreted as revealing a blind spot of the narrative consistency. Luce Irigaray's discussion of Freud indicates this deficiency: 'it would be interesting to know what might become of psychoanalytic notions in a culture that did not repress the feminine. Since the recognition of a 'specific' female sexuality would challenge the monopoly on value held by the masculine sex alone.'¹⁶⁶ This is a censure of the masculine tradition based on which academic study has mostly developed. In order to depict oneself as an active subject, she asserts that we shall need a different strategy from that traditional style of study, otherwise there is a danger of falling into the standard categories into which females have been placed. In relation to our discussion, her statement is read as the suggestion to generate a new basis of discourse that might be more comfortable for some people, who have not been suited to the existing discourse.

This type of discussion can be found in arguments that aim to gain a more appropriate mode of discourse in which women can present themselves as the subject of narratives. Thus, what Judith Butler insists on in *Gender Trouble* is the reconsideration of political discourse through the analysis of the relation between gender, politics, and

¹⁶⁶ Irigaray (1985, p. 73).

identity.¹⁶⁷ The title of G. C. Spivak's writing, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, manifests her attention to the view of intellectuals on subaltern woman, who are located in a dependent position. Spivak assesses the intellectuals' responsibility for approaching the subaltern woman and the difficulty and danger in studying the silent minority's location. It is anguishing to devise an eminently sensitive narrative on the subject.

The acquisition of one's own discourse is counted as a condition of participating in society not as subordinate but as independent beings. Although the variety of feminists' theories are not standardised to one idea, it can be said that the search for a discourse by which untold narratives are disclosed is one topic in a number of debates.¹⁶⁸ There might be a question: As long as the concept of personal identity can be compared to the narrative form, people are, anyhow, narrativised during their lives. Even in the cases which are above mentioned, the subjects are thought to be able to acquire the narrative form in this notion, because they may, anyhow, hold the view of their past. My view to this opinion is that if people do not totally lose their sense of unification, they are indeed narrativised in some sense. However, putting their experiences into the existing narrative form bewilders them, since the meaning of experiences is seen not to be expressed sufficiently in that way. In such cases, people may feel estrangement to that existing narrative form, and I will concentrate upon depicting that situation. People who do not find comfortable places in their culture,

¹⁶⁷ Butler founds her writing on these questions, which can be interpreted as the quest for a new meaning of 'gender': 'we ought to ask, what political possibilities are the consequence of a radical critique of the categories of identity? What new shape of politics emerges when identity as a common ground no longer constrains the discourse of feminist politics? And to what extent does the effort to locate a common identity as the foundation for a feminist politics preclude a radical inquiry into the political construction and regulation of identity itself?' (1990, p. ix.)

¹⁶⁸ For the variety of such examples, see E. Marks and I. de Courtivron (1981), Hélène Cixous (1981).

society, and history are subjects who tend to fall out of the structure of existing narratives. People might keep silence in this isolated situation, or fight against the system which excludes their discourses. Whatever they choose, it is certain that their states imply that their narratives are not told enough in the accomplished structures, so I insist that the narrative form becomes an important issue in that situation.

I have referred to two distant cases, traumatic experiences and feminist theories. This does not mean that I want to bridge the gap between them, but I cited them together due to the commonality that their narrative eludes the common structure of representation. There must be a number of cases that show the struggle of obtaining a mode of expression that may depict one's situation better than existing modes. I interpret these struggles as signs of movements that endeavour to survive by making discourses more suitable for them. Trauma and some feminist theories can be remarkable instances that indicate what these struggles want to acquire.

In another case, some memory such as a vague feeling or an impression of music is also difficult to concretely describe in the narrative form, but I do not reckon them as of a kind with the above struggles. The reason is that they do not become obstructions to forming a consistent narrative, so they do not need to cast about for their proper places in society. On the contrary, the cases that we have seen are those that cannot be located in the existing discourses in tradition, so they have to conflict with the stability of narrative if they want to be represented more adequately. For this reason, something that is not described since it is merely not suitable for some types of expressions is omitted from the above discussion.

Moreover, although we have examined cases that desire to establish their unique expressions, there might be another possibility: that the notion which indicates the

minimum of the narrative approach does not even need to take the narrative form. Even though some experiences do not become pieces of a whole picture of life, there might be a way in which they survive as a fragmentation, not a fragmentation of the whole but a fragmentation as it is. If we push ahead with this thought, we see the dissolution of the unity of narrative in organising memory. This dissolution is pondered by Lyotard who contemplates the system which resolves unsettled elements in the community, and he examines the method by which these elements survive their exclusion from the system.

2.7. Residue: the Excess Part of Society

The issue of narrative takes a central position in Lyotard's discussions. He develops a number of particular views concerned with narrative, and in those various points, we here converge upon his notion of 'residue'. First, Lyotard regards narrative in tradition as the function that produces collective memory and identity in society. That narrative is particularly located in primitive societies in which a tight interaction between members and their community is found owing to their exclusive attitude to that which is exterior to them. It is supposed that the society in which there is less exchange of information with external culture is apt to be cliquish, but is also one in which the closeness between members of the community grows intense.

People in such a society are assumed to learn rules and manners of their community through telling and listening to traditional narratives. Lyotard writes metaphorically that the traditional narratives are 'like a plateful of anecdotes

[historiettes],’ which are absorbed by everyday conversation as folktales, precept, proverbs, implications, and so on. The anecdotes as general knowledge are too natural to be specifically focused on in daily life, and people cultivate their manners in the society through the absorption of them day by day. These narratives are digested by the members of the society and become their body and soul. In contrast, a residue is defined as the leftover of the orderly narratives which are ‘not consumable as anecdote and which has no place in the universe of narrative phrases’.¹⁶⁹ The residue is something which runs off the range of the traditional narrative form, so is not assimilated into the basis of the society.

The concrete subjects of the residue are different depending on culture, but their characteristic lies in the point that they cannot be absorbed into the standard of the society. On this point, it can be assumed that many societies are supposed to possess a system to deal with the residue. Using the example of primitive societies, Lyotard depicts the system of ‘sacrifice’ as a method of the disposal of uncontrollable elements. That which threatens the stability of the society must be released or deported, and a way by which this is done is to sublimate them by ritualistic activity (so, this sacrifice does not necessary mean to actually kill something). The things which are ‘transformed into an airy element: smoke from sacrificial fires, the volatility of shaman spirits’ are thought of as the residues, and their obstructive aspect to the society is removed in the process of the sacrifice.¹⁷⁰

The surplus, excess, or extraneous element which does not become part of history in the society is cautiously put into the sacrifice and sublimated in safety. In addition,

¹⁶⁹ Lyotard (1988, p. 154).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.,

although the sacrifice represents the dissolution of the residue in Lyotard's writing, other ceremonial events can be included as examples of this method.¹⁷¹ Festivals, religious ceremonies, and folk customs which separate sacred events from the common can be counted as systems which work to release the residue of the society. Contradictions, discontents, and questions of the existing society are gathered up in ordinary life, and some rituals are arranged for the sake of the deliverance and forgetfulness of them. Human communities must empirically realise the necessity of the system through which the excess is dispersed, or it may be accumulated enough to collapse the society.

This is the method by which the residue is dissolved, but Lyotard also considers the case in which the residue is not sublimated but seeks a way to survive without losing its particularity.¹⁷² This is represented by the term 'phrase'. A phrase in his thought is characterised as a minimum style of expression, so it does not necessarily take the form of writing. A distinction of the phrase is that it does not always need to be put in the context of a whole life story from its beginning to end, but its meaning can be condensed into a link to another phrase. It is not enough to be considered a narrative, but it does not mean that the linkage of phrases is meaningless. The reason why Lyotard adapts the notion of a phrase is seen in his discussion of narrative in his relatively later texts.

Lyotard understands the operation of narrative as making harmony of phrases, so

¹⁷¹ When Lyotard asserts that 'To call this residue the "accursed part" [*part maudite*] is useless pathos,' it is indisputable that he keeps in his mind Georges Bataille's discussion of the expenditure of excess energy. Bataille copes with the issue of the humanity based on Marcel Mauss's gift-theory, and Bataille regards the expenditure of the gift as the accursed share in which various situations of the consumption of the wealth are included (1991).

¹⁷² 'Phrase' is one of the main themes of *The Differend* (Lyotard, 1988), and the discussion of phrases in this thesis is largely owed to that text.

it works to settle differences of phrases into a harmonious story. To make a story by phrases is understood as to draw a certain line between them, so it shakes off phrases that do not comply with that line. Hence, narrative removes the heterogeneousness of phrases that may disturb the consistency of narrative, but Lyotard focuses on the aspect of the uniqueness of phrases. I suppose that this disturbance leads to two attitudes to the narrative approach; one is the requirement of one's own discourses that has been examined in this section, and the other is a doubt of the necessity of the integrating narrative. The second attitude is also represented by the form of a phrase and the linkage of phrases that do not require the unity of narrative but make a sequence or chain of phrases.

The loss of unity of the self, identity, and reality seem to be argued at present more than before. The identity of a person has been a notable topic in philosophical discussions, and although its importance does not fade away, I assume that another type of argument has also arisen today. This is the discrediting of the idea that individuals are unified existences. Although there are a number of studies that seek for the cause of this discrediting, I want to approach this problem in terms of the expansion of information that has particularly begun with the development of the electric and/or electronic media. This issue will be considered in chapter four and chapter five as a distinct feature of the present age, which I call 'postmodern'. Thus, I defer the full discussion of the breakdown of the unity of narrative and the influence of the latest media on it to later opportunities, and present only an outline here. This will help me to present the way in which I unfold this topic hereafter.

It is my assumption that our concept of what a person should be is largely

cultivated by circumstances that surround us.¹⁷³ If the circumstances thoroughly alter, the concept of a person, and the concept of personal identity as well, will undergo changes to a greater or lesser degree. The cause that gives rise to the changes can be multifarious, and I suppose that the role of the media can be counted as the one of them. Information is more rapidly circulated than ever before, and we receive a massive amount of messages regardless of whether we like it or not, and from where they comes. Today, information attacks us from around the world through numerous media. I regard those characteristics of the present media as an opportunity that triggers off wide-ranging transformations of what a personhood holds, and insist that the change of a medium can possess the power to alter social system and tradition.¹⁷⁴ If this notion is adequate, today's media are also able to show their particular effects on society.

In the latest media, I specifically pay attention to digital media in which the meaning of human interaction seems to suffer some changes. Of writing on the computer network, the question 'who is the subject of the phrase?' becomes less significant, but a variety of phrases interact with each other without reference to their subjects as the solid and unified beings to which phrases belong.¹⁷⁵ Communication in the digital world tends to converge upon the link of phrases at a particular time rather than put the phrase in a longer context of discourse. Often, it is not easy to know exactly who really wrote which, and to which context the messages belonged before. This is a characteristic of computer mediated communication in which people do not always disclose themselves as a whole but make relationship with each other as phrases, so in

¹⁷³ For instance, Alfred Schutz depicts this aspect by demonstrating a case that a stranger enters different culture and society. In that society, people naturally know manners there and behave according to 'thinking as usual,' but a stranger must learn patterns of that culture intentionally (Schutz, 1964, Chapter One).

¹⁷⁴ Innis (2003, p. 21).

¹⁷⁵ Lefebvre (2000).

this sense electric technology seems to work 'to disperse the self in the world'.¹⁷⁶ Writing in the digital network can be received irrespective of the totality of its subject, so the unity of a person is not necessarily completed, on this thought.

The consistency of narrative is not the necessary condition in this communication.¹⁷⁷ This tendency depicts an image of dispersal in various media, and as a typical discussion of this view, I evoke Jean Baudrillard's argument about reality in which individuals are reduced to mass-produced codes.¹⁷⁸ He insists that reality has vanished in a flood of simulation, which does not accord with subjects in the actual world but is a reflection of reflection like a picture in a hall of mirrors. Social systems produce copies without origins for their continuance, because the ceaseless reproduction provides the ceaseless consumption through which the system is retained. Reality is swept over by this symbolic reproduction and becomes 'hyper reality' in which only the image of reality remains, and individuals also become coded information in that hyper reality. Persons are depicted as pieces of reproductions in the simulation, as mutually reacting with each other. We see ourselves in the reflection of the media in which life as the origin of simulation collapses but the multiplying codes react upon each other. Persons are imagined as indefinite movements of codes that do not aim to establish a comprehensible account of the self as a whole.

The concept of personal identity faces its destruction in this simulation-society, since the context of narrative as the kernel of the person is dissolved. To ask the criterion of personal identity also loses its meaning since there is only a play between

¹⁷⁶ Poster (1990, p. 128).

¹⁷⁷ Although this does not mean that people do not ask for consistency according to the tradition in the actual world, I stress the aspect that the requirement to be consist becomes lessened in this communication. For more consideration, see chapter five.

¹⁷⁸ Baudrillard (1993).

copies that are not restored to their original place. Poster determines that Baudrillard depicts the end of the previous idea of society and history as 'a culture in which subjects orient their practice around a sense of collective direction, in which public events are interpreted in relation to a "rational" metanarrative.' Instead, Baudrillard argues about the decline of the meta position from which events converge, but asserts that there is the flow of encoding and decoding of reproductions in this immensely computerized society. A person as the only organizer of their own narrative is lost in layers of hyper reality, and a number of simulations without origin are diffused in the media.

I read these features of Baudrillard's opinion as the signs that the media have the potential to change our way of viewing a person. The situation that Baudrillard illustrates shall not happen without the expansion of electric and/or electronic media. We are absorbed into an incessant production of images through which we contact with the world; for example, we buy, sell, desire, and communicate with images offered by the media. These features of the media indicate the question of whether or not people have different notions of themselves under different media.

I have considered the minimum of narrative understanding in the last two sections, and shall review some points here. At the beginning of this chapter, the narrative approach to the concept of personal identity was depicted as that, that gives coherence to experiences through life. Then, I asked the question if it is necessary to cover the whole life when memory is reconstructed. A model of a person as an agent that organises his or her actions through a life is reconsidered in that thought. This is reduced to a question that whether or not the concept of personal identity can be formed without relying on the unit of a narrative. It leads to a fragmentation of the narrative as a story through life but focused more on a linkage between experiences.. Rather, I insist

that the fragmentation particularly becomes popular from the late twentieth century, and one of its causes is assumed to be the expansion of information.¹⁷⁹ Based on this assumption, we see if the manner by which information is carried can possess any influence on the concept of personal identity. By the fragmentation of narrative, I do not assert that the narrative consistency is unnecessary, but insist that the reliance of the consistency may have been doubted recently. It is specifically observed in the present age, in which a notion of a person, which has been cultivated based on the unification of personhood, is reconsidered. The reason why that notion is called into question will be examined in the rest of the chapters from several angles including its historical changes, the relation to the media, and the particularities of the contemporary era, which is the so-called postmodern age.

Hence, the fragmentation of narrative is certainly an important topic for us hereafter, but I should stress again that it does not mean total rejection of narrative account. In some studies, researchers direct their attention towards an idea that the narrative account of life does not survive any more. I nonetheless should confess that I am not radical enough to persist in the idea that that we are only pieces of information without any sense of unification at all. I in some degree sympathise with Robert Scholes's comment on the idea of anti-narratives, which disapprove of the necessity of the narrative order for the unity of a person. Although he evaluates this idea as a challenge to overthrow the narrative understanding of a person, he affirms 'they [the narrative processes] are too deeply rooted in human physical and mental processes to be

¹⁷⁹ For instance, the relation between circumstances and personal identity is considered by Schechtman as follows: 'the view of morality, agency, and self-interest...come from exclusive attention to a traditional conception of the self.' Thus, our judgments of the conditions of identity 'would be different if we operated with a different conception of what constitutes the story of a person's life' (1996, p. 103)

dispensed with by members of this species. We can and should be critical of narrative structuration, but I doubt if even the most devoted practitioner of anti-narrativity can do without it'.¹⁸⁰ I accept Scholes's opinion on the point that we may not be able to completely abandon the narrative form for understanding our past. As long as we keep a certain comprehension of our experiences, it is assumed that memory is reconstructed through our own perspective.

However, even though we may not stop telling our experiences, it might not be necessary for this to take the form of narrative. I suspect that a phrase does not need to be put in the longer context of a whole story, but that it can be treated as not-yet-represented expression that may bring about a new type of linkage. Thus, although I agree that we do not completely abandon the sense of making some consistency of our experiences, I still insist that we can depict the status of a person more loosely and scatteringly than as a fixed unity. That is why I do not only focus on 'differences,' but the work of making 'identity' is also crucial in this thesis. Based on this notion, I will pursue the study of the fragmentation of personal identity hereafter, whilst remaining more positive than Scholes.

To sum up, we have seen the work of the narrative account and how it is used to make an intelligible explanation of that person's experiences over time. This is different from the criteria-arguments of personal identity, because it does not ask enough and sufficient conditions of identity but asks the manner of explanation by which characters of a person at different times are given a comprehensible view. Two standards were counted as the order of this narrative understanding; the temporal order and the causal order.

¹⁸⁰ Scholes (1981, p. 208).

Their operation is reduced to the work by which one's experiences are put in understandable positions in the context of a whole life. The reconstruction of memory corresponds to one's own life in this manner, in which people are doers of actions as well as the narrators of life stories.

However, we should not overlook the point that not all experiences can be explained by this understanding. Straying from narrative consistency is not a case of mere forgetfulness or insignificant discrepancy of memory, but is the case in which experiences have an effect on life but cannot be fitted into the existing narrative form. This inconsistent memory is sorted into two types, one is the idea that has not yet acquired an adequate form and seeks a method of expression. The other is that which does not require the narrative form for its representation but acts as a phrase which does not contribute to make the unity of narrative. I claim that the narrative understanding of our identity is effective and it makes a basis of the unity of a person. Nonetheless, it would be too ambitious to claim that the narrative is the only form by which we can explain the concept of personal identity. I have therefore insisted that both works, the narrative approach and the minimum of that, are necessary for the study of personal identity. Because of this reason, I will consider the extent to which the dissolution of the narrative can be appropriate from here onwards.

We have seen the influence of the media as one of the reasons that the diffusion of identity has appeared at present. I proposed that if tradition in society dramatically changed, the understanding of a person may suffer this change, and the concept of personal identity, which is inseparably related to the understanding of a person, as well. In this change, the media play an important role, because a new medium is thought to possess the potential to change the social system through altering the circulation of

information.¹⁸¹ I believe that there are several points in media history at which a dramatic shift of the circulation of information occurred. I will divide the media history according to those points, and examine the temporal transformation of the concept of identity in them. This will also be the search for the time from which the modern study of personal identity arose in philosophy.

¹⁸¹ Marvin (1988, p. 4).

Chapter 3

The MEDIA

External Influences and the Concept of Personal Identity

3.1. The Social Factors of Identity

We have discussed the method by which the framework of personal identity is formed, and asked if the method can be unconditionally applied to all cases. The answer was negative, and we saw the reason in the minimum of the narrative approach, and examined that in the context of the present media. I will discuss this point further in the question; if the media have an influence upon the concept of personal identity, what sort of relevant features we can find in different media? In this study, I ask whether or not there is a particular medium through which the concept of personal identity comes into being in philosophical thought. This will lead to the consideration of media through time in relation to identity. For this matter, I specifically pay attention to the concept of 'person' in identity, because I assume that it is necessary to be conscious of individuality separate from the involvement of society in terms of establishing the concept of personal identity.

As a preparation for this discussion, I should clarify three points. First, although I will focus upon the work of the media in this chapter, I do not regard the media as the

only reason that introduces the transformation of the concept of a person and personal identity. The media are, in my opinion, an influential factor that can lead changes to the organisation of society and the understanding of a person, but there are a variety of causes that bring about the changes. For instance, the Industrial Revolution made a great impact on European societies in their industrial technology and labour situations, and the increase of the number of capitalist countries determines the trend of economic situations in the world. Not only the media, but also others such as politics, economics, or armaments are essential elements in terms of analysing the common view of a person at that time in that community. I am aware of the point that the transformation of society is not so simple that it can be reduced to just one cause, but it is also true that I cannot treat all such factors at once, or the point of the discussion will be vague. Therefore, I choose the media as one of the factors through which the transformation of the concept of personal identity can be examined. The reason that I concentrate on this factor will also be mentioned in 3.3.

Second, we need to determine the area of our research, because the historical development of the concept of personal identity is not the same around the world.¹⁸² Our target must be, broadly speaking, Western culture. The issue of personal identity first precisely examined as the subject of study there, and the conception of a person as an independent and responsible existence has also been well developed in this region. Away from this background, an argument about personal identity in philosophy would miss the mark. Thus, although other regions' situations will be cited as the occasion

¹⁸² It needs further research to compare the historical development of identity in various cultures, so I will not be involved in that discussion but only mention the text, *Nippon Seishin Bunseki* [The Psychoanalysis of Japan] by Kojin Karatani (2002). It is about the development of the nation in Japan in relation to the advent of the sense of individuality from around the twentieth century.

demands, I will mainly examine the historical change in that concept in Western cultures. Third, we are fundamentally involved in the society in which we were born and have grown. We cannot escape from this restriction, and our way of thinking and manners are essentially influenced by these external factors. Society is the ground against which the media work, so to confirm the interaction between people and society will be helpful in depicting the role of media.

In this chapter, we shall first confirm what kind of relation we can make between society and identity, and the media and identity. Since my intention here is to try to show the interaction between external factors and the concept of personal identity, their status in that notion should be considered before we discuss the characteristics of a particular medium. Then, we will move to historical changes of the media as a communication method, and examine this influence on the concept of identity at that time. I divide media history into four periods; the medium of oral culture, the medium of writing, the medium of printing, and electric and/or electronic media, and characterise the concept of identity in each medium.

In addition, although each period possesses its particular role in cultivating that concept, the most considerable period for us is that of the early modern age in which the term 'personal identity' has started to be used widely, as I will later discuss. Therefore, the medium of writing and of printing will be focused on more than the others due to their direct participation in the study of personal identity. Through examining media history, we shall follow the process by which people become aware of the concept of personal identity, particularly in the Western tradition. This study thus asks the ground from which today's arguments of personal identity has arisen, and I will attempt to demonstrate that the ground is not applicable to all human history but is the product of a

specific period of time. To mention in advance, it is my interest to reveal the present tendencies of the concept of personal identity if there is any. This notion already includes a presupposition that our concept of identity may not always be the same, and to present this transformability is what I intend to do in this chapter. For the particularities of contemporary concept of identity, I will spare chapter five, in which the work of electronic media is considered in particular.

3.2. The Interaction between Identity and Society

Unlike most infants of other animals, human babies cannot survive by themselves but need to be fostered for years after birth. During that period they are initiated into the basic knowledge of a community including language, behaviour, ways of thinking, and morality. We live in a society that existed before our birth and will exist after our death, and we are not free from this restriction. This involvement in society is a crucial theme in Alfred Schutz's research in respect of the system of knowledge in everyday life. In his view, people accept the sociocultural conditions of their community as guidelines for their lives that have been handed down from their ancestors, parents, teachers, and authorities. Almost all knowledge that we acquire is produced by members of the community, so Schutz states, 'All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous experiences of it...those experiences in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference'.¹⁸³ The inherited knowledge is incorporated in the

¹⁸³ Schutz (1962, p. 7).

way of thinking in which we fertilise the image of ourselves in the society.

Individuals in Schutz's thought are thus subjects that are cultivated in their society, so they are not characterised as distinct from their inherited knowledge. This kind of notion of persons is further exemplified in George Herbert Mead's notion that human beings are to be regarded as cultural and temporal products that structure themselves through relationships to other people. The organisation of a person is, according to Mead, formed by the common rules of a community: The organisation of self is made from the organisation of society in which our attitudes are formed in accordance with common sense there. Thus, 'A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct.' Although Mead agrees that each person has their own uniqueness, he argues that if there is no relationship to other members, consciousness of self would not be established. Self-understanding is only made from participation in society that reflects the 'general behaviour pattern of this social group'.¹⁸⁴ Individuals in his theory are the outcome of social organisation, so no personality is had without social interactions.

Schutz and Mead place emphasis on the involvement of a person in and the influence of the belonging society. Even if a person claims his or her independence from society, this 'independence' cannot be established separate from human communication. As long as a person uses a language and has an idea of other people, the person is not completely irrelevant to the notion of society. To take an extraordinary case, if there were a person who had never communicated with other human beings, he or she would not possess any concept of personal identity such as that which we develop. The 'personal', and the 'collective' both arise from relations and discords between an

¹⁸⁴ Mead (1967, pp. 162-164).

individual and others, so human communication is the unconditional factor for forming consciousness as a person.

We should be cautious about one point: Schutz and Mead do not claim that individuals are mere puppets of society that are worked without volition. Instead, they describe humans as subjects who represent their will through their lives. Thus, I interpret both researchers as claiming that individuals possess flexibility according to which they can modify their understanding of a person dependent upon the context of the belonging community. This mutability might appear to be too general to emphasise, but I insist on the necessity of clarifying this point. When we examine the issue of personal identity, we in the tradition of Western philosophy probably presume a person to be a distinctive and independent existence, but this idea is not absolutely common throughout various cultures and histories. This difference between concepts of a person and of personal identity is that which we have discussed here, so I want to place emphasis on this understanding.

A critical opinion of this view is that even if there are dissimilarities between individual lives in different circumstances, it does not mean they have different ways of identifying themselves. Therefore, it is not effectual to consider social changes in the study of personal identity. The life of a nun in the age of the French Revolution and the life of a pimp in the twenty-first century must be greatly different in terms of morality, judgement, evaluation, and principles of life. However, as long as they stand as independent individuals, the criteria by which they grasp the continuity of themselves would be the same. I do not agree with that opinion. It is true that as far as a kind of communication can occur between people (the understanding of a language, gestures, and so on), they in a strict sense may not be completely incomprehensible to each other.

However, I still insist that it is possible that there could be insuperable differences between people in greatly different circumstances as to what a person, personal, and identity are. Referring to the experiences of Tobias Schneebaum will help to understand this point. For his research, Schneebaum lived for a while with a primitive tribe, the Akaramas, in Peru. During his stay, he became aware of the lack of a sense of independence in that community. He notes that even the death of a member of the community is seemingly insignificant for the Akaramas: 'It was only hours then after his burial, but the Akaramas went their way as if he'd never existed, never died, never had been so much a part of their every moment.'¹⁸⁵ Schneebaum knew the dead man, so he grieved at his absence, but the members of the community who spent their lives with the man appeared to behave as if his death had no significance, or as if he did not exist at all. Schneebaum feels that this may show some deficiency in their concept of a person as a unique being.

Schneebaum's report is examined by Holstein and Gubrium as an instance of a tribe which seems to have almost no sense of individuality. They mention that the Akaramas 'did nothing independently, working, playing, hunting, and eating' and even sleeping together, and that 'the Akaramas hardly acknowledged separate individuals; each member was fully—and only—a part of the collectivity'.¹⁸⁶ If people did not act independently but always stayed with their fellow community members, it would be incredibly difficult to establish the inner self apart from communal life. Schneebaum left the tribe owing to a fear that the Akaramas' custom had encroached upon his Western subjectivity. The Akaramas might have a sense of individuality in their own

¹⁸⁵ Schneebaum (1970, p. 137).

¹⁸⁶ Holstein and Gubrium (2000, p. 11).

manner, but from Schneebaum's writing, we cannot gather whether they possess such a sense, or what the meaning of individuality is for them. We do not have enough evidence to analyse what concepts they have with regards to one another, but it is at least certain that their treatment of members of their community strikes Schneebaum as uncanny within his traditional idea of a person. I consider that the concept of personal identity must not work in this tribe in the same way as it is discussed in Western philosophy because of the insuperable distance between their culture and ours.¹⁸⁷

When we examine the life of a group of people in a different time and/or region, we should presuppose that our common sense may not apply to them and that they have their own customs. It is difficult to appreciate the preconceptions about a person one has oneself. Clifford Geertz advocates this problem as the necessity of putting oneself in the framework of the research subjects as much as possible, because it is easy for scholars to judge different cultures on their own authorities.

The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures.¹⁸⁸

When we face a different society, we should be careful about misreading its particularity, since we may not be free from bias as to the conditions of a person. Although we will deal not with different areas in the same era but with roughly the same areas in different

¹⁸⁷ Shoemaker touches slightly on the problem that if a social situation is totally different, it would not be clear to us which attitude is regarded as adequate (1984, pp. 131-132).

¹⁸⁸ Geertz (1976, p. 225).

eras, this admonition can work to realise features in peculiar socio-cultural conditions. This issue is considered in connection to the media, but the 'media' are a wide conception that can include various methods, so we next determine which aspects we treat in our discussion.

3.3. What is the Connection between Identity and the Media?

Any method of transferring information is what I call the 'media,' which are indispensable techniques for human communication. That is the main reason why I regard the media as a suitable subject for depicting the transformation of the concept of identity. We learn, from belonging within a community, how to become a 'person' as we have seen in the former section, so the interaction between people is necessary to cultivate the sense of who we are in society. The media are adequate in examining this sense, because they are the way to expand information from person to person. I regard the sharing of information as the method of organising a common understanding of the community including its social rules, the sense of personhood, its cultural knowledge, and so on. The media in this account are, thus, deeply concerned with the view of a person in that society. In addition, if we want to see the historical changes of some ideas, we would need to employ a way that is applicable through the time. I include all measures, which mediate information between people, in the category of the media, so a medium can be found in any period of human history. As I mentioned before, the media must not be treated as the only method that causes the change of social situations, but

they are useful to observe the relation between circumstances and the concept of identity at a particular period of time. For these reasons, I employ the media as the method by which we will ask what kind of presupposition the study of personal identity is involved in.

Moreover, there are all sorts of media which work not in the same way. 'The medium is the message' is a slogan of Marshall McLuhan who claims that a medium is not only a vehicle of information but brings its own message. People do not receive the same influence from different media, but each medium possesses its particular impact and has the capability to affect a social system by means of the power to circulate information.¹⁸⁹ For instance, the introduction of the telephone made possible distant oral conversation, and electronic mail brings a change in the circulation of information from paper to data, so each introduced new styles of carrying messages. These media are thought to alter our sense of time and space through the use of such new styles for the circulation of information. As the invention of writing induces the shift of the storage of knowledge from oral to manuscript, the change of major media can have an impact on the society and knowledge based on which the understanding of a person is established.

Numerous media have appeared in Western societies from oral conversation to computer mediated communication, but not all of them are straightforwardly concerned with the problem of personal identity. We need to reduce the scope of the media in order to make it relevant to our concerns, so I first determine which media will be focused upon. I pay attention to points in media history at which the circulation of information is definitely changed and people have had to adapt themselves to the new methods, though not necessarily all at once but sometimes taking some time.

¹⁸⁹ McLuhan (1964).

I maintain that there are four such points by which media history is divided. The first medium is oral, which is the most primitive method of human communication. The second is writing, by which human beings first acquire the method of keeping their memory outside of their bodies.¹⁹⁰ Since the writing system was established, a number of improvements have been added to this medium, but the invention of printing technology should be seen as an epoch-making change. The number of printed publications is incomparably larger to that of manuscript, and the number of themes of writing also increased owing to this new technology. Printing introduces the popularisation of reading, so the advent of printing is counted as the third point of media history. The final is electric and/or electronic media that introduce faster and wider circulation of information than ever before. These four media are rated in this thesis as the most remarkable changes in media history in Western cultures.

This division of the media is indebted to predecessors' works that stress the technological aspect of transmission of information. André Leroi-Gourhan analyses the system of memory-storage with reference to the development of technology.¹⁹¹ He divides the system of stored information into five periods and discusses their characteristics in relation to information.¹⁹² The transformation of the media is also considered by Jacques Le-Goff, who focuses especially on the connection of memory to history. He emphasises the power of memory in ruling societies, and discusses change in the method of keeping memory in a community over time in relation to the alteration

¹⁹⁰ I do not insist that memory is equal to knowledge, but the store of information is an essential factor to cultivate knowledge at that place at that time. As an instance that demonstrates the importance of record in a community, see Ascher and Ascher (2003). For the connection between memory, narrative, and knowledge, see Lyotard (1984).

¹⁹¹ Leroi-Gourhan (1993, pp. 259-264).

¹⁹² The five periods are oral transmission, written transmission with table or indices, simple file cards, mechanical writing, and electronic sequencing, respectively (Ibid., p. 65).

of social structure.¹⁹³ Jack Goody analyses the transformation of the status of knowledge particularly in a comparison between oral culture and writing culture,¹⁹⁴ and Mark Poster argues about newer circumstances brought by digital media today with reference to contemporary philosophers.¹⁹⁵ The emphasis of these researchers is not exactly the same, but a point which they have in common is that they direct their attention to the transformation of the media as changing methods of storing and transporting social and/or individual knowledge.¹⁹⁶

I take their side, in that to depict changes of media is to analyse modes of contemporaries' attitudes toward the custody of information, and I set four points in media history. Due to my interests, I also add the idea that those changes can introduce transformation of the concept of personal identity. On the basis of these conditions, we shall observe characteristics of each medium in the rest of this chapter.

3.4. The Medium of Oral Culture

How did people in oral culture develop the concept of themselves in order to identify them through time? This is the question in this section. Oral transmission is one of the oldest methods of conveying messages from people to people. Within the range of oral

¹⁹³ 'Memory is an essential element of what will henceforth be called individual or collective identity, the feverish and anxious quest for which is today one of the fundamental activities of individuals and societies. But collective memory is not only a conquest, it is also an instrument and an objective of power.' (Le-Goff, 1992, p. 98.)

¹⁹⁴ Goody (1977).

¹⁹⁵ Poster (1900).

¹⁹⁶ For more references, see Jack Goody (1968, 1987), Olson and Torrance (1991), Innis, (1951, 2003).

culture, I include other methods that can be regarded as instant communication; gesture, face, tone of voice, and pre-verbal sound. Since people have to meet to receive information through those methods, I do not treat them separately but deal with them as parts of immediate communication represented by 'oral'. A prominent feature of this medium is that utterance and gestures cannot be sent to the distant future intact, so people need to be in the place in which they listen to the utterance. For instance, when a narrative is presented, people receive it as a member of an audience, so oral transmission is a kind of joint work through which members of an audience are associated with each other. This medium is thus apt to make people unified as a group, and people foster their sense of identity in this affinity to their community. I call this collective identity in which people confirm their existences by reference to the sense of belonging to their society. I will explain this type of identity more in the next section, but focus on depicting the characteristics of this culture in this section.

It is true that oral communication has never been renounced throughout history, and it is still a popular method for us today. However, I specify the period of this medium as the age in which people were not involved in any other medium of communication, or we will miss its particularity. This period is roughly defined as from around the beginning of the use of languages to before the advent of writing.¹⁹⁷

On consideration of this culture, we need to be cautious not to regard oral culture in the same light as today's oral communication. As Walter Ong asserts, literate people today have great difficulty envisaging what people are like in oral culture that has

¹⁹⁷ According to the anthropologist, Taryo Obayashi, the use of language can be traced back to the Old Stone Age. He also indicates that the period in which social stratum were founded overlaps with the period in which several genres of narratives were generated (1998).

neither writing nor even the possibility of writing.¹⁹⁸ Literate people are remote from the tradition without writing, so need to make an effort to understand life in that period. The greater part of those who live in post-industrial countries are entirely involved in the literate mind, and even in oral communication we are often conscious of written expression. We may envisage spelling in our mind when we hear some words, and there are numerous expressions which are related to writing.¹⁹⁹ In addition, in the modern age, instant speaking is merely one method of communication, but utterance was almost the only way to exchange information for the people of oral culture. Apart from the direct meeting, they could not communicate with each other, so the weight of orality is not the same for the people in oral culture and the people at present.

This characteristic of orality bounds people within the distance in which immediate communication can be undertaken, so the scale of communities was not as large as after they expanded in writing culture. Consequently, their narrative is supposed to directly connect with members' lives more than narratives of the later cultures. Although traditional narratives more or less reflect the manners and tendencies of a society in any medium, in oral culture a degree of remoteness between narrative and people must be lesser than in others. This involvement in society is supposed to have a great influence upon forming the sense of identity in this culture.

Identity in Oral Culture

In oral culture, remembering is the main way to keep information, and in that form

¹⁹⁸ Ong (1982, p. 31). Similar discussion is found in Havelock's work as well (1978, p. 4).

¹⁹⁹ 'A literate person, asked to think of the word "nevertheless",' will normally...have some image, at least vague, of the spelled-out word and be quite unable ever to think of the word "nevertheless" for...60 seconds without adverting to any lettering but *only* to the sound' (Ong, 1982, p. 12).

social manners are learnt. Eric Havelock focuses on this method by which narratives are memorised in preliterate societies, especially in ancient Greece. Through remembering epics people learnt law, tradition, and skills, so the narrative format is a 'formulaic technique' of education, and it plays the part of an oral encyclopaedia in preliterate Greece.²⁰⁰ The words of epics represent the interrelation and behaviour of the community, so people find themselves reflected in these inherited narratives.²⁰¹ People remember epics through their rhythmic patterns, meter, repetition, and somatic gestures which are a special technique to help to memorise a vast amount of information. Havelock presumes that in this tradition people had to put inconceivable energy into remembering narratives, and this concentration is partly an obstacle to the rise of new ways of thinking.

I compare two different types of narrative in order to spot the close relationship between narrative as knowledge in the community and its members. The following is borrowed from Lyotard's distinction between a non-cosmopolitical, or savage, narrative and a cosmopolitical narrative. The non-cosmopolitical narrative 'proceeds by phrases like *On that date, in that place, it happened that x, etc.,*' so these factors only belong to the specific community in which the narrative is told.²⁰² In contrast, the cosmopolitical narrative consists of the universal history in which although the names and events may be referred to, they must be equally accepted by all addressees irrespective of their local differences. It is an attempt to make 'world history' applicable for any community²⁰³ In

²⁰⁰ Havelock (1986).

²⁰¹ 'A nonliterate culture can in this way maintain a basic identity for itself simply by maintaining the stability of its vocabulary and syntax...one learns automatic responses to given situations' (Havelock, 1978, p. 19).

²⁰² Lyotard (1988, p. 15).

²⁰³ That history is read as a metaphor of the modern ideal that pushes forward the plan by which equality of all people is acquired. This is more examined in chapter four as

contrast, the non-cosmopolitical narrative only belongs to the particular community's history.²⁰⁴

The non-cosmopolitical narrative in Lyotard's thought is not restricted to oral culture, but its gist can bear upon our discussion of the immediate narrative. Whilst human communication is confined to oral transmission, events and characters in traditional narratives only pertain to the closed and narrow society. Within this limit, members must have a strong sense of participation in their own community through which collective identity is cultivated.²⁰⁵ Therefore, in oral culture, consciousness as an independent subject of action is weak, but more likely, a person is understood as various roles in society, for example, someone's son, father, husband, and lord. Ong analyses this in the comparison of characters in oral and written narratives. He uses E. M. Forster's terms and calls people who are described in oral literature such as epics, 'flat characters,' who undertake predictable actions in a story and never act unexpectedly.²⁰⁶ The flat character is classified into a number of fixed types that perform in expected ways. A deviation from the plot is bad form in oral literature, and audiences do not appreciate unforeseen performances. The opposite of the flat character is the 'round character,' who is unpredictable in action and enacts a complicated personality. The round character has developed with writing according to Ong.

The medium of writing requires the solo activity of reading, and consequently, reading requires introspection and individual thinking of readers. Characters in this fashion are anticipated to show the depth of humanity. Ong concludes that the

the Idea of the grand narrative in Lyotard's discussion.

²⁰⁴ We will return to the inconsistency between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan narratives in chapter four.

²⁰⁵ The direct connection between narrative and the members of the community is also suggested by Le Goff (1992, p. 59).

²⁰⁶ Forster (1974), Ong (1982, pp. 148-152).

popularisation of the round character through writing and printing represents 'to present-day consciousness what human existence is like' that includes the awareness of the inner self.²⁰⁷ If we today could compare ourselves with the round character, the flat character would correspond to those in the tradition of oral literature. I do not insist that people in preliterate societies always behave predictably and did not possess any complex personality. However, it can also be said that characters in their narratives are thought to have an influence on their self-understanding as models in that society.

Abstractive or Situational

The understanding of the self in oral culture is also analysed by Ong in terms of whether it is 'abstractive' or 'situational'. Abstractive in Ong's theory is explained by the example of the term 'tree' that 'refers to a concept which is neither this tree nor that tree but can apply to any tree.' The situational in oral cultures is minimally abstract in the sense that those cultures 'remain close to the living human lifeworld'.²⁰⁸ He accepts that all conceptual thinking includes the abstract in some degree, but the use of concepts 'are more abstract than other uses' in oral culture. Thus, self-understanding in oral culture is more situational and operational than abstractive. He cites A. R. Luria's work on illiterate people and concludes that these people find it difficult to articulate self-analysis: 'Self-analysis requires a certain demolition of situational thinking. It calls for isolation of the self'.²⁰⁹ Solitude is necessary to establish self-awareness in order to reconsider the self objectively. Solitude is produced in writing more than in oral narrative.

²⁰⁷ Ong (1982, p. 152).

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 54.

Havelock also discusses the point that in the progression from oral to literate, cognitive structure alters from situational and concrete cognition to more conceptual and formal cognition.²¹⁰ Therefore, people in oral culture seem hardly to obtain the abstract view of their existences. This means that it is difficult for them to grasp their own continuity as a self-independent doer of their own actions, since the cognition of their existence leans toward their roles in their local society. That is the circumstance in which people are deeply involved in their society, and in which reference to the past is only in memory. It is rare to see oneself from the outside, compared with the present situation. In this condition, I assume that the concept of the 'personal' is difficult to develop. However, even if we determine that there are communities in which that concept is not realised, there should be a way in which people confirm their being. People must not always have been confused about their own continuity over time even though philosophical discussion of personal identity had not yet arisen. I propose that in that situation that which discloses the doer of the actions may tend to be depicted in accordance with social conditions rather than as an individual. I expediently call that sense 'collective identity' in comparison with personal identity.

I lastly should warn that we must not be confused by the fact that even though we observe those who seem to live without the concept of individuality, it will not prevent us from applying that concept to those people from the perspective of today's understanding. It would be possible to describe the people in oral culture as if they possessed the concept of personal identity, if we analyse their behaviour by the contemporary yardstick. However, I argue that this does not mean that these people were aware of this concept, and in this regard, I maintain that they only realised

²¹⁰ Havelock (1963).

collective identity at that time.

I shall cite the status of children as discussed by Philippe Aries in explaining this notion of self-awareness of identity, and those who are not awake to that concept. Although he treats a different issue from ours, his idea is worth comparing to this problem. He advocates that there was no concept of childhood until Europe entered the modern age. The image of children in the Middle Ages was of young adults and there was no clear distinction between children after the age of seven and mature people. He states that the concept of childhood did not naturally exist in European culture but that it was made in the early modern period.²¹¹

Then, even though people in the medieval period had no concept of 'children' in today's meaning, we would not think that there were no people between the age of seven and adulthood; a boy would not have had his eighth birthday and immediately have become eighteen-years-old. In its stead, we understand that people at that time lacked the concept of childhood. Our discussion of the lack of the concept of personal identity is described in the same manner. We may discover that people in oral culture seem to act in a way grounded in the principle of personal identity, but I claim that they could not have realised that concept and could not establish the theory needed to explain it. In this respect, I argue that a life story in oral culture consists not of what I have done but of what role is given me in society and how I behave in that role.

In order to support that view, I shall cite Havelock's comparison between verbs in oral expression and those in written documents. He regards the use of the verb 'to be' in writing as 'the function of denoting not on an act, or an event, but a relationship

²¹¹ 'In the world of Romanesque formulas, right up to the end of the thirteenth century, there are not children characterized by a special expression but only men on a reduced scale' (Aries, 1962, p. 32).

which is both logical and static.’ In contrast, oral poetry depicts ‘what justice does, what is done to it, but not what it is’. In this notion, an objective view of things is largely concerned with the literate mind. He exemplifies their differences as follows; ‘Hesiod would be able to say, “Ten thousand spirits guard the justices and reckless works of men”; Plato could say, “Justice is that principle which preserves the city as one and is the opposite of nonjustice”.’²¹² In the context of our discussion, this can be interpreted as suggesting that the narrative in oral culture describes a person in terms of what position he or she is put in, and the narrative in the modern age onwards points out which actions can be gathered under the framework of a particular person. This example shows the different concepts of a person in oral culture and other media.

In short, people in oral culture cultivate their identity through their communal status more than through the perspective of their independent lives. They are assumed not to have sufficient distance from their society to structure a sense of the inner self. Hence, I state that the concept of personal identity was not formed in this medium, but that people grasped the continuity of their existences in reference to their positions in their community. To be cautious, I do not claim that we must have either collective identity or personal identity. Even if we in the present age were aware of personal identity, it would not mean that we do not possess any sense of collective identity. However, the point is that people in oral culture did not cultivate their consciousness sufficiently to realise their personal identity independently of their surroundings.

²¹² Havelock (1978, pp. 233-248, p. 325).

3.5. The Medium of Handwriting

Writing is the definitive invention in media history. Not all cultures use writing but only a handful of them adopted this medium, and the cultures that did so underwent various changes by means of writing.²¹³ One of the most remarkable changes brought about by writing is the sense of remoteness. Oral communication requires the presence of addresser and addressee when information is exchanged. Conversely, in the medium of writing, the absence of an author is presupposed when the written material is read. Sound is visualised in writing, and this is the first invention that allowed people to store complicated information not in their minds but in external materials.²¹⁴ This is the beginning of a new style of communication which leads to a number of alterations in society including the method of storing memories, the expansion of rulers' authority, the introduction of introspection, and the development of the sense of self. Isolation from a narrow and indigenous community is a characteristic of the era of writing.

The system of writing was not an invention which was established overnight, but it was constructed over a long time. Tens of thousands of years ago, before the advent of the writing system, people made a kind of inscription which possessed symbolic meaning.²¹⁵ Leroi-Gourhan calls iconic inscription 'mythogram' in his research of Lascaux cave painting. Mythogram is not letters in the strict sense but more than

²¹³ In numerous spoken languages that have arisen in history, only around 106 are thought to have established a culture of writing deserving to be called literacy. Today, there are assumed to be three thousand different languages in use, but only about a hundred are committed to writing (Ong, 1982, p. 7; Jean, 1992, p. 69).

²¹⁴ Havelock (1978, p. 4), Ong (1982, pp. 77-78).

²¹⁵ Jean (1992, p. 12).

‘rhythmic manifestations’ to which ‘no meaning can be attached’.²¹⁶ The mythogram is however not sufficient to express the complex import of oral languages. Early systematic writing was formed in the fourth millennium B.C. in Mesopotamia.

In Western cultures, writing advanced with phonograms such as the alphabet which was established in ancient Greece in the fifth century B.C., and later, written language was dominated by Latin. The culture of manuscript flourished until before the middle of the fifteenth century in which Gutenberg’s printing machine was invented. This is the period of handwriting in which written materials are produced by manuscript. At this step literacy did not pervade ordinary life but was monopolised by the ruling classes. Writing was not at the disposal of the populace at all, but this period gave birth to the literate mind which has been more or less continuously passed on to present writing cultures. I will specifically observe changes to the social system and the manner of thinking brought by writing and the beginning of awareness of the inner self in consequence of those changes.

Writing, the Expansion of Authority and the Decline of Mnemonics

If immediacy of narrative in local communities encouraged members’ collective identity, indirect communication is assumed to bring about some diffusion of the tight relationship between narrative and community. The scope of voice is more limited than the scope of writing; voice fades away in the air just after utterance, and only the people who catch it can keep the contents in their individual memory. Writing leaves a message as it is written, and people can always access the same letters. The meaning taken from a message may not be the same for all readers, but words themselves do not change

²¹⁶ Leroi-Gourhan (1993, p. 188).

through time. This sameness of writing is adequate to convey information over time and distance, and this characteristic opens the way for indirect government of wide areas.²¹⁷

This medium is more suitable for the establishment of the concept of personal identity than oral, because of its comparative distance from the source of information. However, there appears to still be shortages in what is needed to make this concept arise, and one of the reasons mostly resides in the monopoly of writing. This is examined in two points in this section: One is the expansion of ruler's authority that brings about the change of governing system in society, and the other is the shift of the storing method of information from mnemonics to writing.

At the beginning of writing culture there were a very limited number of people who could read and/or write, and such intellectuals belonged to religious or high classes. The medium of writing was the privilege of a handful of people in society.²¹⁸ Since writing was governed by such ruling classes, they also possessed the power to choose whether or not an event was recorded in writing. Besides, written events were often arranged at the rulers' convenience, so 'every document has in itself the character of a monument and that there is no unmediated, raw collective memory'.²¹⁹ Myth and legend, which often describe the origin and authority of the rulers, are politically corrected narratives. The authority of such narratives is strengthened through the medium of writing due to its ability to transmit information more widely and for longer than did

²¹⁷ For instance, Innis claims that in ancient Sumer, 'Adaptability to communication over long distances emphasized uniformity in writing and the development of an established and authorized canon of signs. Extensive commercial activity required a large number of professional scribes or those who could read and write' (2003).

²¹⁸ Literacy gave authority to the people who were engaged in the work, so 'scribes to a certain extent constituted a caste apart, sometimes, perhaps, becoming more powerful than the illiterate courtiers or even the sovereign himself...Knowing how to write was already a source of considerable power' in Babylon and Assure in Assyria in the ancient time (Jean, 1992, p. 21).

²¹⁹ Leroi-Gourhan (1993, p. 260).

oral transmission.²²⁰ The close relation between writing and the governing classes means that a change of writing system can have an impact on the organisation of society.²²¹ An instance of the change is indicated by Innis in the case of ancient Egypt; as the writing material changes from stone to papyrus, as the written letters are simplified from hieroglyphic script to hieratic characters, political and religious institutions suffer great alterations in terms of civilisation, culture, and authority.²²² Transformation of the writing system, which was closely connected with the ruling organisation, carries cultural alterations in customs, living styles, and ways of thinking. The expansion of governing power relies not only on this medium, but it is certain that ruling systems suffered not a small change through the advent of writing.²²³

In the case of ordinary people, although writing was not in their hands for the most part of its history, they were not totally unconcerned with the medium of writing. People at any rate know that there is a method of writing and some people use it for retaining information. Moreover, literacy was not widespread immediately, but this shortage was partly made up for by a proxy such as the clergy, scribe, judge, and ruler.²²⁴ The person who read aloud the writing was not usually the person who wrote it but a deputy, so a writer and a reader do not communicate directly but have a mediated relationship. People began to receive information not only through immediate communication but also in interceded ways, and this custom is assumed to foster more abstract thinking in

²²⁰ Georges Jean mentions the government of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt when referring to the rule of the written narratives (1992).

²²¹ One reason that writing is strongly connected to religion is that letters were often believed to possess mystic force, so this medium itself was thought to be concerned with some holy power.

²²² Innis (2003, p. 22).

²²³ For more consideration of this topic, see Claude Lévi-Strauss' view of writing with the Nambikwara in Brasil and Jacques Derrida's criticism of Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss, 1973; Derrida, 1974).

²²⁴ Clanchy (1981).

writing culture.

Hence, writing helps to extend ruling power over the bounds of local community by means of its characteristic of remoteness. People are given the opportunity to reconsider the meaning of their community and themselves in this movement. This distance from their locality becomes a moment that prepares people for the concept of personal identity in the era characterised by the next new medium. In this period, people in the ruling classes might have had the opportunity to cultivate their consciousness of themselves as individuals, but the number must be limited and not be influential enough to expand the consciousness in society.

The introduction of writing furthermore brings a decrease in the labour of keeping information in memory. Narratives in the oral tradition are structured in a particular way that is easiest to remember in oral form, but after the advent of writing, especially of the phonetic alphabet in Greek, the style of narratives undergoes dramatic changes. The alphabet unties narratives from the restriction of acoustic remembering. The release of mental energies from the mnemonic leads to 'an immense expansion of knowledge available to the human mind.' The Greek alphabet gives an opportunity to record any discourse in the same style, so in place of mnemonics and repetition, writing 'made possible the production of novel or unexpected statements'.²²⁵ It is the start of new ways of examining both the internal and the external world abstractly and scientifically, so this medium 'introduced a new level of abstraction, analysis, and classification into Western thinking'.²²⁶ Objective thinking which is essential for the development of self-awareness starts to be cultivated with the evolution of the medium of writing.

²²⁵ Havelock (1982, pp. 87-88).

²²⁶ Logan (2003, pp. 59-60).

The Beginning of Self in Ancient Greece

One of the particularities of writing related to identity is to present a way of observing things from the objective standpoint. In ancient Greek philosophy, it is first applied to the investigation of the essence of nature and then to that of human beings. The matter of the self becomes an issue in the middle of the fifth century B.C. in which people start reflecting on themselves. People at this stage do not consider the issue of personal identity in terms of the sameness of a person at different times; consciousness of self relates instead to the long-term question 'what the self consists of' that leads to further, wider questions later, including the status of personal identity. Literacy was not the only condition by which the consciousness of self arose, and the settings of Greek society such as its politics, economy, and education are crucial to fostering thought, but it is also true that the medium of writing was greatly conducive to the growing of this consciousness.²²⁷

In this history of the study of self, Plato's Socrates writing occupies an important place at its beginning. Self in Socratic discussion is mostly concerned with self-knowledge through learning, by means of which virtue is acquired, and the achievement of this ethical intelligence is that which he stresses to Athenians. This thought is condensed in the phrase 'care for the soul' based on which people form their own selves. Havelock regards the consciousness of self in ancient Greece as 'an invention of the Socratic vocabulary,' it was originally the oral to which Socrate belonged and he was later written by Plato.²²⁸ The terms 'a subject' or 'me' are formed in this vocabulary

²²⁷ Thomas (2001).

²²⁸ Havelock (1986, p. 114).

separate from natural environments and collective identity.²²⁹ Therefore, in general the consciousness of self has been investigated from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly from Socrates. In addition, in relation to writing, it is interesting to consider that Plato keenly criticised writing as an untrustworthy method despite the fact that he left a number of written materials. We will observe this point in Socratic-Platonic thought and seek features of the concept of a person in that age.

A distrust of writing is mostly manifested in Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Seventh Letter*. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates reveals the confrontation between orality and writing.²³⁰ Socrates emphasises the priority of spoken words over writing by mentioning the story of gods in ancient Egypt, and introduces his distrust of writing under the cover of these Egyptian gods: If people relied on writing, they would not remember things by themselves, which is equivalent to not considering things by themselves.²³¹ Socrates regards writing as a faithless medium for the acquisition of knowledge, but oral dialogue is a method of approaching the matter of truth. For him, writing possesses shortcomings in its nature that cannot be overlooked, enough not to be a valuable method of meditation. In contrast to writing, the method which is extolled is oral conversation, but he does not include all sorts of speaking as trustworthy ways to access knowledge. Mere speeches which use rhetoric with complete control are not worth consideration, but only an intelligent word is worth learning. He believes that it is through dialogue that people may touch the truth, and writing will be left only for recreation and amusement. Written words are no more than the image of proper dialogue. This is Plato-Socrates'

²²⁹ Havelock (1963, p. 201).

²³⁰ All quotations from Plato without reference are taken from *Phaedrus* (Plato, 1999b).

²³¹ Socrates interprets the invention of writing in the ancient Egyptian myth: It 'will create forgetfulness in the learner's soul, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves.' Letters are an aid 'not to memory, but to reminiscence'.

understanding of writing, which is only the semblance of orality and not a truly valuable matter to be considered.

In this argument, we see a contradictory attitude of Plato's. Socrates only attended to discourse, so is not inconsistent, but Plato who criticised writing as a disturbance of memory, nonetheless, bequeathed written texts. Goody interprets this issue as a complex attitude to the new culture. He asserts that neither Socrates nor Plato was an 'intransigent enemy of literate culture' but acutely felt the necessity of arguing about great changes in Athens that were brought by the new technology, by the medium of writing. Goody understands Plato's agony in being torn between two thoughts, one is his interest and understanding of the new technology of literature, and the other is his trust and 'occasional nostalgia for' the unwritten customs and laws.²³² Ong, on the other hand, analyses Plato's negation of literacy to a perplexity with new technology.

Ong compares Plato's denial of writing to the discomfort of people who feel an aversion to computers today: 'Most persons are surprised, and many distressed, to learn that essentially the same objections commonly urged today against computers were urged by Plato in the *Phaedrus*...and in the *Seventh Letter* against writing.'²³³ Then, it is concluded that Plato's distrust of writing is a reluctance to accept a new technology that most people may feel when the a new medium appears. He, nevertheless, does not see Plato as a mere bigoted opponent to writing, but Plato's works are, in his understanding, beyond the limit of oral culture.

Plato's entire epistemology was unwittingly a programmed rejection of the old oral, mobile, warm, personally interactive lifeworld of oral culture...The term *idea*, form, is visually based,

²³² Goody and Watt (1968, p. 52).

²³³ All quotations in this section by Ong are taken from Ong (1982, pp. 78-80).

coming from the same root as the Latin *video*, to see...Platonic form was form conceived of by analogy with visible form. The Platonic ideas are voiceless, immobile, devoid of all warmth, not interactive but isolated, not part of the human lifeworld at all but utterly above and beyond it.

Plato's texts show characteristics of writing rather than those of utterance, so even though Plato rejects the use of letters as a shadow of dialogue, his idea is realised more in writing than speaking. In addition, Ong claims that once one technology becomes popular, and if people want to criticise the technology effectively, they should put their words into that technology, just as Plato writes his text.²³⁴ A criticism of a medium can be striking if it is diffused in that medium, so Plato had to write his texts for the sake of the denial of writing.

Moreover, I assume that the different attitudes to writing of Socrates and Plato were caused by their circumstances. Socrates would have met the people who he wanted to discuss with, and all his actions were settled in Athens. He was a man who was eager to stay in his city and did not find any true value outside of the city.²³⁵ The city for Socrates was Athens which was the world for him. Even though we may be able to find potential for developing a cosmopolitan conception in his thought,²³⁶ he was a resident

²³⁴ 'Once the word is technologized, there is not an effective way to criticize what technology has done with it without the aid of the highest technology available...Moreover, the new technology...brought the critique into existence' (Ong).

²³⁵ In *Phaedrus*, when Socrates was taken out to countryside, Phaedrus asked Socrates 'Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates,' and Socrates answered 'I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country.'

²³⁶ Plutarch (1910).

of Athens, and other cities were not worth living in.²³⁷ It was possible not to participate in the medium of writing in this Socratic microcosm, but I insist that this medium was necessary for the society, which experienced the exterior world, and which could not conclude all matters by the direct dialogue.

Due to the decline of the tradition of the polis, the patriotism of the citizens of Athens also decayed. Plato lived in this transitional period in which he could not unconditionally rely on the law and governments in a polis.²³⁸ Socrates lived and spoke in Athens, and stubbornly deliberated everything from the interior, but Plato often lived and wrote outside of Athens, and observed matters from the exterior – actually, he was the best witness of Socrates. In this difficult situation, I assume that Plato needed to sharpen his sense of the self apart from his tradition. This intricate position possibly made Plato's thought deepen, so as Innis mentions, 'The mixture of the oral and written traditions in the writings of Plato enabled him to dominate the history of the West.'²³⁹ The consciousness of self in Plato's writing was the beginning of Western philosophy, and this thought was born in the conflict between oral and written traditions. Therefore, I understand that Plato's idea of self opens up the way for the study of individuals, of what a person consists of, and his work may not have been established without the medium of writing.

²³⁷ When Socrates was recommended to escape from his prearranged death penalty, he answered that 'you [Socrates] never stirred out of her [Athens]: the halt, the blind, the maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city (Plato, 1999a).

²³⁸ Jay Bolter indicates the position of Plato in history in a similar way to us: 'Plato's dialogue was a nostalgic form looking back to a time when Greek culture could do without writing. Plato lives in a period of transition in the history of literacy' (1991, p. 111).

²³⁹ Innis (1951, p. 10).

As a conclusion, we shall review our discussion and extend our scope to the medieval period. The age of handwriting was a turning point from which people entered into different cultures which used letters. Narratives in oral culture are directly connected to a community, but narratives in writing culture move toward making an indirect organisation. This new tradition introduces more abstract thinking to people, and it also leads to the beginning of the awareness of self separate from collective identity. This change is, for example, observed in Plato's writing which includes contradictory features of both orality and writing.²⁴⁰ Further, after Plato, the sense of self has been widely studied, such as in Aristotle's discussion of the soul, and the concept of the cosmopolitan in Stoicism. Later, in the philosophy of the medieval period, scholars mostly deliberated the matter of self in relation to Christianity.

Christianity is a religion that has been deeply concerned with writing. The clergy preached orally, but their words followed the holy text. They vigorously transcribed the Scriptures and prayer books. They believed that to be literate was to read and/or write the holy language, Latin, and dominated ordinary people by privilege since only the people who understood Latin could access the texts. Transcription was important work for monks, and monasteries became the places in which manuscripts were produced, collected, and stored. Writing was mostly dominated by the religious classes during the Middle Ages that allowed the classes to control religious, intellectual, and authorised works.

As a work that keenly investigates the matter of self in this period, I cite

²⁴⁰ For further discussion of Plato's response to writing, see Jacques Derrida's 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1997).

Augustine's *Confession* that specifically presents a great concentration on the recognition of the inner self as reflecting God. His method of confession, constructed through inner dialogue, shows the strong consciousness of 'I' in his mind, and the great effort involved in recalling and reconstructing his memory. His writing is interpreted thus: 'To see how and why Augustine invented the private inner space of the self is to understand something about the possibilities of self-understanding available to human beings in the West.'²⁴¹ It is Augustine who introduced the interior self to Western thought, and the course of the investigation of self, which was awoken by Plato and was inherited by Descartes' *cogito* and Locke's discussion of personal identity, is thought to be decided on in Augustine's writings.²⁴² *The Confession* is an autobiography in which a self appears as the narrated and written self, and without reading and writing, it is supposed that this type of self-awareness would not have been strongly established.

However, religious power over writing gradually declined. Manuscripts were produced by monks for more than a thousand years, but the work was also left to craftsman from around the twelfth century as the increase in demand for transcription was beyond the capacity of the monks. Afterwards, the genre of writing was expanded in order to reflect readers' interests, so written materials became concerned with not only religious subjects but also treatises on philosophy, logic, mathematics, astronomy, and literature.²⁴³ This large variety of subjects prepared the market for printing, because printing technology would not have become widespread if there was only a little demand for written material.

Therefore, the development of writing prepared the way for the sense of the inner-

²⁴¹ Cary (2000, p. 242). For further discussion, see Stock (1996), Hanby (2003).

²⁴² Taylor (1989, pp. 111-199).

²⁴³ Jean (1992, pp.88-90).

self, but the concept of personal identity did not arise fully in the era of this medium properly. The sense of the inner-self unfolded well in the Middle Ages, but it was tightly bound with high classes and religious thought. It is not necessary to separate oneself from religion in order to require the concept of personal identity, and I do not say that Locke or Hume established their thought irrespective of their religion. However, at the dawn of its study at least, people need to keep some distance from that great influence. This means that writing should be shared in public in order to be implicated in wide reconsideration of the conditions of a person. It is the medium of printing that made it possible to expand literacy, and to develop the sense of individuality.

3.6. The Medium of Printing

Since the establishment of the writing system, a number of modifications have been added to its method from scratching on a slate to the use of a word-processor, but an epoch-making change must be, before everything, the advent of printing. The reason why it is significant for our discussion owes to the expansion of the habit of reading and writing through this medium. The influence of literacy on people completely changed after the rise of printing, and we will pursue this change here.

Printing technology transformed the production of books and other written materials from hand-crafted to machine-made. It lead to the point of no return in terms of the amount of publishing, the variety of subjects, and the use of every written language from Latin to the national languages. In addition to these changes, the

development of printing technology also opened the way for the age of reproduction and mass-production. The period that will be included as the era of this medium is as follows: The start of printing technology was the responsibility of Gutenberg, who published the first printed paper, a 'Thirty-six line' Bible in 1450. Once this technology was established, it was improved in a number of ways. As to the quantity of printed papers, the hand press printed a maximum of three hundred sheets per day until the late eighteenth century, becoming 1100 sheets per hour in the 1810s. The output arrived at 4000 sheets per hour for *The Times* in 1828, and around 40,000 copies per hour were available in 1939.²⁴⁴

The significance of these numbers is that there were people who read these printing products, so this implies a gradual penetration of literacy into ordinary people's lives. The period of time that is considered in this section ranges thus from Gutenberg's invention to before the rise of electric transmission, though the eras of manuscript and electric tools overlap with the period of printing to some extent. We will hence pursue from what the concept of personal identity arose with the expansion of printing.²⁴⁵ The most remarkable features brought to the writing world by printing technology are the quantity of publishing and the augmentation of subject matter. There are various reasons why these changes occurred, but I assume that the transformation of written languages was one of the crucial factors in this movement. Therefore, we first examine the advent of national languages with the improvement of education, and then move to features of the novel as a springboard for discussion of the features of this medium.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 105-106.

²⁴⁵ Although there are various products of printing, I will focus mainly on books. They are repeatedly read, handed down from generation to generation, and show a relatively unified form. These features contribute to the development of philosophical literature at that time more than other printing forms.

Printing, Vernacular Languages, and the Enlightenment

In the age of manuscript, documents were usually written in Latin, which was regarded as the only language which was suitable for writing down intelligent matters. This doctrine of Latin is partly supported by the contents of books which were mostly works relating to Christianity, in which the holy language had to be used. However, this situation was not continued long into the age of the medium of printing, in which the use of national languages was gradually popularised. It is true that Latin did not immediately become a dead language after the advent of printing. For instance, before the sixteenth century, seventy seven per cent of printing products were written in Latin. This percentage is no wonder if we see the subject of the books, the majority of which were religious works including various editions of the Scriptures. 'What subject was more likely in the eyes of printers to sell at a time when most readers were clerics?' Febvre and Martin asked, and the answer was obvious.²⁴⁶ The printing industry was before everything a business and its purpose was the pursuit of profit, so printers did not want to run a risk and preferred publishing those books which had already achieved success in manuscript form.

This commercialism was, nonetheless, also the cause of the decline of Latin from the central position of published language. First of all, Latin had not been a national language adapted for customary use after the disruption of the Western Roman Empire. It was mainly used in religious and academic areas as a written language, so texts in

²⁴⁶ The percentage of written languages in books except Latin before the sixteenth century were as follows: 'About 7 per cent are in Italian, 4·6 per cent in German, 4·5 per cent in French and just over 1 per cent in Flemish.' The printed products except Scriptures were classical, medieval and contemporary literatures (over 30 per cent), law (over 10 per cent), and books on scientific subject (about 10 per cent), respectively (Febvre and Martin, 1976, pp. 249-250).

Latin were not for ordinary people's use.²⁴⁷ The artificial aspect of this language was an obstacle to the continued use of Latin, particularly after the invention of printing. In conformity with the expansion of the printing market, 'The book-reading public became...increasingly a lay public—made up in large part of women and of merchants, many of whom had hardly any knowledge of Latin,' and printers published more books which were written in local languages according to customers' demands. Until the sixteenth century, a diverse number of spoken languages were already written and had evolved around Western Europe, and owing to the advance of national languages Latin had become a dead language.²⁴⁸

To turn to the process by means of which literacy penetrated society, the weight of the Enlightenment must not be ignored for its contribution to public education. It was an intellectual movement which promoted the idea that human beings can progress through the acquisition of rationality, empirical science, and universal knowledge. Reliance on human rationality as a prime mover of improvement becomes the basis of modern thought in Western cultures. These characteristics are the base upon which various philosophical thoughts were produced. The philosophers in the period of the Enlightenment developed their meditations through responses to others' works, which were usually printed materials. Printing made imaginary ties between philosophers. Peter Gay understands that philosophers in the Enlightenment 'were neither a disciplined phalanx nor a rigid school of thought. If they composed anything at all, it was something rather looser than that: a family. But while the

²⁴⁷ Benedict Anderson aptly expresses the restriction of Latin: 'The determinative fact about Latin—aside from its sacrality—was that it was a language of bilinguals. Relatively few were born to speak it and even fewer, one imagines, dreamed in it' (1991, p. 42).

²⁴⁸ Febvre and Martin (1976, p. 320).

philosophers were a family, they were a stormy one,' and I assume that this looser relation can be made partly owing to the expansion of publishing.²⁴⁹ The expansion of the medium of printing made it possible to absorb and to ponder on information beyond the differences between countries and times, and intellectuals interacted with each other through reading and writing. Diffusion of education and popularisation of publications, which cooperate with the evolution of the Enlightenment, made a contribution to forming the ground in which early modern philosophy was cultivated.

We can even track the decline of Latin by following the development of philosophical writings. Latin was the academic language and this tradition continued in the age of printing, but philosophers gradually started writing in national languages. The choice of a written language did not only depend upon the time when it was written but also upon the circumstances in which the author lived, but it is certain that the number of philosophical writings in national languages increased after the middle of the seventeenth century. Books written in Latin almost faded away from philosophy in the eighteenth century, at the height of the Enlightenment.

In the period of transition from Latin to national languages, some authors chose their written language according to the subject and readers. For instance, René Descartes is an early philosopher who wrote in a national language. He released his three essays with one introduction written in French in 1637. His intention to use French was declared in the introduction to the book in which he compared 'those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity' to 'those who believe only in the writings of the ancients.' The former people are those who did not have any ill feeling towards reading French, and the latter people were those who only regarded Latin a

²⁴⁹ Gay (1967, p. 4).

suitable language for an academic work. Descartes expected that the former readers would accept his theory more readily than the latter readers, because the readers who used their reason were thought not to be gratified only by staying within the traditional method of writing, so they would not feel contempt for reading French.²⁵⁰ Not rapidly but slowly authors moved towards the use of their national languages, and this transition also reflects the way in which the habit of reading in national languages permeated people's lives.

In this stream of early modern philosophy, the most remarkable philosopher for our discussion is John Locke, by whom the issue of personal identity was first addressed in modern form. He introduces the concept of a person in his discussion, and insists that we need to consider what 'person' stands for if we ask what 'personal identity' consists in. This question represents the point that the identity of 'person' is the issue and the concept of a person needs to be determined for this matter to be decided upon. The definition of a person in Locke's thought is 'a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places'.²⁵¹ Any person in this statement is supposed to obtain, or at least can obtain, intelligence with reason and reflection. We find reliance in his thought on the idea that people must act rationally as long as they are intellectual beings. This is a new mode of thinking about human beings as subjects the life of which is unified by reason. Locke introduces the idea that the identity of a person needs to be measured by different criteria from the identity of things. If the Enlightenment was 'man's claim to be

²⁵⁰ 'And if I write in French which is the language of my country, rather than in Latin which is that of my teachers, that is because I hope that those who avail themselves only of their natural reason in its purity may be better judges of my opinion than those who believe only in the writings of the ancients; and to those who unite good sense with study, whom alone I crave for my judges, they will not' (Descartes, 1931, pp. 129-130).

²⁵¹ Locke (2001, p. 180).

recognized as an adult, responsible being,' the Lockean concept of personal identity can certainly be seen to have been formed under the influence of this movement.²⁵²

In Locke's thought, any person must be able to be independent and take responsibility for their actions. We should not punish a person, Locke insists, for an action of which he or she is not conscious at all. If '*Socrates* waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness,' we would have no right to punish *Socrates* waking for what sleeping *Socrates* did, because *Socrates* waking was not conscious of that action.²⁵³ This is an arguable point in his thought, but putting aside its adequacy, we can see clearly his opinion of how a person must be understood. Persons have to be able to take responsibility for their experiences, and through this activity the person is regarded as possessing personal identity.²⁵⁴ Because of this introduction of what a person and personal identity must be, I count Locke as the most significant philosopher in the study of personal identity.

In Locke's view, there is no room for social influence as a factor which affects the form of personal identity. This is the modern view of human beings and personal identity, obtained beyond cultural and social conditions. Taylor names this modern notion of a person the 'punctual' self that was established under the influence of the Enlightenment. The punctual self is the subject who can objectively control him or herself: 'Locke's theory generates and also reflects an ideal of independence and self-responsibility, a notion of reason as free from established custom and locally dominant authority.'²⁵⁵ Locke's thought cannot be analysed separately from the mode of the age in

²⁵² Gay (1967, p. 3).

²⁵³ Locke (2001, p. 187).

²⁵⁴ Locke, for example, depicts personal identity as 'the sameness of a rational being'. (2001, p. 180).

²⁵⁵ Taylor (1989, p. 167).

which the independence of a person from his or her locality was mooted. Hence, I insist that the concept of personal identity appeared along with the rise of modern philosophy which was based on the foundation of individuality. What I stress in this view is the periodical ground of the concept of personal identity, and I maintain that it blossomed in early modern philosophy which was greatly fostered by the expansion of the Enlightenment.²⁵⁶

The Advent of the Author

The use of national languages and its influence on intellectuals are significant events in the early modern age that are partly due to the spread of publishing. In this movement we shall consider one more factor which symbolises a shift in the concept of a person. This is the advent of the novel. Its impact on human lives is keenly focused on in Walter Benjamin's discussion. Benjamin spotlights the genre of the novel in comparison with the nature of storytelling.²⁵⁷ Storytelling in his thought is defined as 'orally, the wealth of the epic,' for example, prose literature that has been acceded by long-established human experience. The features of the novel are opposite to those of storytelling, in that it is written in solitude and silently read.

The distinction between the two comes from, Benjamin stresses, the difference in the source of the stories. Traditional narratives are first of all shared stories, so 'the storyteller takes what he tells from experience — his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale.' A story becomes a part of collective memory in a community through being a common

²⁵⁶ Of the situation of ordinary people, see Steinberg (1959).

²⁵⁷ All quotations without references in this section are taken from the following text: Benjamin (2002, pp. 146-147).

experience. Although the narratives of a community are related not word for word but modified depending on circumstances, the outline of such stories is passed on from person to person. Oral literature has survived in this way.²⁵⁸

In contrast, the author of a novel does not share his or her work with others but writes about (the novel is fundamentally written texts based on publishing) matters that are that author's particular concerns, and are not necessarily expected to appeal to the public interests. Benjamin understands this separation of the author from other people's experiences as an absolute loneliness:

The novelist has secluded himself. The birthplace of the novel is the individual in his isolation, the individual who can no longer speak of his concerns in exemplary fashion, who himself lacks counsel and can give none. To write a novel is to take to the extreme that which is incommensurable in the representation of human existence. In the midst of life's fullness, and through the representation of this fullness, the novel gives evidence of the profound perplexity of the living.

The novel arises from the solitary pondering of an author, which does not aim to represent the collective memory of the belonging community, but which rather tries to depict the individual's internal agony and struggling which are honed in the writing. This is the characteristic of a novel that is produced by an author, and 'The dissemination of the novel became possible only with the invention of printing.' Individual uniqueness must be hard to transmit orally over time if it does not appeal to common interests, but it is eventually accepted as a matter worth writing about when the

²⁵⁸ In the analysis of folklore Robert Darnton refers to an interesting case of modification (1984, p. 20).

medium of printing becomes available.²⁵⁹ The method of expression of individual thought is actualised in this period, and this thought becomes the seed bed of the genre of the novel.

On this point, that printing technology contributes to yielding a sense of individuality, Keiichi Noe suggests that if the author's isolation is the birthplace of the novel, its most suitable subject must be the confession. The author who confesses his or her life must stare into the mind in order to express personal experiences, and Noe cites *The Confessions* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as an example. Such an author needs to force phrases out of memory to write a confession, or in Rousseau's own words 'The true object of my confessions is to reveal my inner thoughts... It is the history of my soul.' Noe asserts that there is no person but only 'I' who can access his or her own past in order to confess, so a confessor must be a person who is keenly aware of the existence of the inner self beyond the tradition of collective identity. For this reason Rousseau said that 'to write it [the history of Rousseau's soul] faithfully I have need of no other memories; it is enough if I enter again into my inner self, as I have done till now' (1953, 262). This consciousness of the inner self, which originated with Augustine as we have seen before, is a distinctive feature of the person who writes of personal experiences, because the source of writing in this case is only found in one's personal life.²⁶⁰

A particularity of this age compared to the medieval period is the weakness of the role of God. Although religious thought is not completely removed from intellectual

²⁵⁹ Giddens asserts in his discussion of modernity and identity that 'Modernity is inseparable from its 'own' media.' To make a medium in personal use is a characteristic of modern technology, and this trend partly leads to more personal thinking in that medium (1991, p. 24).

²⁶⁰ Noe (1996, pp. 23-26).

writing in the age of printing, a number of authors more eagerly excavate consciousness of self than search for the relation between the soul and God. This is also a cause of the fact that people were more conscious of the concept of personal identity than ever before in making a concept of themselves, and the novel as a genre serves to demonstrate this point.

To sum up, the concept of personal identity flowered under the circumstances in which the awareness of inner-self sharpened, and scholars consider those conditions in which persons can be supposed to be continuing agents of their actions. To take responsibility for one's own actions is to approve a bridge between a series of past events and the present self. People who accept this responsibility are thought to grasp their lives not as a miscellany of scattered events but as unified, and such subjects are regarded as being able to possess the concept of personal identity. In this manner, there is a connection between the awareness of individuality and the advent of the concept of personal identity. The medium of printing partly supported the connection by its contribution to the expansion of literacy and of knowledge, and this expansion can be a factor in introducing the realisation of the inner-self as an independent being.

It might aid understanding if I call the concept of personal identity in the modern era the 'individual concept of personal identity' and collective identity the 'communal concept of personal identity'. The former concept is honed by the establishment of the sense of an individual self, and the latter is cultivated through living in a society. At any rate, what I have claimed is that the necessity of individuality is a particular tendency in the modern age, and the traditional discussions of the concept of personal identity have

arisen with that idea.

At the end of this section, I would like to pay attention to possibility that some might say that this view indicates holism. I do not treat the concept of personal identity completely independently from social functions, but argue that this sense is formed through interaction between a person and external influences. Does this interaction suggest a kind of holism, in which the relation between the whole and its parts is presupposed? I consider that if holism is the insistence on the priority of the whole over its parts, it would not fit our discussion. I do not mean that social factors surpass individuality but that there is only the interaction between them. Nonetheless, holism is a possible position in many debates. If semantic holism is viewed as the idea that the meaning of a part is defined in its connection to the whole, it might be thought to bare some similarity to our discussion. I also do not agree with that opinion, because the notion of the 'whole' comes into question in that thought. I consider that although the meaning of a part is understood through the network of others, that network does not need to be regarded as the whole. The premise of the whole can be reduced to a more temporal relation, as I will discuss in chapter five. This might be compared with a sort of semantic molecularism, but this kind of debate will lead to huge arguments that are not directly concerned with our topic. Hence, I stop participating in it except to say again that we will not enter the discussion that presupposes the setting of 'whole' against 'part'.²⁶¹

The concept of personal identity began with the development of the modern sense of the inner self. This awareness was not well established in the age of the medium of handwriting due to the restriction of literacy, but the medium of printing brings about

²⁶¹ Fodor and Lepore (1992).

the relative popularisation of writing and reading. I insist that this is a prominent reason that the idea of the identity of a person through time flowered at that time, in that place. The ideal of a person as an indivisible existence that can exercise reason seems to develop in cultures that are influenced by this Western modern notion. If this ideal had not developed thoroughly, the concept of personal identity might not be a subject open to discussion. Thus, I reckon that the modern is a key idea in the question on what basis the concept of personal identity was established.

Besides, since the study of personal identity has its roots in the modern idea of a person, we are led to the idea that the concept might be changed if the idea is reconsidered. This is a possibility that we have considered in the last part of the previous chapter, and will ponder in the rest of this thesis. With regard to media history, it specifically concerns the advent of electronic media.

3.7. Electric and/or Electronic Media

The fourth part of media history is concerned with electric and/or electronic technology.²⁶² The most significant characteristic of these media lies in the fact that the circulation of information shifted from material to immaterial. This caused a conspicuous alteration of the transformation of information, which is now conducted

²⁶² 'The electric media' indicates all methods of communication or information transmission that rely for their energy source on electric power, and although 'the electronic media' use the same source, their work is operated through digital signals, which usually use electronic circuits. Their precise division seems not to bring any further advantage to our discussion, so I do not strictly divide the electric media from the electronic media in this writing.

beyond our physically possible speed. Once information broke away from the yoke of physical transportation, the sense of time and space was somewhat altered in society.²⁶³ This distant communication is thought to have an impact on our understanding of a person and identity, as we have seen in the cases of other media.²⁶⁴

In the category of electric and/or electronic media, we include communication using wires (wired communication) to the electronic, for example, the telegram, the wireless, the telephone, the radio and television broadcasting, and computer mediated communication. Among these, I believe that computer mediated communication presents the most prominent case in terms of depicting the current circumstances in which our concept of personal identity may have been seriously transformed. For this reason, I propose that the details of electronic media that uses computer technology are worth examining in their own right. Thus, I will devote the rest of this chapter to the tendencies of electric and/or electronic media until the expansion of computer mediated communication as the pre-history of today's electronic media, and will discuss the most recent methods of communication independently in chapter five.

From Wired Communication to Broadcasting

The beginning of the new type of transmission, which does not materially carry information but uses electricity, can be traced back to the introduction of the telegram, when Samuel Morse laid the first telegraph cable in the United States in 1844. At first, this method was mainly adopted by businesses, for example as a trading method in the

²⁶³ There have been earlier methods which exceed the physical speed of a human: fire signals, firing a gun, beating a drum, and carrier pigeons were used for a rapid communication over long distances. However, these methods have not acquired the popularity that electric and/or electronic media have achieved (Headrick, 2003, p. 123.)

²⁶⁴ "Mediated experiences, since the first experience of writing, have long influenced both self-identity and the basic organisation of social relation' (Giddens, 1991, p. 4).

commodity market and in journalism.²⁶⁵ It took a little time until this distant communication was used by ordinary people, though the length of time is definitely shorter than the period in which oral culture was unseated by the writing system. In turn, this medium is superseded by another technology, wireless communication. Wired and wireless communication require special skills for their use in that period, so although they are not as widespread as printed papers are, they are recognised by the public as one of the new transmission methods.

Firstly, these media are effective in raising sympathy between people over a long distance. The tragedy of the *Titanic* was the very affair that drove home the advantages of this medium because of the unparalleled scale of the accident and the quick circulation of the news.²⁶⁶ When the captain of the *Titanic* discovered that his ship was sinking, he ordered that rescue be requested by wireless. The first ship which rushed to the scene was not the geographically nearest one but a ship which learnt of the accident by intercepting the radio message. The sinking of the *Titanic* appeared in newspapers only the next day, and a massive number of people sympathised with the tragedy almost all at once. The unthinkable speed of the circulation of the news is owed to the medium of the wireless. Hence, it would be no wonder if those people, who heartily perceived the work of this medium, thought that it connected people together around the world through simultaneity of experience. The media help to combine people's interests, so

²⁶⁵ 'It [the telegraph] shifts speculation from space to time, from arbitrage to futures. After the telegraph, commodity trading moved from trading between places to trading between times. The arbitrageur trades Cincinnati for St. Louis; the futures trader sells August against October' (Carey, 2003, p. 159).

²⁶⁶ 'The ability to experience many distant events at the same time, made possible by the wireless and dramatized by the sinking of the *Titanic*, was part of a major change in the experience of the present' (Kern, 2003, p. 211).

they become tools to spread a sense of affinity among contemporaries.²⁶⁷

The idea that people can feel more sympathy for others over distance due to the development of the media is upheld by our experience of the medium of broadcasting. Radio and television broadcastings clarified a feature of mass-media which made imaginary relationships between audiences. The importance of these two media is their bringing the social world into the family space. Until these media came into widespread use, to acquire the news generally meant to go out and enter a social space, so finding information was a kind of a social activity before broadcasting started.²⁶⁸ However, society came into the home with the news from the first half of the twentieth century by means of radio broadcasting.²⁶⁹ The radio broadcast has pervaded audiences' lives, and the distance between places becomes a lesser problem for the acquisition of information.

Sympathy between listeners is abstractive because other listeners do not appear in front of us but exist in our mind. This imaginary linkage intensified with the medium of television, which broke the meaning of closeness in our relationships. It is not strange for audiences to feel more intimacy with their favourite entertainers than with the people who are merely physically near to them, such as unknown neighbours, mere-

²⁶⁷ Between wired and wireless communication, one invention arose and spread widely, which was the telephone. The significance of this medium is, after all, its ability to convey sound. At the beginning, this medium was at the forefront of wired broadcasting, too. The telephone, for the use of which no complex technique is necessary, offered a method of distant personal communication to ordinary people (Fischer, 2003, p. 150).

²⁶⁸ The early medium that brings about official information in private space is newspapers, which open the beginning of mass-production and mass-communication. This medium is mentioned in chapter four as the medium that effectively makes an imagined linkage between people.

²⁶⁹ Douglas (1987, pp. 292-293), Sterling and Kittross, (2003, p. 220).

talked-to classmates, and unfamiliar colleagues.²⁷⁰ Watching the television screen has encroached on our sense of reality.

To demonstrate the influence of television, McLuhan cites an interview with Joanne Woodward in which she was asked about the difference between being a movie star and being a television actress. Her answer is that 'when I was in the movies I heard people say, 'There goes Joanne Woodward.' Now they say, "There goes somebody I think I know"'.²⁷¹ The phrase 'I have seen the person before' did not work in the same way before the age of television. Through mediated images we 'meet' people who we never encounter directly. People may argue that this is an overstatement and that generally most audiences do not confuse the real and the artificial, or that they do not watch television as they are entirely involved in the fantasy offered by its programs. Nevertheless, involvement in the media is, I claim, not essentially concerned with the length of time spent watching television programs, but with the degree to which our lives are surrounded by a variety of media. The present life-style in post-industrial countries is highly mediated in this manner, in which the sense of distance and relationship between people undergoes some transformations.

What do these tendencies of the media indicate? I consider that they encroach upon the meaning of reality and of human relationships in particular ways realised by electric and/or electronic media. In accordance with the multiplication of information, local communities face difficulties in keeping their traditions alive. The arrival of new information and technology is often a cause of a discontinuation between generations,

²⁷⁰ 'Television viewers live in a world of mediated reality. Increasingly they talk and think about people they have not met, places they have not been...we borrow the newscasters themselves—with whom we fancy ourselves on a first-name basis—as surrogate busybodies, surrogate friends' (Stephens, 2003, 277).

²⁷¹ McLuhan (1964, p. 339).

as a younger generation is put into contact with various types of information beyond their culture. To simplify, the more people feel empathy for new ideas beyond the boundaries of their region, society, and tradition, the more people are likely to lose a tight relationship to their local communities. This is what has happened in late modern cultures by means of our enthusiasm for information. An interesting notion arises in this movement in the form of the sense of the nation. This notion is already found along with the previously discussed media such as national languages, but it is greatly strengthened in the age of electric and/or electronic media.

The sense of the nation is concerned with both collective and personal identity. In collective identity, it appears to be beyond the local boundary. It is established based on an indirect relationship between its members, so even though people do not immediately face all other co-nationals, they still know that there are compatriots in their country. In the case of radio broadcasting in the United States, even though the idea of the nation was widespread in the early twentieth century, ordinary people would have found it difficult to foster a national spirit, because they did not have a clear idea of what the nation is. The radio is suitable for rousing patriotism in its listeners due to its essential equality. As long as people have a radio, they can receive its programs, regardless of their differences in living place, level of education, social class, and wealth. This equality and simultaneity accelerated the unification of the sense of the nation: 'a sense of nationhood, a conception that Americans were all part of one country, was only an abstract idea, often without much force...But now that atomized state of affairs was changing' by means of the medium of radio broadcasting.²⁷² To enhance the sense of the nation was an urgent issue for strengthening the power of a country, so people stressed

²⁷² Douglas (1987, p. 306).

that aspect of the radio that forms an imaginary closeness between listeners.

As to personal identity, the awareness of the nation helps to intensify the sense of a person as a unified subject. This sense is important for constructing the nation. This new idea, the sense of the nation, cannot appeal to the authority of tradition as a local community does, but it needs to encourage people to participate in the nation as an independent and rational existence keeping distance from the narrower restrictions of, for example, regional law and habits. This is a noteworthy characteristic of electric and/or electronic media through which people are suggested to be aware of their responsibility for the nation. Thus, those media are effective in making a person unified, but ironically it is not only the age in which the unity of a person is enriched, but also the age in which anxiety about that unity begins to surface. Electric and/or electronic media, which once served to establish the sense of the nation, also became a factor in the disintegration of this ideology.²⁷³

In the above opinion, I do not claim that only the media make the conception of nation cultivated, but there are factors that make the sense of the nation beyond local and traditional communities. However, the influence of other factors does not exactly hit the aim of our discussion, so I will not mention them in this thesis. What I want to stress here is that: the advent of the sense of nation is the modern product that encourages the development of the concept of personal identity, and the electric and/or electronic media are concerned with the development.

At present, people do not need to be involved in the ideology of the nation entirely. These media make any previously definitive idea comparable to others, and people are

²⁷³ For the influence of radio and television broadcasting on the sense of collective identity, also see Morley and Robins (1995, 'Globalisation as Identity Crisis').

drawn into the whirlpool of the diversity of values. It can be said that today is the era of disorder in which people lack an index by which to collect their selves as a unit, and the ground of the concept of personal identity has also been lost, to some extent.

These are a quick reference of media history specialised in the study of identity. We have confirmed two points there; one is that as one of the external factors, the media can contribute to cultivate the concept of a person and identity. In this view, I stress a point again that the medium of printing is not the only condition by means of which this concept arose, but with other factors such as the Enlightenment, the rise of national languages and nations, printing technology strongly pushes forward the development of the concept of personal identity. The other is that today's study of personal identity is not the exception, so it holds the assumption of what a person should be in its basis. In other words, although people possessed a kind of identity in the oral and writing traditions, the sense of personhood in the traditions was not suitable for establishing their individuality as a single and independent person. We needed to wait for the advent of the modern ideas in order to establish the concept of personal identity.

Moreover, grounded on those points, a question may arise; if the criteria-arguments of personal identity are a kind of modern product, the basis of that study may need to be reconsidered some time. Put another way, I assume that the concept of identity possibly faces its transformation today owing to remarkable changes of communication methods in society. The concept of personal identity became common sense in the age of electric and/or electronic media in Western cultures; nevertheless, this concept seems already to face some distrust today. We have seen that distrust in the last part of this chapter, and

will follow it from now on. Lastly, I shall mention some views of that distrust here for the indication what kind of topics I will treat later.

According to Benjamin, 'experience has fallen in value'.²⁷⁴ People's customs and practices used to be stored as the general knowledge of a community, and passed on, generation to generation. It nevertheless has lost its authority under new circumstances. He furthermore argues that people feel insecure because of this decline. Experiences present wisdom which is worth learning for survival in a region, but the rapid development of technology has destroyed this tradition. Benjamin depicts soldiers in the First World War as an example that indicates the fall in the value of experiences. He argues that people are thrown into a completely different environment and are stunned by that situation as soldiers:

A generation that had gone to school on horsedrawn streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape where nothing remained unchanged but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in a force field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body.²⁷⁵

In the battlefield their traditional experiences are of no avail, and furthermore, their practice in the war is not commensurable with the traditional community to which soldiers returned. Soldiers thus keep silence after coming back from battle. Their personal and collective experiences belonging to their communities are crushed by a gigantic force, and Benjamin states that the development of technology takes part in this demolition.

Discontinuity of generations owing to the development of technology can be

²⁷⁴ Benjamin (1996).

²⁷⁵ Benjamin (2002, p. 144).

found all over the place today. The special skill of accountancy is exceeded by using accounting computer software. Knowledge of using one piece of computer software soon becomes old, since a new version of the software is published in a moment. We now know that experience quickly becomes useless if it is regarded as old, so the throwaway principle in the present era is also applied to our experiences. The value of experiences, in particular the social value of experiences, has been declining in this electric and/or electronic age. In addition, if people's experiences are mostly not worthy of becoming general knowledge and collective memory, they would be only stored as personal memory. This individual who is separated from collective experiences but maintains his or her own concerns evokes in us an image of an author of a novel that we have seen before. People have to whet their sense of individuality in order to form their identity more than ever before, because although society is still a body of collective identity, it has lost the capacity to take diverse personal experiences as its source due to the serious dispersal of individuals' episodes.

Moreover, if society lost its authority and as a result the disorder of social organisation occurred, the concept of personal identity, which is in part formed based on this organisation, would suffer this chaotic situation. Although human reason is prized in modern Western societies, anxiety about reliance on reason has been discussed in those same societies. We can see an admonition of this anxiety in, for example, Edmund Husserl's statement:

Scepticism about the possibility of metaphysics, the collapse of the belief in a universal philosophy as the guide for the new man, actually represents a collapse of the belief in "reason"...It is reason which ultimately gives meaning to everything that is thought to be, all things, values, and ends...Along with this falls the faith in "absolute" reason, through which

the world has its meaning, the faith in the meaning of history, of humanity, the faith in man's freedom, that is, his capacity to secure rational meaning for his individual and common human existence.²⁷⁶

This passage demonstrates a great faith in human reason, and to lose it is 'not just a matter of a special form of culture—'science' or 'philosophy'—as one among others belonging to European mankind.' The fall of rationality is not a mere disruption of one academic area but implies the crisis of the reliance on reason, which has been the basis of human arts in Europe. However, in spite of his warning, people seem to step ahead in an inconsistent and scattered situation, especially since the latter half of the twentieth century.

If trust in universal human reason vacillates, the concept of personal identity may be suspected in terms of its validity, and this is particularly observed in the medium of computer communication. At the beginning of the electric and/or electronic age, the media were used for gathering people's minds together, but they have also worked to destroy the unification of community. I do not say that reliance on human reason has totally collapsed, but today's situation implies a doubt about the idea that human beings will be improved by the use of intelligence and rationality. A serious suspicion of the modern idea is, I shall say, represented by the term 'postmodern,' which is a movement that brings doubt of values which were established in former ages. The postmodern is an ambiguous term used in various ways, so we shall examine ideas about this term in the next chapter, before starting a discussion of the identity and difference of a person in the age of electronic media.

²⁷⁶ Husserl (1970, pp. 12-13).

Chapter 4

The POSTMODERN

The Discontinuity between the Modern and the Postmodern

4.1. What We call 'Postmodern'

The influence of the media on our concept of identity was the former topic, in which transformations of communication technology were followed until the advent of electric and/or electronic media, just before computer mediated communication arrived. Although we will pursue the effects of that latest medium here, it will be profitable to first consider in what context they will be analysed. This context is the circumstances in which the expansion of information occurs in a wide range and traditional knowledge loses its authority. I, in a word, call this tendency 'postmodern'.

I realise the difficulty involved in using this word, since the postmodern is often described as a resistance against staying in a fixed idea that can include denying giving a definition of its own meaning. In addition, it is used in various areas in a number of ways from 'an already outdated vogue' to 'a not-yet realised movement'.²⁷⁷ It is not an easy term to discuss on the whole, however, it is also true that I have not been able to find any alternative term which can include the present state of affairs in which our

²⁷⁷ Palmer (1977).

circumstances are kaleidoscopically changing and the indexes of life are dispersing. Only 'postmodern' may satisfy this demand. Thus, I will dare to use this term in order to depict tendencies of the present age in which we live. That is the reason why the term 'postmodern' is employed in this discussion. However, it must not be used without further consideration owing to its various interpretations, so I supply this chapter to catch its meaning. The approach to the concept of personal identity in the former chapter was historical, seeking the point at which the concept was generated. Although the determination of the postmodern also includes a temporal view, especially in comparison with the 'modern,' this will be an analysis of the contemporary rather than temporal understanding of the concept.

It may be helpful to mention in advance the view which I plan to reach at the end of this discussion. I claim that the traditional concept of personal identity corresponds to the modern ideal that promotes people as stable and rational. These characteristics are suitable for the smooth conduct of the modern social system, but I arrange postmodern thought as the disturbance of that conduct. It attempts to embody aspects that are not represented by such modern thought. On the matter of identity, the concept of a person that is considered after this doubt of the modern ideal is called 'postmodern identity' here. It is thought to be directed more towards the dissolution of a person than its unification. It is a deviation from the narrative consistency of life, and we will track that concept of identity by characterising postmodern thought. In that process, the minimum of the narrative approach for making personal identity is reconsidered as well, and I focus upon the elements that are less than narrative—phrases. A phrase is always linked to another, and if we set the concept of identity in the postmodern age, it would be done in terms of that linkage. This is the basic view of this chapter.

In the analysis of the postmodern, I should first emphasise that this notion cannot be studied without referring to the modern. 'Postmodern' already includes the word 'modern', so to discuss the postmodern is to reconsider the propriety of the modern, and to seek the relation and separation between these two conceptions. In this respect, it is also our concern to locate the status of the modern. Roughly speaking, the characteristic of the modern is condensed into the ideal that we are opened to mutual understanding by human communication. It makes it possible for us to reach a consensus overcoming particular socio-cultural conditions, and today's confusion with regards to society, ideology, and the comprehension of a person brought by anti-modernists must be cured in such a way. If we were to identify a particular scholar who asserts the modern ideology, it would be Jürgen Habermas, who declares the necessity of accomplishing the modern project.²⁷⁸ Habermas pushes the idea of making a consensus to resolve conflicts by the use of human reason, and this is what Lyotard argues to be the authority of the modern. We will discuss the denial of such modern ideals as a particular feature of the postmodern, and seek a method of surviving insecure conditions not by returning to the stability of modern identity but by pursuing the condition of postmodern identity.

The point of examining the postmodern is, as in former chapters, its relation to identity and narrative. We have used narrative as an explanation of the way in which we grasp the continuity and consistency of a person over time, so to investigate a type of narrative in postmodern thought is also to contribute to this study. In this regard, I believe that Lyotard's discussion is worth examining, since it includes postmodern conditions, the role of narrative, and the status of the modern. Although he does not directly mention the problem of identity, there are indications of the status of identity in

²⁷⁸ Habermas (1987a).

the postmodern age in his writing, in relation to doubt of the modern concept of a person. He contemplates peculiarities of the postmodern and the modern in terms of knowledge, society, and technology, so to follow his research will be helpful in considering the connection between personal identity and the postmodern.

In this chapter, we will first observe the rise of postmodern thought in some fields. Although I mainly refer to Lyotard's thought in the discussion of the postmodern in this thesis, his notion is peculiar and specific. We may lose the context of postmodern thought in which Lyotard is located if we only examine his theory. For this reason, we shall glance over more general notions of the postmodern in several fields, and define the period in which this term appears in philosophy. Then, we will move towards a more specific idea of the postmodern, and the modern as well, in Lyotard's thought. There are two views of the postmodern in Lyotard's thought. According to one view, it is defined as a period of time that comes after the modern, and in the other, it is regarded as a movement of thought that is not necessarily arranged in chronological order. The former view seems to be more popular than the second view, so we will start our discussion with the chronological understanding of the postmodern.

In Lyotard's thought, the postmodern is expressed as the 'breaking up of the grand narrative'. Grand narratives, or to use another term of his, 'meta-narratives,' represent modern Ideas, which were once expected to be a beacon of the development of society. Instead of the decline of grand narratives, Lyotard highlights the performance of little narratives, which is another name for postmodern thought. Thus, we will consider the characteristics of grand and little narratives in order to identify the subject that faces its decline. The postmodern and modern will also be characterised in comparison with the classic, which is relevant to 'before the modern' in more primitive social systems than

those of the modern and postmodern.

We will later shift to the argument for the non-chronological division of the postmodern, the modern, and the classics. We do not decide which is a more adequate view than the other beforehand, but investigate what kind of picture we will obtain from each definition. In this view, those three terms are considered as different movements of thought, and we will see the differences through examining the legitimacies by which each idea insists its validity.

4.2. A Rough Sketch: The Beginning of Postmodern Thought

The term 'postmodern' is not independently arrived at in philosophy but corresponds to movements from the latter half of the twentieth century in architecture, literature, art, politics, subcultures, and so on. The outline of the postmodern movements in those fields is as follows. Architecture is one of the fields in which this term is introduced in the early days. In this field, the death of modern architecture is sensationally declared by Charles Jencks.²⁷⁹ This is accepted as a symbolic incident in the modern and the beginning of the postmodern in architecture.²⁸⁰ The idea of postmodernism is also advocated by Robert Venturi, who inspired the rejection of the modern style of architecture in his writing in 1966.

²⁷⁹ 'Modern Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 as 3.32 p.m. (or thereabout) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme...[was] given the final coup de grace by dynamite' (Jencks, 1986, p. 9).

²⁸⁰ The modern architectural idea is depicted as attaching a single meaning to construction. Jencks proposes 'double coding' as the concept of postmodern architecture that gives at least two different styles of coding to construction.

In literature, postmodern thought appeared in literary criticism in the 1950s as a new trend in literature. Ihab Hassan was one of those who announced the arrival of postmodernism in this field.²⁸¹ Literature has produced a number of works that can be understood as postmodern texts. They often take a style that does not commit to certainty and fixed reality but to disorder, multiplicity, meta-description, and indeed those notions become keywords in depicting the tendencies of postmodern literature.²⁸² In art, the advent of plural contexts in art works can be regarded as the beginning of the postmodern.²⁸³ It develops as the negation of modern art, and becomes a popular movement in the 1980s. In music, it correlates with the above movements in the 1960s, and flourished in the 1980s. To sum up, the term 'postmodern' has been used deliberately from around the 1960s in several fields. It then expanded into wider areas, for example, sociology, politics, film, drama, anthropology, and cultural theory from the 1970s onwards.

It develops in each area differently, and the postmodern conception in contrast with that of the modern is diversely illustrated; opposition, reaction, excess, supplementation, following, or caricature. However, there is a common interest between them; an interest in criticism of modern establishments.²⁸⁴ Philosophy is not the exception. The period in which the term 'postmodern' is introduced to philosophy is defined as the time at which Lyotard advanced his writing, *The Postmodern Condition*:

²⁸¹ Hassan (1975).

²⁸² To help imagine this movement, I cite those authors to which Brian McHale refers in his analysis of the shift from modern fiction to postmodern fiction; Samuel Beckett, Alan Robbe-Grillet, Carlos Fuentes, Vladimir Nabokov, Robert Coover, and Thomas Pynchon (1989, pp. 12-25).

²⁸³ Danto (1998), Jameson (1992).

²⁸⁴ As a brief summary of the advent of the postmodern, see also Berman (1983, p. 351 (24n)).

A Report on Knowledge in 1979.²⁸⁵ The central argument of this book is concerned with the decline of modern thought and with the investigation of another method by which knowledge is transmitted and shared in public. This idea, the decline of the modern, gives rise to arguments both for and against, but it is certain that the declaration of the fall of the modern is influential to model the image of the postmodern in philosophical thought. Thus, it can be said that the beginning of the use of the term 'postmodern' has been spread among philosophers since the 1980s.

However, it is also true that the establishment of a thought is not only the work of one person, but that there were pioneers who left indications of the postmodern. As a recent movement, post-structuralism is not clearly distinguishable from postmodernism. Besides, if we concentrate more on the postmodern's anti-fundamental aspect, Friedrich Nietzsche can be counted as a philosopher who earlier stated distrust of the Western tradition. The essence of his claim of the 'transvaluation of all values' has been inherited by a number of later postmodernists today, so his study can be considered as the ground of postmodern argument. On another interpretation, the postmodern is categorised as a part of the history of scepticism, which is portrayed as 'a long-running tradition in Western thought that stretches back to classical Greek philosophy'.²⁸⁶ Doubt of all existing authority and a refusal to admit universal validity are general features of the postmodern, and because of these characteristics, it can be dealt with in the context of the long tradition of scepticism.

Although I appreciate the value of studying the postmodern from these viewpoints,

²⁸⁵ There are scholars who indicated this concept in its early period, so Lawrence Cahoon writes that the term 'seems first to have been used in 1917 by the Germany philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz'. However, as the person who first used the term 'postmodern' accurately, I count Lyotard as the first philosopher in the study of the postmodern (2003. p. 2).

²⁸⁶ Sim (2001, p. 3).

I will centre on the flourishing of the postmodern in more recent times rather than produce a genealogical study, otherwise our discussion will cover too many topics to manage at once. I set up the beginning of the postmodern roughly from the middle of the twentieth century. Post-structuralism falls within this sphere, but other above-mentioned discussions are not included. Nietzsche may be understood as a precursor of the postmodern, and scepticism possibly prepared the groundwork for postmodern arguments, but I locate them as early signs of this notion. I will focus on this narrower range of the postmodern in what follows.

In addition to the above topic, I feel it necessary to mention the way I use several terms here. I have used the terms 'postmodern' and 'modern' so far, but there are words related to them that are sometimes used differently, such as 'postmodernism' and 'modernism', 'postmodernity' and 'modernity'. Their definitions are not exactly in agreement but rather depend on the person who uses them.²⁸⁷ Their definition is not the aim of this chapter, but it is necessary to think about their use when discussing the modern and the postmodern. Of the distinction between modernity and modernism, some people use them almost in the same way,²⁸⁸ or modernity may be applied for the broader period of modernism in relation to the status of social and political systems. Modernism in this respect is probably regarded as a response to modernity, making up for its insufficiencies.²⁸⁹

However, it is still hard to clearly separate modernity from modernism. For

²⁸⁷ For example, Cahoon (2003, pp. 1-13), Sarup (1993, pp. 129-132), Eagleton (1996, p. vii).

²⁸⁸ For instance, Habermas does not make a clear distinction between modernity and modernism in the above mentioned article. He calls the movement began in the middle of the nineteenth century both the 'most recent modernism' and 'aesthetic modernity' (1987b).

²⁸⁹ Sim (2001, p. 319).

instance, modernism can be thought of with reference to an artistic movement, especially in the first half of the twentieth century. Douglas Crimp writes that 'the beginning of modernism in painting is usually located in Manet's work of the early 1860s'.²⁹⁰ Nonetheless, Habermas searches for the establishment of the concept of 'modernity' tracing back to its original form in Latin, 'modernus,' and determines that recent modernity is most sharply contoured in the work of Baudelaire.²⁹¹ It is adequate to see Baudelaire as the father of the modern poet, but in Crimp's and in Habermas's use, we cannot find a difference between modernity and modernism.

Thus, I change the question, from what is the difference between modernity and modernism, and ask rather what conditions I will deal with in my discussion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, I set the beginning of modern thought in the portent of the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century, as that period from which the sense of the individual began to be firmly established.²⁹² Which term is most suitable to grasp this period? Modernism does not cover the period due to its general understanding concerned with artistic movements. However, modernity is still ambiguous in its status and may incur unnecessary confusion if scholars understand the term in relation to so-called aesthetic modernity. Hence, I prefer to use 'modern' in order to include this sphere of time.

As for the postmodern, there is basically not a significant difference between 'postmodern' and 'postmodernism,' though postmodernism corresponds in some way to modernism. Postmodernism represents movements that start from the latter half of the

²⁹⁰ Crimp (1983, p. 45).

²⁹¹ Habermas (1987b, p. 5).

²⁹² On another understanding, the modern period is thought to start from the Renaissance. This is reasonable on one view, but I do not include that period in my discussion in order to make clear the point that the awareness of individuality is the essence of modern thought.

twentieth century, as we have seen above. I use postmodernism in this manner, but mainly employ 'postmodern' in comparison to the 'modern'. Postmodernity does not embody particular meanings unless the notion of modernity is given a peculiar definition, so I will not use this term. In short, the modern in this discussion implies the period in which rationality and individuality are assumed to be important human conditions. The postmodern is the attempt to demonstrate the minimum of that modern thought. It is a broad notion which cannot be applied to specific arguments such as literary theory or architecture, but I think it works for our discussion. Based on this assumption, we shall consider further the notions of the modern and postmodern hereafter.

The characteristics of the postmodern are summarised by Lyotard as the fall of grand narratives which implies a crisis of the absolute Ideas that have supported the social system. Thus, we will start our discussion with the question: 'What is a grand narrative?' in order to grasp the subject which faces its 'breaking up'. In Lyotard's thought, this type of narrative is connected with the modern, so firstly the modern, and next the postmodern, will come up for discussion in the following sections.

4.3. Grand Narratives as the Representation of the Modern

A basic conception of the breaking up of grand narratives, or meta-narratives, is their loss of credibility from at least the end of the 1950s.²⁹³ The subject based on which

²⁹³ Lyotard (1984, p. 3).

grand narratives establish their credibility is, according to Lyotard, modern Ideas. I count three characteristics of these Ideas. First, their remarkableness is seen in reliance on the use of human reason for the development of society. This owes its foundation largely to the Enlightenment, that presupposed equality through education, so universality is an essential aspect of grand narratives as well. Second, the Ideas of the grand narrative are understood to be tasks which have to be realised, and any other mode of organisation is located in a subclass that must be governed by them. Hence, the modern Ideas have to be 'meta' narratives, because they need to be beyond locality and need to enact their rules over the peculiarities of different communities.

Third, although the concrete contents of these Ideas are described in different ways depending upon the goals they are intended to achieve, they have one point in common: They are intended to produce the narrative of emancipation from temporal and pitiful conditions. The following are mentioned as typical grand narratives: The Enlightenment is regarded as the narrative of emancipation from subordinate situations owing to lack of knowledge, and it rescues people through 'knowledge and egalitarianism'; capitalism promises the release from poverty that can be actualised through the evolution of technology and science. Marxism is also a kind of narrative of freedom from exploitation and alienation of people through the socialisation of work.²⁹⁴

Thus, modern Ideas are represented as an advocacy of release from the conditions that oppress people's lives. An important function of the narrative of emancipation is to offer a new view to people according to which all events are reinterpreted as preparations for accomplishing the Idea. For instance, if a narrative gives an explanation of estrangement and poverty as being due to the existence of the exploiting classes, and

²⁹⁴ Lyotard (1992, p. 36).

claims that equality and socialisation of work will change the situation, it proposes a particular view of society. If another narrative demonstrates that lack of education is the cause of people's subordination and dependence, but that equality of learning will improve the situation since all human beings can be educated rationally, it gives its own order to the understanding of human beings.²⁹⁵

These statements are only vulgar imitations of the original Ideas, but I try to illustrate in outline the way in which the grand narratives appeal to people through the reorganisation of events. If we apply the modern concept of personal identity to this type of narrative, it may be described thus: It is the narrative of emancipation from infancy and irrationality through the establishment of individuality and rationality. People participate in society as respectable and mature beings by the realisation of personal identity, by which they can prove the consistency of their actions. Due to this operation, modern social systems such as law, the election system, and debit and credit arrangements, work smoothly. Hence, I believe that the purpose of grand narratives is to rewrite history, assessing all events as warnings of the forthcoming future and arranging the actualisation of the Ideas at the end of their narratives. Meta-narratives assure us that their theory is universal beyond regional and cultural conditions, and demand participation in the Ideas for bringing about the ideal world.

The study of personal identity from the late seventeenth century onward is indebted to this meta-idea according to which human beings can be equal irrespective of their local differences. This is a relatively new ideology that makes an abstract relation between people over regional restrictions, as we considered in our discussion of media

²⁹⁵ For a criticism relating to the un-necessity of 'emancipation' in making a cosmopolitan-narrative, see Rorty (1991).

history. I want to review this point here, stressing what kind of relationship is promoted between people in that ideology. For this consideration, Benedict Anderson refers to the newspaper as an effective medium for making imagined links between people. Newspapers are printed in huge quantities in a day but become old just the next day, so they are 'one-day best-sellers' which are 'merely an "extreme form" of the book, a book sold on a colossal scale but of ephemeral popularity.' This characteristic highlights what Anderson calls the 'extraordinary mass ceremony.' This ceremony is an imagined one, conducted every day, and the participants in the ceremony know of the existence of other readers through the daily ritual:

[T]he almost precisely simultaneous consumption ('imagining') of the newspaper-as-fiction. We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed between this hour and that, only on this day, not that... Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion... What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?²⁹⁶

The readers confirm their imagined linkage to others by the fact that newspapers are sold all over the place, even though they never ascertain exactly who reads them. This imagined linkage is a kind of fiction, and the 'fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations'.²⁹⁷ A person feels a connection with a massive number of others without having any real acquaintance with them, and this sympathy is thought

²⁹⁶ Anderson (1991, p. 39).

²⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

of as a particular tendency of the modern.²⁹⁸

The abstract relation is necessarily advanced by grand narratives, because these narratives bind people by Ideas that are not naturally rooted in tradition. In the community that can settle problems by face-to-face meetings, the normal relation is not highly abstract.²⁹⁹ To overcome the boundary of locality is to polish the sense of indirect communication, and it is the modern tendency that encourages people to be involved in that kind of relation. The modern concept of personal identity is not an exception to this more distant sense of locality. When the system of local community declines in accordance with the collapse of direct communication, it is no wonder that people want to seek another way of maintaining the stability of identity such as in the nation, religion, capitalism, and so on. Grand narratives respond to that need by offering Ideas that allow people to organise and re-understand their experiences, and consequently unify their lives.³⁰⁰

The modern is partly characterised by its invention of a person as a unique existence, as Fredric Jameson argues in relation to the 'modernist aesthetic'. It links to 'the conception of a unique self and private identity, a unique personality and

²⁹⁸ '[T]he convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.' (Ibid., p. 49.)

²⁹⁹ For example, James Burke depicts illiterate villages in the Middle Ages: 'On the very rare occasions when news arrived from outside, it was shouted through the community by a crier. For this reason few villages were bigger than the range of the human voice, and towns were administratively subdivided on the same scale' (2003, p. 75).

³⁰⁰ Hoffmann-Axthelm describes the modern ideal of identity as the power to organise the social system: 'Identity was one of the grand promises of the modern...It was hoped that dominion of collective suppression and prevailing linguistic patterns would end and that identity would be based in one's own person and one's own responsibility.' (Hoffmann-Axthelm, 1992, p. 200.)

individuality' which throws its peerless perspective to the world.³⁰¹ A person, on this view is thought to possess the ability to distinguish his or her existence from others' and constructs the framework of the self on his or her own.³⁰² However, a person is, as Anderson's discussion indicates, also regarded as anonymous in the abstract relation that supports imaginary belonging to a huge society. Therefore, uniqueness and anonymity are characteristics of modern identity, and in both concepts a person is accounted for as a unified existence that possesses reason in order to adapt to society.

To construct a society that is beyond any peculiarity is the ideal of the modern, and Lyotard represents this in the term 'grand narratives'. His discussion is linked to the conception of the postmodern as a counterargument to the modern, so we shall see how it can be a criticism of the modern Ideas in the next section.

4.4. Heterogeneity of Postmodern Thought

If the establishment of the absolute Idea is a feature of modern thought, the postmodern is depicted as discrediting such an Idea. The postmodern in this understanding is a notion which does not require grounding in a general theory that has authority over diverse societies but endeavours to achieve its own discourse. Lyotard calls this postmodern thought 'little narratives,' which are characterised as 'incredulity toward

³⁰¹ Jameson (1987, p. 114).

³⁰² This modern identity, which relates to the abstract sense, is described by Anthony Giddens as follows: 'The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems.' (1991, p. 5.)

meta-narratives'.³⁰³ 'Meta' is the nature of grand narratives, and although he criticises meta-narratives in terms of their doctrine, his intention is directed not primarily towards the notion of 'narrative' but to that of 'meta,' which subjugates heterogeneous genres of narrative under its theory.³⁰⁴

The postmodern for Lyotard is epitomised in the act of seeking the point at which people do not need to be involved in any meta-activity but create heterogeneous discourses.³⁰⁵ I consider that this absence of a meta-position, from which experiences are regulated, is also the particularity of the postmodern concept of personal identity. It is interpreted as a denial of a meta-position by which experiences are settled in the context of a whole life story. It is my view that identity in this mode is reduced to a temporal network of communication through which dispersed information is connected at a particular time—but, I think this notion is still ambiguous. In order to present this notion more clearly, we need to grasp the characteristics of little narratives more firmly, and shall return to the concept of postmodern identity again.

Little narratives do not participate in the establishment of theories that organise other narratives under them, so all of them are, in a sense, playing their own games. Lyotard uses the idea of 'language games' to explain this activity, a concept that is borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. A language game on Lyotard's interpretation is described as a set of discourses and rules which define the

³⁰³ Lyotard (1984, pp. xxiii-xxiv).

³⁰⁴ Fraser and Nicholson state 'We should not be misled by Lyotard's focus on narrative philosophies of history. In his conception of a legitimating meta-narrative, the stress properly belongs on the "meta" and not the "narrative"' (1988, p. 376).

³⁰⁵ In this sense, Lyotard's notion can be compared with Michel Foucault's rejection of 'historico-transcendental dominance': 'My aim was to cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism; it had to be freed from that circle of the lost origin, and rediscovered where it was imprisoned; it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this role of revealing the transcendental moment' (1989, 203).

moves of a player. It is likened to the game of chess in which players follow the rules that regulate the moves of players.³⁰⁶ A language game follows its own rule that is applicable only to that game but not to others, because a general rule cannot be formed that can cover different and equally self-legitimated language games without spoiling their individuality. This is what Lyotard describes as the incommensurability of different language games.³⁰⁷ This incommensurability can be compared to the impossibility of combining different paradigms without changing their uniqueness. Language games are used to express the rejection of the meta-position from which it is as if a conflict between different language games can be settled equably.

The question may arise, as to whether different language games are really incommensurable. If there is no similarity between them, we may not even be able to imagine the existence of other language games,³⁰⁸ so there must be some familiarities even between different language games. If we discuss Wittgenstein's original thought, this would be an arguable point, especially as regards the notion of family resemblance in language games. However, in Lyotard's application, the stress is laid on whether or not a meta-language game, which absolutely and equally resolves problems of different language games, is possible. At the beginning of *Differend*, he mentions this point:

³⁰⁶ Lyotard (1984, p. 10).

³⁰⁷ William James explains this incommensurability as follows: 'By incommensurability Lyotard means that there is no common set of rules, norms and values between games.' He also illustrates the incommensurability between different language games with the metaphor of the city. (1998, pp. 27-28).

³⁰⁸ I assume that in order to understand another language game, there must be some similarities between two groups such as their thinking style, the manner of life, and so on. If those matters such factors are completely different between parties, they would be incomprehensible each other. I understand Wittgenstein's following sentence as indicating this incommensurability: 'If a lion could talk, we could not understand him' (1963, 223e).

As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [*différend*] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's legitimacy does not imply the other's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them.³⁰⁹

Incommensurability in this case is used in order to question the legitimacy of judging different parties by a single rule. It thus belongs to the establishment of a grand narrative, and Lyotard seeks another standpoint that does not require the setting of a meta-position. This is his interpretation of the uniqueness of language games, and the incommensurability of plural parties' rules.³¹⁰

The Criticism against the Enlightenment in Postmodern View

The postmodern thus understood does not attempt to achieve the modern Ideas by making up for their shortcomings. This is, as Cahoone points out, one of the common features of the postmodern: 'something about recent society or thought in the "advanced" societies since...the 1960s, reveals a discontinuity with earlier phases of the modern period.' This interruption is sometimes expressed as a criticism of the Enlightenment as the movement which gives birth to modern thought. Cahoone also claims in this respect that 'postmodernism is the latest wave in the critique of the Enlightenment, the criticism of the principles characteristic of modern Western society'.³¹¹ If the Enlightenment is influential enough to characterise the modern in

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. xi.

³¹⁰ Hayden White's analysis of Foucault may help to understand the notion of differend: 'Wherever Foucault looks, he finds nothing but discourse; and wherever discourse arises, he finds a struggle between those groups that claim the "right" to discourse and those groups that are denied the right to their own discourse' (1987, 114).

³¹¹ Cahoone (2003, p. 2).

Western culture, the analysis of that idea would be useful in distinguishing the features of the modern.

On the one hand, the Enlightenment, which advocates liberation from religious superstition and from the old authority of politics, has grounded the ideal that society will advance and morality will improve through the acquisition of human reason. The Enlightenment locates the human race as the master of nature through its scientific and logical thought. This is the positive side of this project. It has a great influence on our understanding of a person even today, and certainly it renders remarkable services to society. Nevertheless, it also possesses a negative side, and we shall discuss this aspect of the Enlightenment as an example of why the modern ideal is thought to be insufficient in postmodern discussions.

The Enlightenment is often exposed to censure for its being the symbol of the modern, and in this regard Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno keenly disclose the limit of its doctrine in their joint work *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. They do not use the term 'postmodern' in their writing, but I propose that it is full of suggestions of this thought. The two authors' theme is epitomised in the question 'why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism'.³¹² They first define enlightenment's program as aiming to expel any irrational belief from the status of knowledge, such as belief in myth, the occult, or fantasy. On this view, civilised is considered to be equal to enlightened, and

³¹² Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, p. xiv).

disenchantment with the world is a transition from myth to rationalisation.³¹³ They do not criticise this transition itself and understand its necessity for establishing freedom in society, but ask if enlightenment absorbs the destructive side of its project.³¹⁴ The Western tradition, without reviewing the validity of its ideal, is a target for their criticism, since it will fall into the self-destruction of enlightenment.

Enlightenment on Horkheimer and Adorno's understanding is the plan which attempts to control society by the principle of reason. It impels rationalisation of everything to excess, so its ideal world is dominated by uniformity in which people become functions of their reason. This means that people are not masters of reason in practicing their free will, but that reason is given priority as a necessary condition of organising the social system accurately. People are, in a sense, identified as servants of reason. In this situation, outstanding individuality becomes an obstacle to managing the social system due to the difficulty of predicting action, so people are compelled to be one of the mass, in which they are standardised, and in which it is easier to calculate the outcome of their lives.³¹⁵ Enlightenment in this process does not, in opposition to its initial ideal, make human beings masters of the world but makes them controllable tools of the system. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that if enlightenment only pays attention to the propulsion of its project and does not reflect on its drawbacks, it will lead to another barbarism in which the 'weakness of contemporary theoretical understanding' is revealed, or in other words, the belief in a connection between reason and progress is

³¹³ Horkheimer and Adorno use 'enlightenment' to mean the idea that 'has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters' in a wide sense. 'The Enlightenment,' written with a capital letter, refers to a historical movement in Western societies. Thus, when I refer to their discussion, I follow their usage.

³¹⁴ Ibid., p. xvi.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 23.

thrown into disorder.

That Enlightenment can be regarded as the gist of modern Western thought that also penetrates common sense, and the postmodern brings about questioning of this presupposition. I do not simply say that all achievements of the modern are wrong, but claim that it neglects things that stray too far from its framework. In terms of personal identity, incoherent aspects of a person, which were examined as the residues of narrative in chapter two, have not been given enough positive attention in the modern discussion: These are often thought to be infant elements that should be overcome by the modern, ripe thought. I believe that the postmodern discussion of identity partly arises from frustration with this modern view of a person, and as Horkheimer and Adorno assert the necessity of reflecting upon the ideas of enlightenment, I also want to review the concept of personal identity in modern thought from the postmodern perspective.

In relation to Horkheimer and Adorno on the failings of the modern, I mention Lyotard's discussion of names. He asks 'whether this failing could be connected to a resistance on the part of what I shall call the multiplicity of worlds of names, the insurmountable diversity of cultures.' Names in this context correlate with unique proper nouns which are learnt not independently but in the context of their own local narratives. Through involvement in a specific event, names obtain their singularities, and Lyotard indicates that this system of names is opposed to that by which the modern Ideas direct their course. The grand narratives 'involve precisely an "overcoming" [dépassement] of a particular cultural identity in favour of a universal civic identity'.³¹⁶ Here, we find resonances of Horkheimer and Adorno, who also claim that the loss of

³¹⁶ Lyotard (1992, pp. 44-45).

names becomes a reality through enlightenment's project.³¹⁷ The extinction of names is the modern aim for the sake of founding universal history, because specificity shows is related to belonging to a particular community's history.³¹⁸ Lyotard's answer to the elimination of the locality of names by the modern is: 'let us activate the differends and save the honour of the name'.³¹⁹ That which escapes from the totality of the modern is the postmodern, and Lyotard takes part in this conflict with universality.

We have seen the discontinuity between the modern and the postmodern, and the manner in which the postmodern criticises the modern. However, the postmodern is not only a criticism of the modern establishment but its essence resides in the ability to open a new discourse. In order to examine this characteristic, considering the status of science in Lyotard's thought will be helpful. He mentions 'postmodern science' as one of the postmodern discourses which is distinguished from modern scientific knowledge because of its potentiality to open new discussions.

Postmodern Discourse in the Case of Science

Modern science is defined by Lyotard as aiming to establish a stable theory and system by which phenomena in the universe can be estimated accurately.³²⁰ It is conducive to

³¹⁷ 'If unitary knowledge is the only norm which theory has left, praxis must be handed over to the unfettered operation of world history...The oldest fear, that of losing one's own name, is being fulfilled' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, pp. 23-24).

³¹⁸ The name of a hero in a particular community is respected as that of a great person for its members, but in universal history, the significance of the name in that community is reduced and the hero is regarded not as a particular member of that community but as a member of the whole class of human beings.

³¹⁹ Lyotard (1992, p. 25).

³²⁰ This modern science is the science that was mentioned in chapter two. To make clear the difference, I will call it 'modern science' and science which tries to make a new paradigm is called 'postmodern science' afterwards.

the reinforcement of its theory for the sake of the improvement of its performance, so an act, which maintains its field, is understood to strengthen the paradigm of the study.³²¹ In modern science, uncertain experimental elements are sometimes treated as irregularities or errors in the theory. The discovery of the universal theory by which a law of the universe can be explained is an ambition of modern science. Such an ideal has been pursued in, for example, Francis Bacon's idea of 'one universal science' and in Einstein's dream of founding a unified field theory to encompass the electromagnetic field and gravitational field.³²²

In contrast, postmodern science is interpreted as pursuing a new form of discourse that is not represented by modern theory.³²³ If the aim of modern science is to maintain its paradigm, postmodern science is the attempt to include extraordinary within a theory. It actively acknowledges the possibility that its theory might consist of contradictory elements, and it tries to include them rather than remove them. Due to these characteristics, Lyotard includes postmodern science in the list of little narratives that do not have an authorised and fixed position but can expand their discussion all around.³²⁴

³²¹ The use of 'paradigm' is owed to Thomas Kuhn. 'Normal science,' which corresponds to modern science in Lyotard's thought, is the science that establishes its ground in which theory develops, so it acquires its own paradigm. It generally rejects anomalies, though if they are too significant, a new paradigm may be required (Kuhn, 1970).

³²² As a case of modern science, Lyotard cites the theory of thermodynamics which 'is in theory always calculable, between heat and work, hot source and cold source, input and output.' It is essential for modern science to improve performance, and that performativity is reduced to a system of input (energy which is expended in the process) and output (results which are brought about by the operation) (1984, pp. 47-55).

³²³ 'Postmodern science' is a risky word to use, because some scientists may rebut it as postmodernist irreverence. I only use this term in order to characterise Lyotard's thought, and I believe that the term is helpful within this scope. However, I do not intend to discuss its definition further. For more criticism of this use, see, e.g., Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1998).

³²⁴ 'We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives...as a validation for postmodern scientific discourse. But...the little narrative [petit récit] remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention, most particularly in science' (Lyotard, 1984., p. 60).

Thus, postmodern science is described as the quest for a resolution of the crisis of determinism, which is defined as the 'hypothesis upon which legitimation by performativity is based.'³²⁵ The study of Gödel's theorem, part of dynamics, quantum mechanics, and atomic physics are enumerated as varieties of postmodern science in which the scope of knowledge can be illuminated by a new vision. Lyotard does not intend to examine the scientific accuracy of these theories but he uses them to explain his notion of postmodern narratives. The status of observation is determined according to the particular conditions of its process, and the outcome is unstable in this situation. This instability can be an essential factor for postmodern science, because it has the potential to produce an unexpected shift in theory.³²⁶ If reference to Kuhn's thought is allowed, Lyotard's intention can be described as directed towards the moment at which a new paradigm arises through the verification of anomalies. Not for strengthening the paradigm but as the creation of another paradigm, is what Lyotard illustrates as postmodern science and the activity of little narratives.

If we apply these different manners of science to the case of personal identity, it can be said that its traditional theories are influenced by the principle of modern science by which any phenomenon can be explained logically. It is a hope that the universe can be governed by scientific knowledge through the development of human reason, as exemplified in Newton's law of universal gravitation and Leibniz' monadology. Nature could be explicated scientifically and such a theory is applicable under any circumstance. I assume that the expansion of the modern concept of personal identity is

³²⁵ Ibid., 53-4.

³²⁶ Lyotard calls the act which makes a new move 'paralogy.' The postmodern science is not in the 'expert's homology' which reconciles differences between language games, but in the 'inventor's paralogy' which pursues the method for establishing a new paradigm (1984, p. xxv).

partly owed to this idea of science, in which the fundamental nature of human beings is thought to be universal. On another understanding, human beings may be thought to possess so-called perfect identity, that is, an entire entity that is not transformable. This is a negative of scientific understanding, but not be involved in postmodern discussion. On the other hand, the multiplicity of postmodern science may correspond to the dissolution of identity. This is another way to describe a person not as a highly individual and unified existence but as a more fluid and momentary one. We need further consideration to grasp this view, so I will focus upon this point in the next section.

Postmodern science for Lyotard is the activity that is against the principle of performance, which manages a system for the purpose of gaining time. Good performance is the modern principle, and 'good' means how much we can save time for making more products. Things that are not calculable are unpredictable in terms of their outcome, so they are not 'good' for performance. However, Lyotard evaluates them as a way to evade the modern Ideas. This is the gist of postmodern thought represented in terms of the doubt of the modern, through which Lyotard tries to sketch out the transformations of social status in the postmodern age.

4.5. The Linkage of Phrases and the Concept of Personal Identity

In Lyotard's discussion, 'narrative' is an essential concept, but later he is interested rather in elements of narratives; what he calls 'phrases'. Although narrative is still a

central conception in his arguments, he also reflects on his works and says that he 'exaggerated the importance to be given the narrative genre,' and appeals to the necessity of considering the distinction 'between different regimes of phrases and different genres of discourse'.³²⁷ This notion is particularly disclosed in *The Differend*, in which the phrase and the linkage of phrases are the main theme. Although this topic is mentioned in chapter two, it is worth re-examining in the context of the postmodern. The matter of a phrase outlines bounds of narrative and leaves clues to the concept of personal identity, so we shall observe the role of phrases, mainly referring to *The Differend*.

Linkage is defined as an unavoidable condition of phrases. A phrase links to another phrase in any circumstances, because to make a phrase is to connect it with prior and later phrases. A doubt or rejection of a phrase also takes the form of a phrase, and even silence is interpreted as an expression in the context of discourse. Therefore, according to Lyotard, all issues are reduced to the way in which one phrase links to another. If there is a phrase that takes a question form and there are other phrases that can be linked to that, to choose one phrase is to choose the genre of discourse in which the phrases are understood.³²⁸ Imagine there is a phrase and that we need to decide our attitude towards it. Whatever it is, positive, negative, or ambivalent, to choose the phrase that links with another is to determine the genre of discourse, or so to speak, a sort of a language game. If there is a phrase 'Would you like fish?,' another phrase that links to it might be, for example, 'I prefer meat,' 'I am very worried about marine

³²⁷ Lyotard (1992, p. 31).

³²⁸ See, for example, Wittgenstein on propositions: 'A proposition is a sign in a system of signs. It is *one* combination of signs among a number of possible ones, and as opposed to other possible ones. As it were *one* position of an indicator as opposed to other possible ones' (1974, p. 131).

pollution, and the governments must take action against it,' or 'I actually have a big fish tank in which various tropical fishes are kept. They are more beautiful than gems!' This is very simple case, but is an example of the way in which the sequence of phrases forms the pattern of discourse.

Lyotard sees that narrative is a relatively consistent form. When phrases are put into narrative structure, they are given certain roles and suitable positions in the story, so it offers stability to phrases. Wherever the narration stops, it makes the end of the story from which we retroactively reorganise it and give order and meaning to its events. The end suppresses the conflict between events in the story by providing an interpretation of it as if there were a great conclusion of acts. Thus, to put phrases in a narrative form is to give a certain plot to them in which the beginning and the end of the story are defined. Even an interrupted or unfinished story has an end, in that the story stops, and we judge the whole story by looking over it from beginning to end. The narrative which makes phrases homogenous is described as follows:

The *vicus*, the *home*, the *Heim* is a zone in which the differend between genres of discourse is suspended. An "internal" peace is brought at the price of perpetual differends on the outskirts. (The same arrangement goes for the ego, that of self-identification.) This internal peace is made through narratives that accredit the community of proper names as they accredit themselves. The *Volk* shuts itself up in the *Heim*, and it identifies itself through narratives attached to names, narrative that fail before the occurrence and before the differends born from the occurrence.³²⁹

The internal peace of society is compared to self-identification in this paragraph, and narrative gives calm and repose to both. The work of narrative is understood as locating

³²⁹ Lyotard (1988, p. 151).

phrases where they should be, so narrative tames war between the phrases in its framework.

In contrast to the internal peace, the border zone of narrative is set as a battlefield of phrases and discourses: 'A phrase, which links and which is to be linked, is always a *pagus*, a border zone where genres of discourse enter into conflict over the mode of linking...[*P*]agani waging war among the genres of discourse.'³³⁰ The rule of linkage of phrases is determined in the secure place, but heretical thoughts are expelled from the inner place. They must seek new phrases because they do not find a proper place in that narrative. Hence, it is a struggle to find an expression for a not-yet-realised idea. This is the place for little narratives which do not belong to a complete and stable story but go in quest for a new way of linkage. This view of phrases reveals the minimum of the narrative form, in which there are always residues that are not dissolved in the network of coherent phrases.

The unity of a person is compared to the unity of narrative in the first half of chapter two, so personal identity in this case is also supposed to be consistent and continuous. However, a person tends to be described as a more fluid and unstable existence in postmodern thought, in which a person is reduced to transient actions at a particular time rather than the subject that undertakes the whole life story. I assume that the concept of identity on this understanding is more compatible with a link of phrases than with the unity of narrative.

An instance that plainly depicts the dispersion of a person can be represented by a series of Cindy Sherman's photographs. In each shot, a woman appears in different hair styles, clothes, fashion, make-up, and situations. Although these are the same person,

³³⁰ Ibid.,

Cindy Sherman, we have an illusion that the persons in the photographs are different. She directs herself in diverse modes. Her work looks like a collection of actresses' photographs, comprised of various film stills, though her photographs do not belong to any specific story. When people see her products, they may be driven to ask which shows the real her, or at least is the closest image of the everyday Cindy Sherman. This will be an empty question to her, because every character just performs momentary roles on each occasion. Craig Owens sees the insecurity of identity in Sherman's work: 'while we can presume to recognize the same person, we are forced at the same time to recognize a trembling around the edges of that identity.'³³¹ It can be said that we can catch a glimpse of the act in a series of her photographs that attempts to fasten herself together just for an instant.

Sherman's early work, in which her fashions evoke in readers some typical female fashions in monochrome films, television programs, or male magazines, can imply the lack of reality of those characters and the existence only of acts (1995, 2003, Lisa Philips, 2004). I stress that her works are, nonetheless, not an insistence that individuals are reduced to a set of roles in society, as Erving Goffman asserts.³³² To play roles for Goffman is to take up positions which are socially required, but in Sherman's work the social meaning is also lost. David Harvey analyses her activity as separate from existing institutions: 'The interest of Cindy Sherman's photographs...is that they focus on masks without commenting directly on social meanings other than on the activity of masking itself.'³³³ Her performance is recorded in stills from non-existent films that do not connect with each other, so there is no meta-story that unifies the stills.

³³¹ Owens (1987, p. 75).

³³² Goffman (1956).

³³³ Harvey (1989, p. 101).

The roles that she plays are mostly produced in accordance with her imagination, so it is not necessary to understand them in association with social requirements.

This does not mean that people completely abandon their roles and tasks in society and only live as imaginary characters, though that disposition seems to have increased in the present era. In the age in which the worth of the experiences of the former generation decline sharply, the firm meaning of a role, which must be secured by society, also faces its collapse. The concept of the sense of reality needs to be questioned in this situation, and the meaning of identity is also reconsidered.

We establish the consistency of life through a connection between experiences by a narrative approach which gives 'internal peace' to phrases. Nonetheless, there is also dissolution that cannot be located in the unity of narrative but always goes beyond its boundary. This can be contrasted with those phrases which enter conflicts in order to create their own discourses. I do not deny the role of narrative understanding in making the context of our experiences, but insist that inconsistent elements, which are usually ignored as surplus or heresy, are also unavoidable aspects in our formation.

This is the outline of what I call 'postmodern identity' that breaks up the unity of a person which is cultivated by the modern. I will examine more closely, particularly in relation to the present media, but before we become fully involved in that topic, we shall discuss other features of the postmodern. We have not yet examined several aspects, one of them being the notion of the 'classic'. Lyotard stresses locality in his discussion of little narratives, but it is not the same as the locality that is grounded on the immediate connection between narratives and communities. Participation in little narratives is not the return to the pre-modern situation, so we should make clear their differences. Therefore, I will next look at the notion of the classic in Lyotard's

discussion and then move to the non-chronological understanding of the postmodern, the modern, and the classic.

4.6. Traditional Knowledge in the Classic

Grand narratives represent the modern, little narratives characterise the postmodern, and one more term which is compared to these is the classic. We examined different types of identity in the former chapter, in which the rise of modern personal identity as located in the era of the medium of printing. The media of oral communication and hand writing were defined as characterising the period in which the concept of personal identity was indicated but not yet realised. In the ages of those media, people are supposed to put their sympathy into collective identity within the community. I locate the period of the classic in the era in which a tight relation between members of a community is kept, and in which lives are not widely separate from narratives. Although Lyotard does not limit the classic to oral and writing cultures, I assume that they can be compared with those societies that are involved in traditional narratives.

The classic is characterised in relation to knowledge in general. Knowledge in general involves numerous criteria of judgement in ordinary life, so it must be applicable to miscellaneous conditions in response to circumstances.³³⁴ It is not only used for acquiring a definite answer based on evidence, but also for taking proper steps

³³⁴ This knowledge 'includes notions of "know-how," "knowing-how to live," "how to listen," etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth' (1984, p. xx).

to meet a particular situation. Knowledge in general, or as I shall call it 'traditional narratives,' is characterised by Lyotard in terms of four points. First, it indicates basic rules through the actions and outcomes of characters in the stories of a community. There is a hero, a heroine, trials, and a great purpose in a story, and characters' successes or failures teach what is evaluated or prohibited in the community. Second, it allows for a multiplicity of statements. It is natural for traditional narratives to include plural discourses which belong to different categories in modern scientific knowledge. In modern science, for example, we do not mention any admonition of human arrogance in a biological description of a species, but myth can contain these different categories in a story; as for example the reason why the spider was created and why people must not take an overbearing attitude.³³⁵

Third, these narratives do not only convey information in their contents, but also imply the tacit understandings of a community. Through participation in storytelling, people learn the proper attitudes of storyteller and audience, and learn what qualifications are necessary to be a storyteller and audience. These are not directly mentioned in a story, but are woven into the rule of storytelling. Finally, they do not need require meta-narratives in order to prove their legitimacy. Culture is already authorised in its origin, and in the same way traditional narratives are also self-legitimated. The issue of legitimacy will be considered further in a later section.

Traditional narratives are comprised of particular names and events in a culture. The case of the Cashinahua Indian in South America is often referred to by Lyotard when he explains his notion of a traditional community. The narratives of the

³³⁵ For instance, a Greek myth explains why the goddess created the spider (the mythical origin of the spider), due to the haughtiness of one girl (the admonition of arrogance). Biological explanations of the origin of the spider today never include any moral element.

Cashinahua are important only for the members of the community, and the community is the only world for them: 'The bond woven around "Cashinahua" names by theses narratives procures an identity that is solely "Cashinahua" .'³³⁶ They do not have any intention of extending their narratives in terms of involving other communities outside of their society. The community of Cashinahua is the universe for its members, so even though they may have the concept of 'others' for the people who live outside their community, these people's names would generally not appear in their narratives. The Cashinahua's narratives contain only Cashinahua people, and there is no objective to make universal history over 'other' people.

Lyotard evaluates the capacity of traditional narratives to hold a diversity of plural statements, but is also conscious of the limitation of this method. Traditional narratives are flexible within the framework of the belonging community, but they do not reach outside the community. These narratives can escape from the decline of grand narratives, because they are formed by different legitimacies from the grand narratives.³³⁷ The traditional narratives do not need to confirm their privileged status since they are already authorised in the community. However, they have at any rate lost their domination through being attacked by modern science as superstition and not the centre of the world but one of many local narratives.

In addition, the classic is also dissolved by the postmodern, because it breaks the boundary of the community by which the domination of traditional narratives is preserved. These are the characteristics of traditional narratives, and although they can offer us a different view from that of the grand narratives, we who have undergone the

³³⁶ Lyotard (1988, p. 155).

³³⁷ Lyotard (1992, p. 31).

postmodern criticism of ethnocentrism cannot live in peace in the position of the classic.

The differences between the three terms are also represented by ideas of identity found in each view. The modern is represented by belief in the development of humanity by the use of reason. The modern concept of personal identity is based on the ideal that the unity of actions makes continuity of identity of a person through life. The concept of the identity in postmodern thought is concerned with the denial of the above views and disperses unification. Features of the classic reside in the close connection between narratives and the members of a community, because they are assumed to identify themselves through collective identity more than personal identity. Although the postmodern and the classic might be thought to be similar in that both of them refuse to accept the universal idea, the reason is different; whether the local is thought to be the whole world or not. Traditional narratives do not need to acquire universality. Since their authority is already established in the community, they do not regard themselves as local. Locality in postmodern narratives contains, before everything else, ascent from the abandonment of the meta aspect, so it is not unconscious of its peculiarity but dares to stay in that position.

The discussion until now has allowed us to interpret the characteristics of each term in relation to the chronological understanding, but Lyotard leans toward denying that understanding, especially in his later texts. We need to examine this non-chronological view in Lyotard's work as well, or we may miss the essence of his notion of the postmodern.

4.7. The Modern and the Postmodern as Movements

The postmodern is defined not only as a period in time but also as a movement of thought, art, literature, politics, and so on. This non-chronological division in Lyotard's thought is specifically analysed in the article 'Answer to the Question: What is Postmodern?' in relation to features of art.³³⁸ Lyotard does not use a generally accepted categorisation of postmodern and modern art in this article, but expresses his own classification of them. His answer to the question, 'what is the condition of postmodern art?' is summarised in this passage: 'What then is the postmodern?...It is undoubtedly part of the modern...A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern.'³³⁹ A work of art is, for him, the attempt to create a new field through criticising predecessors' achievements. If it is successful in establishing its own field, this field will then be challenged by the next generation as the existing authority. In this manner, every art work first occurs as the postmodern (challenging to find a new expression), and then becomes the modern (already possessing the method of expression). Anything which was once received, Lyotard insists, must be reconsidered as the ground its successors, and this is one understanding of the difference between the postmodern and the modern.

To grasp the postmodern as a movement of thought is to understand art works not in fixed positions in art history but in flexible positions that are interpreted in relation to other works. In this context the postmodern is regarded not as the end of the modern but

³³⁸ This article is consciously written to respond to Habermas's criticism of the postmodern in which modernity is explained in relation to aesthetics. Thus, Lyotard also examines the status of art in the modern and postmodern movements.

³³⁹ Ibid., pp. 21-22.

as a modern 'nascent state, and this state is recurrent'.³⁴⁰ Every innovative work first appears as the postmodern, and then becomes the modern. This is one explanation of the non-chronological division between the postmodern and the modern. Lyotard is, nonetheless, not completely satisfied with this answer, which seems to him too automatic and mechanistic to produce postmodern thought, and he analyses further the characteristic of the postmodern.

A postmodern attitude for him is more a lively action than a systematic operation which brings postmodern movements to the former position of the modern. He grasps it as the struggle to embody something that cannot be expressed in the existing framework. The newness of the presentation is supposed to give unpleasantness to people rather than comfort; the work has not been previously known, and people are not yet prepared to accept it. Relief and repose are offered by the already-known, and this is regarded as the work of modern art. The work of postmodern art does not follow existing rules but creates them by itself, and this is understood to be the role of philosophy as well:

The postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes or the work he creates is not in principle governed by pre-established rules and cannot be judged according to a determinant judgement, by the application of given categories to this text or work. Such rules and categories are what the work or text is investigating. The artists and the writer therefore work without rules, and in order to establish the rules for what *will have been made*.³⁴¹

He insists that those who seek better presentation for something which is unrepresentable are engaged in a philosophical task. In *The Differend* we see the same idea about philosophy: 'What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 24.

bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them,' for the phrases which have sought 'new rules for forming and linking.'³⁴² Something which cannot be collected by the modern system is left as the excess of society that must be released, and to give a presentation of the unrepresentable is understood as the work of the postmodern. Thus, the postmodern as a movement is concerned with producing not consolation but the unearthly. I believe that this understanding of the postmodern offers the opportunity to take notice of the strange in our identity.³⁴³

This is the approach by which the discontinuity between the modern and postmodern is explained as a matter of different modes. Brian McHale sketches their differences in a discussion of fiction: 'the dominant of modernist fiction is *epistemological*,' while 'the dominant of postmodernist fiction is *ontological*'. McHale analyses the mode of fiction in each movement in terms of which question is asked in each: The modernist's question is thought to be concerned with how 'I' can interpret and record the world in which I am located. The postmodernist's question is more 'post-cognitive'; what kind of the worlds (or selves) they are.³⁴⁴ Although McHale does not insist on the necessity of a non-chronological view for comprehending these terms, his thought helps us to grasp the manner of depicting them by different modes.

In relation to the issue of identity, the best way to grasp the modern and postmodern as different movements is to make clear the conflict between them. Postmodern identity is not a mere idea that comes after the modern concept of personal identity, but it works to disclose the shortcomings of the modern one. This is the reason that I would like to examine the postmodern not only in chronological terms but also as

³⁴² Lyotard (1988, p. 13).

³⁴³ 'They [postmodern artists and writers] "bear witness" to the unrepresentable rather than trying to hide from it in a false nostalgia' (Sim, 1996, p. 48).

³⁴⁴ McHale (1989, pp. 9-10).

a movement. Moreover, if the modern and postmodern can be described as movements, they might coexist as different manners of thought. In the same way, I infer, both modern and postmodern identity can be possessed by a person. We are usually not completely segmented existences but tell stories about ourselves. Thus, a sense of unity is left intact; while we also become the diffusion of unity.

The modern ideal has worked to make the concept of a person as an intelligent and progressing existence through consensus. It is natural for us to regard the proper concept of a person as that of unified and rational existences to the extent that we treat inconsistent elements of ourselves negatively.³⁴⁵ However and therefore, the matter of diffusion has arisen in terms of seeking the means of making differences in identity, because these are also elements of which we consist. I interpret the following quotation from Lyotard in this manner:

Postmodern does not signify recent. It signifies how writing, in the broadest sense of thought and action, is situated after it has succumbed to the contagion of modernity and has tried to cure itself of it. Now, modernity is not recent either. It is not even an epoch. It is another state of writing, in the broad sense of the word'.³⁴⁶

Because we have experienced and were affected by the modern movement, the reconsideration of it is necessary if we endeavour to develop a critical view of ourselves. This is a reason for understanding these two as different movements, not thoughts successive in history. Therefore, it can be said that we today have lived in postmodern

³⁴⁵ As an example of a discussion of the modern rejection of inconsistency of a person, I cite the research of madness by Michel Foucault. He depicts the way to expel uncanny things from society, and argues that the definition of madness can change in different periods of time. (1989).

³⁴⁶ Lyotard (1997, pp. 95-96).

times, but that the modern and the classic are not exterminated; these three have contended with each other. I define the present situation as the time in which an inclination towards the postmodern has intensified in various areas, and the meaning of the modern and the classic have been reconsidered from the postmodern perspective. This is my view of the postmodern, and the matter of identity today will be more understandable if we examine it in the light of the postmodern.

Lastly in this chapter, I shall examine two topics that are concerned with the non-chronological view of the postmodern, modern, and classic. If we read Lyotard's texts bearing in mind this understanding, some of his notions become more transparent. One is the different way in which each is legitimised, and the other is the question of whether or not the 'breaking up of grand narratives' is merely another grand narrative. The former relates to the status of identity in pre-modern, modern, and postmodern narratives, and the second will help for us to grasp more firmly the condition of the postmodern.

4.8. The Legitimacy Problem and the Status of Little Narratives

We have seen some of the particularities of the classic, modern, and postmodern, and this section will centre upon the scope within which they settle the legitimacy of their narratives. Lyotard compares the legitimacy of the modern and that of the classic in order to reveal the points at which the authority of each is located, so we start our discussion with the legitimacies of these two. The narrative of emancipation gives ideas

to people that have not yet been actualised, so people are expected to devote themselves to the forthcoming future: 'Unlike myths, however, they [grand narratives] look for legitimacy not in an original founding act but in a future to be accomplished, that is, in an Idea to be realised. This Idea...has legitimating value because it is universal.'³⁴⁷ A meta-narrative promises to bring the Idea to fruition, and people promote the narrative in the belief that the promise will turn into reality. Thus, the legitimacy of meta-narratives is a matter of the time to come, and their authority is not already founded in its origin but is always under construction.

In contrast with the meta-narratives, traditional narratives have legitimacy in their origin. Traditional narratives are a part of culture that consists of the manners, morals, and knowledge of a certain society. If there is such a thing as the legitimacy of culture, it is to be found in its history, that is, in its having been established and accepted for a long time and having constructed the basis of a community.³⁴⁸ The same rule can be applied to the legitimacy of the classic, because it is inseparably connected to culture. The classic does not need to confirm its legitimacy by relying on the promised future, but the fact that it tightly relates to the history of the community gives it authority, so traditional narratives are already legitimated in their nature.³⁴⁹

In the narrative which is inseparable from its locality, the question of the continuity of a person as an independent and individual does not arise naturally, as I have repeatedly mentioned before. Collective identity is fostered in this circumstance. In contrast, the narrative that sets its realisation in the future can systematise people in a

³⁴⁷ Lyotard (1992, pp. 29-30).

³⁴⁸ Lyotard describes the way in which traditional narratives 'define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do' (1984, p. 23).

³⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-23.

way that reaches beyond their localities, because they are left in a situation in which every one is equal in respect of waiting for the achievement of the narrative. Any person can participate in that narrative if they believe in it, and this is the reason that grand narratives can be universal.

In addition, this type of narrative requires awareness of independence from traditional restrictions, because a participant must make a decision and devote themselves to the narrative beyond regional boundaries. Mentioning the case of religion, free participation is a necessary condition of being a universal religion, so for example, Christianity accepts its believers irrespective of culture, region, and race. On the other hand, indigenous religions often only include those people who live in a particular region. Although there are numerous sorts of local religions, they usually connect to ancestors and rigidly regulate the life of the community. They exclude those people exterior to the region, and because of this restriction, the security of the interior is maintained.

Thus, the legitimacy of the little narratives is also founded upon a different position from that of traditional and modern narratives. Postmodern science is an example appropriate to the clarification of this point. The role of postmodern science is to produce 'not the known, but unknown,' so it acts not to maintain existing theory but to find explanations for the unintelligible.³⁵⁰ Its legitimacy is neither rooted in the origin of narratives nor promises to bring a better future, but pursues discoveries that may transform the basis of the existing style of knowledge. If postmodern science can be verified in its performance, it would be in the activity of producing various sorts of discourses: 'The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.³⁵¹ The work of inventing another move for players sustains the exercise of postmodern narratives, so they locate their legitimacy not in the past or future, but in the process of seeking new ideas.

This legitimacy is set against both the classic and the modern. It works as a disturbance of the closed microcosm as well as the utmost equality of cosmopolitan view. It pays attention to the movement at a particular moment rather than in the distant past or future. As to the aspect of identity, collective identity is authorised by the culture to which it belongs from its beginning. Modern personal identity on this understanding is an aim that must be achieved, so the concept of a person is always on the way to being developed. If there is an unusual aspect of one's behaviour in general circumstances, it must be due to immaturity. Postmodern identity is featured as making narrative peace disintegrate. It reveals a side that is not evaluated by modern identity, and seeks a way to include residues, differences, or fragmentation of a person in its range.

Therefore, the legitimacy of each of the three terms is set in a different perspective; in the past, in the promised future, and in the present action. As we can see in the beginning of *The Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard mentions the chronological description of the postmodern.³⁵² However, in later writing, he is more involved in another way of distinguishing these three terms in which they are dealt with as modes of thought, as described above. The postmodern and modern in the previous section are presented not in terms of a chronological distinction that positions the postmodern after

³⁵¹ Ibid., p. 65.

³⁵² For example, in the following sentence he adopts the chronological division. 'Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age' (Ibid., p. 3).

the modern, but are counted as different movements of thought.³⁵³ If the modern was not understood historically, it would be defined by its legitimacy, and it is one of the ideas that Lyotard tries to confirm by the introduction of the non-chronological division.

One more example that will characterise this non-chronological understanding is the status of the breaking up of grand narratives. This issue does not directly connected to the study of identity, but it can be considered as long as the status of the postmodern is the matter of discussion. A response to the question, whether the denial of grand narratives is also a grand narrative or not, is to some extent a matter of opinion, because it is determined by what attitude people take towards the fall of grand narratives.³⁵⁴ For instance, a narrative of the breaking up of the grand narratives, which I shorten to the 'narrative of the ending,' can be thought of as one of the meta-discourses in the following cases. When we face the narrative of the ending, we might be petrified by a picture which depicts conflicts rather than agreement, fragmentation rather than unification. It brings about a disunity of things that is not easy for us to accept, because it relates to dissimilar, unfamiliar, and strange matters. As Horkheimer and Adorno indicate, 'Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown'.³⁵⁵ We feel relieved when heterodoxy, the stranger, or dissonance is exiled from our habitat, so removal of the unknown is the general desire of most societies.

³⁵³ Lyotard, for example, understands that Augustine's thought shows characteristics of the modern in his writing style as well as in his emphasis on eschatology, which arranges the denouncement of human beings and recovery from evil and sin at the end of the Christian narrative (1992, pp. 35-36, p. 54, 1997, p. 96).

³⁵⁴ For example, J. M. Bernstein says that to tell of the end of ideas is also to indicate the establishment of one Idea: 'even the deracinated social world of capital, governed, tendentially, by temporary contracts, is still a world, social and historical in its roots; and so inevitably legitimates itself through grand narratives repeatedly telling the story of the end of grand narrative, the end of ideology, the end of metaphysics from Descartes to Lyotard' (1991, p. 110).

³⁵⁵ Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, p. 11).

However, if there is no meta-rule which has the legitimacy to expel differences, and this is the case for postmodern narratives, it would bring dread to us. We in these circumstances might wish to cling to the breaking up of grand narratives as the last grand narrative which gives us relief and stability. Whatever its contents, definitive thought can offer a sense of security to people who want to rely on a firm belief. If people accepted the narrative of the ending as their absolute principle, they would exhaust themselves by sticking to the principle. This may lead to futile nihilism which implies the worthlessness of all value and the nullity of all acts. The narrative of the ending would be one of the grand narratives if people comprehend it in this manner.

On another occasion on which the narrative of the ending is counted as a meta-narrative, people might choose a return to religious consolation instead of participating in the postmodern situation.³⁵⁶ They might declare that grand narratives are untrustworthy, so we must re-establish the reliable narrative that sheds light on the return to the origin, to religion. People who hold this opinion take advantage of the narrative of the ending in terms of its scaring people with the image that the narrative presents. Thus, it is used to appeal to the legitimacy of the restoration of religion. It is the trend in which people want to revert to religion in order to reestablish a trustworthy narrative by which they will give order to a chaotic situation. Daniel Bell stresses the power of religion to recover the consistency of society that returns 'us to the existential predicaments which are the ground of humanity and care for others.' In his opinion, the reconsideration of the value of religion is a necessary condition for regaining morality

³⁵⁶ 'Many believe this is the moment for religion, a moment to rebuild a credible narration where the wounds of this fin-de-siècle will be recounted, where they will be healed...But this course of action, it seems to me, is far from being just' (Lyotad, 1992, p. 41).

today.³⁵⁷

If the narrative of the ending only led to the above attitudes, it would not escape from the shadow of the meta-narratives. Nonetheless, it can also be described differently, and in order to discuss this point we will consider whether or not the characteristics of the narrative of the ending coincide with those of grand narratives. First of all, we should reiterate that the narrative of the ending only implies the situation in which meta-narratives have lost their legitimacy. It does not suggest any future emancipation by means of distrust of the modern Ideas. Future or hope is not the matter of the narrative of the ending, because 'Hope is what belongs to a subject of history who promises him/herself—or to whom has been promised—a final perfection'.³⁵⁸ The narrative of ending is concerned with neither the final narrative nor the perfect conclusion, but rather incites reconsideration of the existing authority.

Furthermore, if the narrative of the ending is lacking in the hope of emancipation, the legitimacy of this narrative cannot be found in the future. It highlights the situation in which the validity of the desire for universal history is doubted, but does not hold up any ideal by which it takes up the position that was occupied by the modern Ideas. If people question the role of this narrative, the answer would be that it is a movement that incites pictures of the world which cannot be drawn by the modern. Thus, it tells of no release, no definitive future, and no final narratives. These characteristics belong to little narratives, not to meta-narratives. Hence, the 'breaking up of the grand narratives' is not a kind of meta-discourse due to the lack of any intention of establishing any universal ideal. It joins in the work of producing a new discourse, so I place it in the category of

³⁵⁷ Bell (1976).

³⁵⁸ Lyotard (1997, p. 99).

the little narratives.

Lyotard himself recognises the possibility that the narrative of the ending is accepted as one of the grand narratives, and suggests that the collapse of authority has already been pointed out: 'the grand narrative of decadence was already in place at the beginning of Western thought, in Hesiod and Plato. It follows the narrative of emancipation like a shadow.'³⁵⁹ People have always talked about the end of a great ideal, so if the postmodern and the modern were taken as movements, the narrative of the ending would not be a novel idea. It has been frequently proposed by people who deplore the dusk of grand value. Nonetheless, if there is a particularity of the postmodern movement in this age, it is self-awareness and resolution of the necessity of avoiding returning to meta-discourses.

The postmodern is the attempt to rely on neither local authority nor universal Ideas, but on finding another discourse. Besides, although it may not be absolutely novel, the spread of this notion can be regarded as a feature of this era. If we try to adopt an attitude which does not fall into decadence or emancipation, we need to bare in mind the suggestions of the little narratives. This is the direction postmodern identity faces, and the narrative of the ending on this understanding is not one of the meta-narratives. I treat the question of whether the narrative of the ending is a grand narrative or not in this manner.³⁶⁰ Hence, the classic, modern, and postmodern are used in two different ways; one follows the chronological division and the other treats them as movements of thought. I do not consider there to be a clear-cut choice between two alternatives, but

³⁵⁹ Lyotard (1992, pp. 40-41). The same notion is seen in his article 'Anima Minima' as well (1997, pp. 235-236).

³⁶⁰ Bill Readings also asks himself, 'Is there a grand narrative of the failure of meta-narratives?' The answer can be both positive and negative, but he leans towards the opinion that the narrative of the ending is not a grand narrative (1991, p. 85).

depending on the issue we can use different approaches. As an historical occurrence, the postmodern has flourished from around the latter half of the twentieth century, and as a movement, it can be found at any time in the conflict between the modern and the postmodern, though it has been specifically popularised in this age.

To conclude, the postmodern is defined as a form of serious doubt of the modern Ideas. Whichever the modern belongs to, to a period of time or to a movement of thought, its ideology was certainly effective in promoting people as existences responsible for their actions. Nevertheless, it is also true that it cannot infinitely expand its range. The postmodern exposes this limit of the modern Ideas, and this is the meaning of Lyotard's use of the term the 'breaking up of grand narratives'. In opposition to grand narratives, he introduces little narratives that represent a variety of postmodern discourses. The instability which is due to the possibility of opening new discourses is the essence of the postmodern, and without that feature, it might turn to one of the grand narratives.

It is the condition by which we are surrounded today, and to give its outline in the name of 'postmodern' is the purpose of this chapter. By the introduction of this conflict between the modern and postmodern, I expect that the distinctive features of the concept of personal identity in each thought becomes clearer. In the case of narrative, modern narratives try to eliminate locality as the obstacles which prevent the establishing of universal history. These narratives work to keep the inner peace of society as well as that of a person, or in other words, the security of identity is protected through involvement in a firm narrative structure. On the other side, there is the excess which does not have any place in the existing narrative form, because it makes the inner peace unstable and is excluded from there because of its heterogeneity. The excess

embodies the fact that there is something which is not assimilated by the system of narratives.³⁶¹ This is the significance of postmodern identity that we have discussed and will examine more in the next chapter concerned with the role of phrases. The consistency of a person and of identity has been discussed in the modern study of personal identity, and I would like to leave this issue to researchers in that tradition. I attempt rather to consider an inconsistent side of identity in my discussion.

³⁶¹ 'The sacrifice recognizes the differend which is not digested by the narration and acquits itself of it' (1988, p. 155).

Chapter 5

DIFFERENCES

The Fragmentation of Identity in the Postmodern Age

5.1. The Impact of Electronic Media

An old man opened a window, outside of which there was an immense church outlined against the starry sky. He gazed at it for a while in silence, and then held out his right hand towards a printed book and his left hand towards Notre Dame. He sorrowfully moved his eyes from the book to the church, and grieved. 'This will kill that.' – This is a scene in *Notre-Dame de Paris, 1482* by Victor Hugo, in which the archdeacon's misery and fear of the new technology, printing, is fully expressed. Hugo gives two explanations of this fear: One is fear of the collapse of the authority of church. Control over doctrine supports the church's government of ordinary people, but it now faces decline due to the popularisation of printing. People can come into contact with it through books.

The other, Hugo claims, is concerned not only with the priesthood but also with the wider class of people including the savant and the artist: 'human thought, in changing its form, was about to change its mode of expression; that the dominant idea of each generation would no longer be written with the same matter, and in the same

manner.' Hugo insists that architecture and its decorations have been a 'great book' that have expressed human thought and intelligence at least until the end of the fifteenth century, but this 'so solid and so durable book' is replaced with the printed book which is 'not only more durable and more resisting than architecture, but still more simple and easy.'³⁶² This change in the method of storing knowledge affects the form of thinking, so the advent of printing technology is described as the greatest invention in the history of human intelligence.³⁶³

Although this domination of printing has continued for hundreds of years, we now face another transition period, which is the shift from printing to electric and/or electronic media. In these recent media, the mode of communication is greatly different from printing. According to Hugo, printing gains its premier position in the storage of intelligence through the sturdiness and stability of information. These characteristics are not those of the electric and/or electronic media. They transform the style of information from material to immaterial, solid to fluid, as we examined in the last part of chapter three. Due to this dissimilarity from the former media, the electric and/or electronic media can be another style of information. This change is not the replacement of one medium by another, but the transition is accumulative.³⁶⁴ The invention of writing did not eliminate oral communication, and in the same way, printing will not totally

³⁶² The idea that the Church is a book is a common metaphor today, so, e.g., James Burke mentions: 'Biblical tales glowed from the stained-glass windows. Gothic cathedrals have been called "encyclopedias in stone and glass' (2003, 75).

³⁶³ It is a very tiny case, but Hugo's novel can be seen as an instance of this case. I quote sentences of *Notre-Dame de Paris, 1482* from an electronic text (Hugo, 2001). Due to this, I cannot cite the page number, because the page is not the same depending on the software in which the text is read. We can however easily find the place of the quotation by using a search function. This deviation from the traditional format of quotation is small, but it might be one of the factors which bring great changes to our form of thought.

³⁶⁴ Poster (1990, p. 6).

disappear in the age of electronic media, but its status must change because of the power of the latest media. I will examine particularities of our concept of identity in the age of this new mode of information in this chapter. I thus centralise in the work of the media in this chapter, though I do not insist there is only a single factor that carries present somewhat particular features of a person. A number of occurrences have acted on characterising the understanding of a person such as the crossing of diverse different cultures, economic globalisation, and the end and beginning of some international disputes. The electronic media are part of those trends, and I specifically pick up the media as an effective sphere so as to present the features of a person at present. The media carry human communication with their own influences, and I will examine the role and power of this interaction between the media and the concept of personal identity.

In our discussion, first we will reconsider if all media can be thought as mediated methods of communication or not. We specifically pay attention to the work of electronic media here, so their particularities will be next examined. In the electronic media, one of the significant characteristics is the immateriality in which users' physical factors are usually invisible. I will highlight this aspect from several angles such as the correspondence between names and their subjects, the distinction between an author and a reader, and the comparison between a link of phrases and the concept of a person. I try to depict the discordance between a concept of a person that is established based on modern ideal and that in postmodern discussions.

The above arguments are thus an assortment of positive views at the point that postmodern thought may affect our concept of identity, but there are criticisms of that understanding. One of the arguments shall be the manner by which we organise our

view of a life apart from the consistency of identity. This issue leads to the question of how we can possess a sense of ethics if a life is not unified. We will treat this sort of argument in reference to Parfit's opinion of what is the matter of our survival. In the end, we will consider again the meaning to apply postmodern thought to the study of identity, within the context of Lyotard's discussion of technology. These are the gist of this chapter.

5.2. Postmodern Thought and the Status of the Media

There is one point that I should mention in relation to discussions of the media in postmodern thought. We have treated the media as methods of storing and exchanging information until now, but I want to consider this presupposition again in order to reconfirm the status of the media. The reason is that the media, especially oral media, might be regarded not as methods through which information is expanded but as the direct expression of the self. I would like to refer to Jacques Derrida's thought in this regard.

Derrida criticises the tradition of metaphysics as logocentrism that tends to give priority to speech: We first acquire speech, and writing is invented to aid speech. Writing has its roots in the early period of Western philosophy as we observed before in Plato's rejection of writing. Derrida takes up this point, for example, referring to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's discussion. The superiority of speech over writing is manifested in Rousseau's thought: 'Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as a

supplement to speech...Speech represents thought by conventional signs, and writing represents the same with regard to speech. Thus the art of writing is nothing but a mediated representation of thought.'³⁶⁵ In that Western tradition, Rousseau locates writing as the supplement and imitation of speech. Derrida comments on this phonocentrism from Plato to Rousseau and to Lévi-Straus, and shows that a clear boundary between writing and speech cannot be made. There is no dichotomy between the two but they interact with each other. This notion also leads to the impossibility of the direct presence of the origin of the self. He unfolds a magnificent discussion around this idea, but we do not have enough space here to examine his thoughts. To simplify somewhat, the thought that Derrida depicts by the use of his own terms such as 'archi-writing,' 'différance,' 'trace,' and 'supplement' suggests the impossibility of representing the origin. Speech and writing are comprehended as signs in his thought that imply the absence of an origin, because signs are not the origin itself but its supplement.³⁶⁶

The rejection of the superiority of speech does not mean locating writing above speech. Neither speech nor writing is given a superior position, but all things that are shown by us are always already mediated. For this reason, I suggest that speech and writing are methods of representation, so they are the media. Their act can be regarded as the search for the origin of the self but that effort only reaches at its supplement, so always embodies not the origin but the loss of it. The more this act multiplies its traces, the more it recedes from what it wants to express, so it heads towards making differences, not making identity. To examine this aspect of the media is one of the main

³⁶⁵ Derrida (1974, cited in p.144, p. 295, and p. 303).

³⁶⁶ Derrida (1974, 1987).

themes of this chapter.

In postmodern thought, the boundary of a person is assumed to be looser, and the relation between the concept of identity and its representation is sometimes reassessed. As the media that reflect that tendency particularly clearly, I will refer to digital communication. One of its prominent features is the invisibility of others. It is common for its users to become familiar with others without knowing their conditions in the actual world, and this tendency is assumed to influence our sense of communication. The use of names specifically discloses the uniqueness of the media, so the relation between a name and its demonstrative subject will be discussed. In consideration of this notion, the status of a writer of a message is questioned, and I deal with this matter by examining the distinction between writers and readers. The ambiguity of this distinction is pointed out in a number of recent works; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's collaborative work intentionally represents this matter in which they demonstrate the point at which the question 'who which' becomes insignificant; Roland Barthes expresses this author-reader problem through his declaration of the 'death of the author'; Lyotard describe people as spaces that receive and send information. The notion of differences, that are not consistent with their source, is considered in those various studies, and I want to discuss that idea in relation to the concept of personal identity. I will compare these thoughts and attempt to characterise the concept of identity and differences in postmodern discussions.

Moreover, I will also ask why the concept of personal identity is supposed to be necessary. This question is interpreted in terms of what problems there would be if we did not have that concept. I pursue this question in reference to the study of personal identity by Derek Parfit, who radically asserts the exclusion of the 'personal' aspect

from the study of the continuity of a person over time. Finally, I will review the influence and role of technology referring to Lyotard's discussion of two different types of 'inhumanity'. As to the concept of identity at different stages (the pre-modern, the modern, and the postmodern), I concentrate on its particularities in postmodern thought in this chapter. It is summarised as the search for a method of depicting the relation between experiences without – as far as possible – setting a meta-position. The notion of phrases is used to describe that idea. One of the main topics in this chapter is the way in which a phrase links to another for making a new discourse, so I also try to make links across several researchers' thoughts where possible. I hope there will be some links that support the depiction of differences in a person in this highly mediated generation.

5.3. The Invisibility of Computer Mediated Communication

The electronic media have been widespread in the last several decades, firstly in Western countries and then around the world. In this category of communication I include all methods which use a computer to exchange information, for example, websites, electronic mail, online-meetings, electronic bulletin boards, chat rooms, and so on. Any information in these media is converted from analog data to digital signals consisting of binary code, so whatever information takes shape on the computer screen,

it is reduced to a sequence of 0s and 1s, and is then encoded.³⁶⁷ Hence, this is a highly abstract communication style in which users receive multiply-mediated data. This indirectness is prominent in these media, and we will first observe this point. I focus on Internet communication as a typical example of these digital media.³⁶⁸

The invisibility of others is a general condition for communication on the Internet. Most information is grounded on self-reports there, and users generally have no way of verifying the truth of other users' statements. It is true that not all users wear false personas, and some personas are easily exposed because of their unnaturalness. However, the possibility that users' self-reports might be a complete invention is an unavoidable condition of this type of communication.³⁶⁹

The fragility of mutual trust in Internet communication is a popular theme today. The more users have experiences of untrustworthy self-reports, the more they may learn to keep some distance from information. We may take two extreme attitudes in relation to the insecurity of this communication. One such attitude is that in which users cynically accept that any relationship had on the Internet is in essence a fable, so they wear false personas themselves and have invented interaction with others. Others may insist that they can expose their 'real' selves only in cyber space, because they are hindered by physical constraints in the actual world. Prejudice that comes from physical factors is strong in the actual world, so they can disclose their true mind only when they can escape from these factors. Various versions of the second attitude are observed in

³⁶⁷ Friedrich Kittler keenly examines the relation between computer system and their users in a philosophical context in various articles (1997).

³⁶⁸ Although the Internet is full of letters, sound, voices, pictures, movies and animations, I regard writing as the main method of communication there that conveys detailed information, so written text on the Internet is the target of our discussion.

³⁶⁹ A typical instance of pretence is seen in the case of a male psychiatrist in New York who pretended to be a female neuropsychologist 'Joan' on a network group (Lindsay, 1996, 'The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover,' Rheingold, 2000).

computer mediated communication.³⁷⁰ Nevertheless, I do not seriously take either of them as a factor by which the work of postmodern identity and differences are characterised. We shall see the reason in the following example that gives us a clue of the second attitude.

A striking case of the second attitude is observed in involvement in multi-user computer games.³⁷¹ They are games that are played through access to the Internet. The uniqueness of this type of game compared to off-line games lies in interaction with other players. A player may cooperate with others and complete a mission, fall in love with another, or have a wedding ceremony with other players' blessings. Things that can happen in the actual world are traced there, and things that cannot happen in the actual world can be played as well. Sherry Turkle reports this phenomenon in its relatively early stages. Turkle cites player's words in her writing, 'This is more real than my real life,' which express how seriously players feel about characters in the game world.³⁷² Some players think that they can behave in the game world better than in the actual world, so their online self is closer to their ideal self-image.

Turkle discusses that through online interaction, people may obtain a moment at which they find another self, and at which they develop the idea that their identity can be multiple on the Internet.³⁷³ A particularity of this involvement compared to other computer mediated communications is found in the creation of a certain character which

³⁷⁰ For example, Horn (1998), Rheingold (1993, especially chapter five 'Multi-user Dungeons and Alternate Identities').

³⁷¹ It is often called MUD, which stands for Multi-User Domains or Multi-User Dungeons, though there are other popular names for this kind of game, such as MOO (MUD Object Oriented), on-line games, or net-games. Some of them require the use of particular software, and some of them can be entered into only by connection to a web site.

³⁷² Turkle (1997, p. 10).

³⁷³ Ibid., p. 260.

is not exactly the same as the user but can be fully empathised with as part of the self.³⁷⁴ Through those acts, a user can make a narrative involving the character, more so than when using other modes of electronic communication, and this is a reason why some of those who research electronic media specifically pay attention to this medium.

There are both criticisms and vindications of people who are gravely addicted to Internet communication, but we will not get involved in that issue. It shall be enough for us to indicate that in either case, whether cynical about or more sympathetic towards cyber space than towards the actual world, users separate the 'true self' and the 'transient and false self'. Whichever users emphasise, the actual world or the digital world, it only strengthens the unity of the 'true self' in opposition to the 'false self'. Therefore, although these attitudes can imply the separation of selves to some extent, they do not present the conditions well that I want to depict. They presuppose the existence of a true self behind the persona with which the continuity of their existence is securely identified. However, I insist that the significance of computer-based communication is found in the complete absence of the 'true self', where there are only links between phrases.

In this type of communication, the backgrounds of users do not become essential factors, because we cannot touch them but only know the message. Thus, a message on the Internet is not necessarily grasped as part of a long narrative, but should be understood through a link to other phrases at that moment. There is no centre or origin of phrases in the links, but the present links are all there are. This is my fundamental view of Internet communication, but the following criticism may arise; nevertheless, there is a user who writes a message, so there should be no doubt that would get in the

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 153.

way of regarding the user as the writer of the message. In order to address this issue, it will be effective to examine the relation between names used in messages and persons who use the names in electronic media.

5.4. The Correspondence between Names and Subjects

When we access the Internet, log into an electronic mail box, or enter a special database, we are required to fill in a user name. On an electronic bulletin board or in a chat room, a message is usually accompanied by a user's name. The users' name circulates as a pass permit, so without names we cannot join in with a variety of communicative activities in the electronic world. Although the importance of names is seen in the actual world as well, I say that in electronic media the temporal and abstract aspect of its use is emphasised.³⁷⁵

Due to our tradition, we tend to think that plural statements that are written by the same name are managed by the same user. There is, nonetheless, no guarantee that one name is used by one fixed user. It may happen that a user borrows another user's name to cheat others; a user uses several names as if there are several different users; plural users share one name. The belief that one name corresponds to one fixed user does not stand up in this situation. Not all people, of course, behave in such knotty ways in which reliance upon names collapse, or at least do not act with malicious intent. However,

³⁷⁵ Throughout this writing I use the term 'name' in its ordinary use, that is, I use it as a sign that distinguishes its target from others. I do not enter into the discussion of the properties of a name so prominent in analytic philosophy, but appeal to its more common sense.

there is always the suspicion that a name might not belong to the same user as before, and awareness of this possibility should have an effect on users' thoughts about relationships on the Internet.

In these circumstances, it is sometimes difficult to determine the exact subject of a phrase, when there are only phrases and responses to the phrases. In addition, the Internet has no focal point but expands all around, so there is no fundamental phrase according to which other responses develop. This image, which does not have a transcendental position but is always in the process of propagation, evokes to me Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's idea of the rhizome.³⁷⁶ At the beginning of their joint work, *A Thousand Plateaus*, they demonstrate their writing style:

The two of us wrote *Anti-Oedipus* together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd...We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and think...To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.³⁷⁷

The boundary of a person, which is thought to be firm in modern thought, becomes ambiguous in this notion. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to manifest the point at which the domain of 'I' does not possess a special meaning. Their argument brings us to a

³⁷⁶ A rhizome is contrasted to the tree and tree-structures that have a centre from which discussion develops. A rhizome has 'no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and...and...and..." This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb "to be" ' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 6-7).

³⁷⁷ Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 3).

radical view of self on which a person as a single and organised subject is dissolved.³⁷⁸

This contains a criticism of the theory in which a subject is located at the focus of discussion as a solid and rational existence. I suggest that division and reconnection are also the characteristics of messages on the Internet. The importance of a unified person fades but there are numerous links between phrases. Although users are usually not conscious of the danger involved in their acts, by which they open up the possibility of attacking the modern ideal of a person, digital communication may give a hint of the way to perform without any centre.

By that view, I do not suggest that there is always a definite connection between the tendency of the digital media and the present understanding of a person. If I insist that a medium at all times alters the other and vice versa, it would be too simplified and rough. However, it is my opinion that there can be a loose interchange between them, so their relation is not a mere metaphor or an adventitious resemblance. We considered this relation by the reference to historical changes of the concept of a person and identity in chapter three, and based on that view we have examined the influences of today's media on the concept of a person. If this point is acceptable, we shall return to the use of the name on the digital media.

A name that is attached to a message might be used by another user in different circumstances, so it is argued that the connection between a name and a message is effective only at that time. Hence, 'once-ness' is an important feature of names in the media, but we also should not forget another aspect of name. This is the plural use of name. If a name cannot be repeatedly used, it is not a name in its essence. Even if a name is actually used just one time, it must theoretically include the potential to

³⁷⁸ Deleuze and Guattari (1983).

withstand plural use. A name which is used by a person at one time must be repeatable on another occasion, though it may happen that a person who uses the name later is not the same as the former user. Therefore, a name includes two different characteristics; it is effective at one time only but possesses the potentiality of repetition.³⁷⁹

The once-ness and repetition of names will be made more intelligible if we compare it to Benjamin's notion of the reproduction of art in modern technology. The authority of oneness in art has weakened due to the advent of modern technology, which replicates products in large quantities.³⁸⁰ To make replicas is not itself new, and replicas have been produced as practice for pupils, for popularising productions by artists, or by third parties for profit. Replicas are accepted as a part of artistic activity and practice. Nonetheless, Benjamin insists that modern technological reproductions of artworks are different from replicas made in traditionally. In the conventional sense, replicas are only replicas of something, and their value relies on the existence of an original: 'In even the most perfect reproduction, *one* thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art — its unique existence in a particular place.'³⁸¹ This singularity, this limitation of an object qualifies its status as a unique work. He claims that the original possesses the 'aura,' which is the authenticity of things that makes it impossible to reproduce the same work.

However, Benjamin warns that this distinction between the original and the replica has been demolished by the appearance of technological reproduction in which the existence of an original is not always necessary. Can we say which is original or replica in the case of three artistic photographs from the same frame? No one was made

³⁷⁹ This understanding of a name is influenced by Derrida's discussion of the role of a signature (1982, pp. 307-330).

³⁸⁰ 'By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence' (Benjamin, 2002, 104.)

³⁸¹ Benjamin (2002, pp. 102-103).

from an imitation of another but their quality is technologically equal. In the case of digital music, often there is no original but each part is individually produced and then combined. Any difference cannot be found between the originally sold digital code and a copy of that. For this reason, some creators in electronic media patent their products for the protection of copyright. A product can be regarded as an original in law in that way, but this does not mean that the original has the 'aura' and the copies do not, because there is theoretically no difference between them. The question whether something is an original or a replica does not make sense in these cases, and consequently, things reproduced by modern technology possess the capacity to void the authority of the aura.³⁸²

If we applied the characteristics of a name to the transformations of the status of art works, the stage at which art works possess their aura would correspond to the thought that a name connects to only one subject and is not exchangeable with anybody. However, as Benjamin discussed in the case of reproduction, a name on the Internet can multiply without there being an original. The authority of the name has faced collapse in this computer-mediated communication, and names have tended to be thought of as tentative and temporal destinations of messages. A name with a phrase is effective only at one time in one link, but the same name can be technologically reproduced without original.³⁸³

³⁸² Ibid., p. 105.

³⁸³ I do not insist that this characteristic of a name only belongs to digital media, since it can also be seen in the actual world, but insist that those media easily disclose this aspect.

5.5. Once-ness and Repetition of Differences

When I examine the characteristics of a name, once-ness and multiple use in reference to the Internet, I feel the temptation to refer to Friedrich Nietzsche's thought in order to exemplify the works of differences. I am conscious of a great gap between the circumstances of the electronic media and Nietzsche's concerns. Nevertheless, the idea that a name is effectual only once but that the same name will return reminds me of his notion of 'eternal return'. This association is indebted to Deleuze's understanding of Nietzsche. The eternal return in Nietzsche's discussion is the idea that exactly the same events, people, things that occurred in the past will come again in the future perpetually, and nothing can escape from this sequence. On Deleuze's interpretation, differences are seen as a driving force of eternal return.³⁸⁴ I want to consider this interpretation in relation to the concept of differences in this section.

We shall first follow Deleuze's commentary on two distinct types that do not survive the revolution of the eternal return. They are the 'passive small man or last man' and the 'great heroic active man'. The former conception is called by Nietzsche 'a slave or a camel,' who does not accept the eternal return and only takes a negative attitude to that notion. The second type wants to confront the negative as a hero, or a lion. This type is identical to that which will be a bridge for the coming future, a bridge between people and super humans. The second are somewhat active beings, but they are still not concerned with the work of any creation, because they are a negation of the slavish situation and to not hatch an affirmation. Deleuze defines this as an analogue or

³⁸⁴ All quotations of Deleuze without notes are from the text (Deleuze, 1994, 'That which does not return' in 'Conclusion').

sameness that is stagnant in the same place.

Deleuze comments that the eternal return does not make everything return, but that it is a test, in that it will destroy anything that cannot withstand the trial. On his understanding, neither any negation nor any sameness, identity, or resemblance survives this return, but only the third stage (of Nietzsche's three metamorphoses; the first is the slave and the second the hero) will return. It is the stage of the child, or as Deleuze calls it, the 'affirmation' or 'differences': 'Only affirmation returns — in other words, the Different, the Dissimilar.' Affirmation is the affirmation of the eternal return, and since the negative and analogue do not survive the movement of the eternal return, only 'dissemblance' and 'disparateness' can return.

To summarise this view, the eternal return is thought to be the movement that shakes off things which cannot face the conclusion that everything will return eternally in the same sequence. What are not shaken off by the movement are, in Deleuze's opinion, differences: 'Repetition in the eternal return appears...as the peculiar power of difference.' Acceptance of the disparateness of things outlives repetition, and the reason for this is that it does not follow the negation of or the identification with things but includes the affirmation of making differences. Thus, in his thought, only in the work of affirmation can things survive the eternal return. On this understanding, differences are a key concept in Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's thought.

A name in the digital media cannot be directly compared with the eternal return, because it probably does not possess the power to affirm the eternal return. It seems to be more likely that the use of a name in the digital world may fall into nihilism by means of the apparent thinness of reality in abstract communication rather than that it acquires the strength to conquer the nothingness of nihilism. However, if

communication by electronic media is reduced to links between phrases, this act might be at least a suggestion of a situation in which differences are not expelled to establish consistent communication but are accepted positively. Differences can be a mobile power that makes a new move, and the deliberation as to which phrase we make a link with might be concerned with the move of overcoming nothingness.³⁸⁵ Therefore, although I never claim that the Internet is a place on which Nietzsche's idea is significantly actualised, it can be a vast experimental device by which we to some extent shape characteristics of differences that escape from the organisation of identity.

To return to Deleuze's discussion, to accept the affirmation of differences is analysed as the system of the eternal return: 'Systems in which different relates to different through difference itself are systems of simulacra.'³⁸⁶ 'Simulacra' in his view indicates the situation in which the distinction between the identity of a model (namely, the original) and the resemblance of a copy (reproduction from the original) is lost. In his theory, the idea of the superiority of the model over the copy began with Plato's discussion of ideas in which the copy is a mere reproduction of the model. Deleuze, however, insists that in the movement of the eternal return everything becomes simulacra, which need neither the model nor the copy for their existence. Apart from the necessity of settling the original or copy, simulacra are 'constituted by differences, and communicate with the others through differences of differences'.³⁸⁷ Simulacra are not copies of a copy or inferior copies, but are the affirmation that attacks the dual conception of the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. This disappearance of the boundary between the two implies the method by which we should

³⁸⁵ '[I]nvention is always born of dissension.' (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv).

³⁸⁶ Deleuze (1994, p. 277).

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 278.

withstand the fear of differences, because there is no absolute position from which a copy is made but only differences.

The idea of multiplication of pieces which have no original is seen in a number of recent discussions of reality, self, and identity. Jean Baudrillard also analyses the collapse of the distinction between original and copy, using his idea of 'simulation,' or 'simulacrum'. Although the word is the same as Deleuze's, Baudrillard uses it particularly in order to express the performance of the media in the society. In this consumer society, things are counted as simulacrum; the media sell concepts of things and people touch commodities through mediated images. Images precede things in the 'simulation society' that has no reality that corresponds to simulacrum. This society is directed by the accumulation of reproductions, in which the confrontation between real and simulacrum becomes meaningless but codes of reproductions overflow. This loss of reality is termed 'hyperrealism,' which is not set up beyond or underlying the real world but is the spot at which the difference between real and hyperreal vanishes.³⁸⁸ In common understanding, 'simulation' is an instance or representation of the original, but this is not reflected in Baudrillard's use of this. He presented it as an independent act that increases the reproduction of reproductions, and this can work apart from referring to the source.

Everything can be put in the operation of simulation, so the reality of the real is swallowed in the interaction between simulacrum. This is the ultimate situation which is drawn out from the simulation-society. Baudrillard claims that this is not mere hypothesis, but that it has happened to us: *'today reality itself is hyperrealist...reality*

³⁸⁸ Baudrillard depicts 'the collapse of reality into hyperrealism' thus: "Through reproduction from one medium into another the real becomes volatile, it becomes the allegory of death, but it also draws strength from its own destruction, becoming the real for its own sake...: the hyperreal' (Baudrillard, 1993, pp. 71-72).

has already incorporated the hyperrealist dimension of simulation so that we are now living entirely within the 'aesthetic' hallucination of reality.'³⁸⁹ We today live in this hyperreal world in which our existences are dissolved in the operation of simulation, which presents us as simulacrum.

This operation, in my understanding, has a point in common with that which we have called differences. In terms of differences, the original of a piece is not sought for anymore, but pieces themselves perform, which I describe as the act of phrases which link and are linked with others. This is not only the outcome of electronic media, but they possess the potential to present this characteristic to us most forcefully. I suggest that we obtain more chances to see the generation of differences through the expansion of high-technology, because electronic media are effective in expanding simulacrum and disarranging our sense of reality. That is why I have discussed the effects of the digital media so far, and we will consider their prominence more in the next section. In postmodern thought, this diffusion is sometimes illustrated as the forfeiture of the authority of a writer. The ideal of a person, who has their own unique inner self which is worth confessing, has faded, and the boundary between writers and readers has become fainter today.

5.6. Instability of the Distinction between an Author and a Reader

We have focused on the moment from which differences arise in a person, and observed

³⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 74.

the way in which the recent media demonstrate the aspect of differences. Can the identity of a person be kept in this diffusion of a person? My answer is that even if it was possible to have a sense of identity, it would not be the same as the modern concept of personal identity. It is the identity after it has undergone the doubt involved in the postmodern. I assume that if there is a framework of a person in postmodern thought, it would be depicted as a space through which information is passed. We will consider this notion of a person as a space in this section. As an opening gambit, I will examine Roland Barthes's analysis of the author and the reader.

The author is, Barthes asserts, a modern product which arose when society, in this context Western society, outgrew the Middle Ages and entered the modern time.³⁹⁰ The same opinion is seen in Benjamin's discussion in which the discovery of the author of a novel was attributed to modern consciousness. In both ideas, the advent of the author who personally writes texts is supposed to have had a great impact on establishing the sense of individuality, especially in printing culture. Authors acquire their sense of themselves as individuals through expressing their interiority, and even if readers do not write a text by themselves, they touch upon the acquisition of the interior through reading the text.

The credibility of this view of the author has been, as is the case for other modern thoughts, questioned during the latter half of the twentieth century. Barthes takes part in this questioning and attacks the literary critics who give 'the greatest importance to the "person" of the author,' because they give the privilege of an author to his or her text, but the author is 'never more than the instance writing, just as *I* is nothing other than the

³⁹⁰ All quotations from Roland Barthes are taken from the following text (Barthes, 1977, pp. 142-148).

instance saying *I*. There is no preceding or exceeding authority of the author in his or her writing, but the author only works to 'make language "hold together." ' He expels the author from the position of god of the text, so the author is no longer the master of writing but is given a role to fill in the spaces of writing.

The author falls from the throne of writing, and Barthes proposes another idea in which writing is gathered and interpreted. This is the place of reading. The multiplicity of writing is, he asserts, left to the reader, because the reader is described as the space 'on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination.' Writing is an enumeration of words which are given meanings through the act of reading, so the place in which writing survives does not reside in the author as the origin of the text but in readers as its destination.³⁹¹ Furthermore, Barthes does not insist that a reader is the unity of a person, but a reader is only a location in which writing is assembled and mixed. A reader is not a particular person but a space 'without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that *someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted.' Readers are anonymous; they transmit information but do not acquire specific names, as authors' names are divested of this privilege by Barthes. The reader becomes the function of receiving and reproducing writing through reading, and the matter of the author who wrote it is a lesser problem.

Readers are thus the point at which texts melt into each other, and the superior position of writing disappears in Barthes's thought. Barthes declares the death of the author, and instead of the author he spotlights the role of the reader. The decline of the

³⁹¹ Barthes's thought is described as structuralism in the modern theory of literature. As an introductory text of literary theory, I cite Eagleton's one (1983).

role of author is a noteworthy idea, but I suggest that the author still keeps the position of writing a text in his thought. Barthes's theme is literature, so even though the death of the author is announced, it is natural that a specialisation in terms of who writes and who reads would remain in his discussion. However, if 'writing' is given its more ordinary usage, we would say that that specialisation becomes less today.

To explain this notion, we shall refer to the status of writing and reading on the Internet. To send information in public is incomparably easier in electronic media than in former media. It is true that there are methods of spreading information for ordinary people apart from the latest electronic technology such as private publishing or amateur radio operators, but this is sometimes expensive or needs special skills, and it is not easy to put information into wide circulation. Today, to send information on the Internet, which is literally open to the world, is not very difficult, and there are indeed a huge number of web sites that are privately organised. Writing and presenting this writing to the public are not only for professionals in this medium.

The Decline of the Boundary between Author and Reader

The boundary between the sender of information and its receiver is weakened in electronic media. The death of the author who has the privilege of synthesising all texts under his or her name was foretold by Barthes. I suppose that the shift of emphasis from author to the reader may have been radical once, but its significance seems to decline today. Both the author and the reader become anonymous in digital communication, because their differences are relatively insignificant in the situation in which everyone

can be both a writer and a reader.³⁹²

People may say that digital media, for example the electronic bulletin board or the chat room, are often used as a communication space and that users usually do not realise the author-reader problem. However, as long as there are acts of reading and writing, I insist that this issue is unavoidable. There are many boundary cases in which it is difficult to determine who is the writer of the sentence, on the tradition understanding of that term: There are books that are collections taken from the records of electronic bulletin boards. They were published not by users of these boards but by a third party. In this case, who can be said to be the real author of the books? Legally, we can define an editor who takes the profit and has responsibility for publishing, but as for the act of writing, this instance poses a question.³⁹³ In another example, there are a number of joint works on the Internet, such as encyclopaedia, dictionaries, bibliographies, novels, or newsletters. In some works, any user can add information to the text, so such electronic texts have numerous writers and have not stopped increasing.³⁹⁴

As an early experimental attempt at multiple participation, I shall cite an exhibition 'Les Immatériaux' directed by Lyotard at the Centre Georges Pompidou in France in 1984-5.³⁹⁵ The location, the fifth floor of the museum, is divided into sixty-one sites, and 'For the most part the sites consisted of small installations of various cultural artifacts; technological representations and electronic devices'.³⁹⁶ In one site,

³⁹² Bolter (1991, p. 222).

³⁹³ Ibid., pp. 153-155.

³⁹⁴ The concept of 'Wiki' or 'WikiWikiWeb' is a typical example. This is soft ware by which users can create an open web site that usually allows anyone to add information to the contents and to edit previously existing content as well. Wikis are often used to make databases such as on-line encyclopedia, dictionaries, and the collection of news. For more information, see <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki>>.

³⁹⁵ For an aesthetic judgement, see Crowther (1992).

³⁹⁶ Rajchman (1991, p. 105).

there is an exhibition that is a collection of definitions by people from various fields. They are asked to make short comments on a selected fifty words. Each definition is saved in the database, and the writers can access the database and add comments on any other's remarks. This exhibition demonstrated the possibilities of electronic texts to expand and diversify, though its shortfall is indicated by Derrida; the definitions still required author's names. Poster supports Derrida's opinion and states that if the multiple definitions of the terms, which were responses to responses, were written without author's names, it 'would constitute itself in anonymity, working, as Lyotard hoped, to destabilize language, reforming it in an incessantly provisional play of terms'.³⁹⁷ Today, works similar to this collection of definitions can be easily found on the Internet, and in these works, authorship is open to question. The function of 'hypertext' helps to describe these sorts of works. This is defined as a network of information in which nodes and links are made. It is 'non-sequential writing' and readers can go from one point to another in their own order.³⁹⁸ It is frequently used to make links to other information.³⁹⁹

That exhibition was a reflection of Lyotard's understanding of the postmodern. He depicts people as spaces, in which a phrase links to other phrases, in which the meaning of phrases are transformed, and from which they are dispatched again. This place is not non-resistant to information but intervenes in it, so the flowing of information is interrupted and delayed there. This space is interpreted by Lyotard as 'nodal points' or the 'post' in the network of communication:

³⁹⁷ Poster (1990, 115).

³⁹⁸ Nelson (1981).

³⁹⁹ As an experimental novel, Michael Joyce's *Afternoon, a Story*; is also this kind of project. Readers are given a choice of sentences and structure a story by their choices, so there is no fixed plot but the novel unfolds multiply.

A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at “nodal points” of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass. No one, not even the least privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless over the messages that traverse and position him at the post of sender, addressee, or referent.⁴⁰⁰

There are numerous points in the ocean of data, and they accept, stagnate, change, add, reduce, and dispatch signs to others. This ‘post’ does not necessarily know from where information comes and to where it goes, but passes on incoming messages with some alterations. We are more or less factors that change received information on this thought, and in the act of changing we are also transformed by information.

It will help to grasp this view if we compare the above mentioned idea with the narrative form, as discussed in former chapters. The narrative form, more or less, shows the linear line of a story, so the meaning of an experience usually becomes comprehensible when the experience is placed in the context of the narrative. This is the manner of making a consistent view of oneself over time. In that manner, a person is not regarded as a mere point to which information comes and goes, but regarded as occupying a more meta-position from which experiences are organised and a certain narrative is made. Nevertheless, the idea, which has been and will be discussed in this chapter, treats people as more fragmented beings. It does not insist the necessity of consistency of a story that the narrative approach requires, but it focuses on a transient link between experiences, focuses on how a phrase connects to another at that time. In

⁴⁰⁰ Lyotard (1984, p. 15).

this respect, people are grasped as transient existences more than the narrative account in which a link is made between phrases, and the work, by which a personal history is structured by the reference to a large amount of past episodes, is not placed in an essential position. In this intention, the consistency of a person becomes weak but differences of phrases and their links are more prominent. I emphasise that this issue is, as we saw in the discussion of the narrative form in chapter two, the matter of understanding as to how we grasp our existences. The subject that I attempt to depict in this thesis is this mode of the understanding of a person.

I have referred to Barthes and Deleuze as implying that the framework of a person – in their analysis it often appears as the boundary between author and reader – melts. Since ‘the author of a novel’ is a prominent example of the establishment of the modern type of identity, the fading of its remarkableness can be seen to be a clue to the fall of the modern ideal. Instead of this, I depict a person as a space. When a message comes into the space, the network of information is made in order to respond to the message. This network is not definite but transformable, and information is linked to others as factors of the network. This is an identification process by which the relation between phrases is given at a particular time. If there is postmodern identity, this relation is it.⁴⁰¹

A question may arise as to whether or not we can treat the problem of identity without mentioning the ‘personal’ on the modern understanding. The postmodern questions the idea that a person must be unified. It is a mission of the present age to investigate the point at which the unity of identity does not function, but this mission

⁴⁰¹ As to the status of information, I mention that incoming information may not always arrive in the form that its sender intends. This problem is keenly analysed in Jacques Derrida’s discussion of Jacques Lacan’s article ‘Seminar on The Purloined Letter’ (Lacan, 1988; Derrida, 1987).

does not necessarily end in a total mess. I will examine this issue in the next section in terms of the question of whether the concept of personal identity is really necessary for our survival.

5.7. The Necessity of Personal Identity

We have so far looked at ideas that indicate the decline of the notion that a person must be making a consistent narrative in accordance with their experiences. This is certainly an idea that I have attempted to advance throughout the discussion, but I now want to think again about the account we have dealt with. Even though I insist that the concept of a person as a unified existence has been called into question today, people may say that this is too abstract an opinion that does not coincide with their reality.

Doubt of postmodern thought is expressed sarcastically by Terry Eagleton who condemns postmodernism for advocating a 'decentred' life 'without ends or grounds or origins,' whilst 'Those who celebrate the discontinuous subject...would no doubt be as perturbed as the rest of us if their children failed to recognize them from week to week, or if their philosophically minded bank manager refused them the money they had deposited six months ago on the grounds that it could no longer be said to be theirs'.⁴⁰² This is, as he himself says, a caricature of postmodernism. However, the question of how postmodern thought corresponds to social situations should not be neglected, and I have attempted to depict it by referring to our way of interacting with other people. We

⁴⁰² Eagleton (1996, p. 64).

shall now turn our eyes to the question of whether or not the concept of personal identity is indispensable to our existence.

The necessity of personal identity can be converted to the question of what would be the most significant problem if there were no personal identity. If we can offer a way of managing some problems without mentioning personal identity, it would imply that the unity of a person is not always necessary for our survival. I should say right away that this is, nevertheless, not the suggestion that we can imagine a world in which people are always confused about the subjects of actions. There is no human community which does not have any rules for its members, but whatever they are, manners are necessary for communal living. As long as there are rules in a community (taboos, reward and punishment, the right of succession, the regulation of marriage, the way to share food, and so on), there are people to whom the rules apply. People need to be initiated into and to follow the rules as members of the community (though whether a community member is a personally consistent existence or not is irrelevant to this regulation).

Therefore, by the above question, I do not mean to create the vision of another world in which there is no sense of identity at all. What I want to investigate is the question of whether or not we can discuss the matter of our existence without mentioning the unity of a person.⁴⁰³ I assume that one of the main problems brought about by the absence of the unity of a person is the principle according to which people keep within the restrictions of society: If people focus on the temporal connection of phrases more than on making a consistent life story, why do they need to take care of

⁴⁰³ Bolter indicates a similar issue in relation to electronic writing: 'Elements in the electronic writing space are not simply chaotic; they are instead in a perpetual state of reorganization. They form patterns, constellations, which are in constant danger of breaking down and combining into new patterns' (1991, 9).

the social order? This question is concerned with the problem of what kind of view such people have of their actions and future, and I would like to analyse this issue from the perspective of morality. I propose that if we can discuss this problem without using the unity of a person, it would show that there is at least one example that proves that the disintegration of identity is not a nonsensical notion. The most radical view of this topic is, in my opinion, offered by Derek Parfit. He denies the idea that personal identity is a necessary condition of our lives. This leads to a discussion of the way to describe identity 'impersonally'.

Parfit discusses branch-line cases in depth in order to analyse the criterion of personal identity. These branch-line cases are thought experiments that offer situations in which there are plural existences all of which are derived from one person: If our brain was divided into two parts and put in separate bodies, or if our replicas were made, what would happen to our understanding of personal identity? After discussing a number of proposed solutions to the branch-line cases, he announces that personal identity is not what matters, but that what matters is Relation R, which consists of 'psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause'.

Psychological connectedness is 'the holding of particular direct psychological connectedness,' in which if person P₁ at present has partly the same memory as P₂ twenty years ago, there is psychological connectedness between P₁ and P₂. Psychological continuity is 'the holding of overlapping chains of *strong* connectedness.' If there are 'enough' direct connections between temporally separated existences, Parfit regards it as 'strong connectedness'.⁴⁰⁴ He also declares that 'In an account of what

⁴⁰⁴ The precise definition of 'enough' direct connections is not given. Parfit thinks it is not possible (and not meaningful) to determine the amount, but r mentions that the

matters, the right kind of cause could be any cause'.⁴⁰⁵ Thus, the continuity of our existence in his theory is reduced to Relation R in which some psychological connections between existences are kept.

Therefore, even if there are plural replicas which are produced by, so to speak, some science fictional technology, we would not need to ask if one of them, all of them, or none of them, keeps personal identity which continues from the original. In place of that question, we should ask if it can possess Relation R to others. Parfit refuses to be involved in the search for the criterion of personal identity, because he regards it as an empty question, to which we can give some answers, but any answer is arbitrary, pointless, or misleading.⁴⁰⁶ This view is not to be confused with the idea that there is no personal identity, but he suggests that it is futile to seek answers to such empty questions. In his opinion, the understanding of life as self-contained and linear is not a suitable one with which to describe ourselves, but it is important whether or not there is any existence that has Relation R to the present self.

Based on this thought, Parfit asks if we can establish a sense of morality in accordance with Relation R. This leads to several questions, one being what kind of relation we have to future generations. In outline, he argues that there may be some existences in the future that somehow relate to the present us: There will be some memories of our lives, will be thoughts that are influenced by our works, or will be things that are influenced by us.⁴⁰⁷ They are not the same existences as the present selves exactly, but the relation between us and the future generation can be kept. Thus,

number of direct connections is '*at least half* the number that hold, over every day,' it would be regarded as 'enough'. (1984, p. 206)

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 206-215.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 260.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 281.

to be considerate towards the future generation is not absurd but understandable if we believe in the Relation R.

Parfit asserts that those related in Relation R are not restricted only to the continuation of their particular personalities, and 'our reasons for acting should become *more impersonal*'.⁴⁰⁸ The 'personal' is the idea that 'our continued existence is a deep further fact, distinct from physical and psychological continuity, and a fact that must be all-or-nothing'.⁴⁰⁹ The 'personal' is dealt with as a kind of metaphysical entity in that notion. Our death on that view is our end and there is an insuperable gap between our lives and those of others.⁴¹⁰ To be impersonal is to describe our death in this way: 'There will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences.'⁴¹¹ Parfit confesses that having obtained this view, he regards his death less negatively, because now he can believe that there will be some experiences in the future that relate to his present experiences, even though the relation is indirect. Therefore, it is not meaningless for us to take care of future generations if we accept Relation R. Besides, to be impersonal is to give the opportunity to open a new view of our sense of morality, he insists.

I want to emphasise the point that even if personal identity is not important for our lives, responsibility for others is still kept. A person is not treated as a closed existence but as exposed to various relations to experiences in his thought, so it can be said that this is also consistent with the idea of the decline of a person as a sole and firm existence. It is true that we cannot simply apply his theory to our discussion of

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 443.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 281.

⁴¹⁰ Parfit categorises researchers who take the view that our existences contain a 'further fact' such as the continuity of soul into Non-Reductionist, which involves from Cartesian Pure Ego to Butler and Reid's discussion of personal identity.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.,

differences, and Parfit indeed does not take a position that pushes ahead with consideration of postmodernism. However, it will be beneficial for us to examine what kind of relation a linkage of phrases can have towards the future. A link between phrases always happens at a particular moment, so if it means that it is enough for us to pay attention to the current link, we would not need to think about future generations. For a consciousness which emerges and vanishes immediately, it counts for nothing to be burdened with obligations towards prospective groups of people.

However, although it is certain that links between phrases lay emphasis on the present, phrases will never stop making links, so links include the potential for future expansion. The postmodern was described in chapter four as the movement that attempts to bring forward something that has not yet been represented. A linkage of phrases on this notion should not be rashly made, but we need to ask what discourse the phrases may form. To make a link thus includes consideration of what comes after, though it is often no more than a premonition.⁴¹²

Parfit also pushes for a movement that endeavours to produce a system which has not yet existed, a system based not on personal identity but on Relation R. He is conscious of the fact that his notion threatens people with its unfamiliarity when he refuses the necessity of personal identity but centres on Relation R. This is the search for a new *attitude* to present social conditions, and Parfit depicts it as being more 'impersonal' than 'personal'. I understand that it is a matter of attitude, because Parfit's conclusion is given in terms of how we ought to behave to others more than as the result of logical deduction. Parfit's theory is not counted as postmodern thought, but both of them investigate what sort of relation can be described as holding between people

⁴¹² Lyotard (1988, p. xii).

without instituting the unity of the subject. Therefore, I insist that even if the unity of a person is dispersed into phrases, we should not necessarily abandon care for others as long as the link matters to us. This is my answer to the question of why the postmodern concept of identity is not nonsense but an urgent matter for survival in the age, in which we cannot unconditionally rely on modern achievements.

To be more impersonal is Parfit's suggestion, in order to reconsider what kind of morality can be established today. The term, impersonal, is used to criticise the present ideal of a person. Lyotard adapts the term 'inhuman' in criticism of the social system that makes its member's future measurable. It throws up the question of what is thought to be humanity, and shows Lyotard's understanding of the relation between people and technology.

5.8. The Two Different Types of Inhumanities

In the discussion of inhumanity, Lyotard sets up two different sorts of inhumanities, and contends that it is imperative to keep them separate: The one is the inhumanity of the system and the other is the inhumanity of resistance to definitive control by the system. Their differences are caused by the understanding of what we regard as the humanity, and he explains them by the example of education. Through education, especially learning a language, people overcome their nature, including infancy's confusion, desire, and irrationality, and through that learning they participate in communal life as adults. This is the inhumanity of the system, and the reason why it is called the 'inhuman'

resides in the second view of inhumanity. The second view highlights residues that are not sublimated by the system of education. Criticism of and escape from institutions are assumed to be the sort of residues of the system that do not fit into that order, and on this understanding, education is condemned as 'inhuman'. I shall call the second notion the 'inhumanity of differences'.

The inhumanity of the system is inconsistent with the inhumanity of differences, but their stances toward each other are not the same. The inhumanity of the system 'has the consequence of causing the forgetting of what escapes it.'⁴¹³ Things which are regarded as meaningless by the system are at best exiled from that system, or merely treated as if they did not exist. This intensifies the view that valuable elements are those that are held by that system, and this is, for example, found when we use Internet search engines. Cyber space is a melting pot of information but not all information is stored there. Users know this fact, but they have an inclination to think that data that cannot be found on the Internet might not exist or be less important. The film, *The Net*, plainly shows this idea that a person whose existence is not recorded anywhere is thought not to exist.⁴¹⁴ In the story, a heroine is unconsciously involved in a conspiracy, and as a result her existence is informationally replaced with another person. She is deprived of her job, property, and all identifications, and forced to be another person, who is a drug addicted criminal, through rewriting her records in the database.

The theme of the film itself is not new but appears as an old fear that one day a person suddenly finds that nobody remembers who he or she is. The fear implies that our notion of 'who we are' is partly influenced by the behaviour of other people and

⁴¹³ All quotations without references in this section are taken from the following text (Lyotard, 1991, pp. 1-7).

⁴¹⁴ *The Net* (1995).

recorded data. Thus, the film repeats a familiar topic, but shows that it is easy to make the situation real with electronic media by means of which a person takes the place of another person. It is not easy to replace information manually or to include in the conspiracy all people who are concerned with the deceived person, so vast stage settings must be prepared even in fiction. The electronic media nonetheless have a mighty power of persuasion to bring about these circumstances compared to other methods. I think, therefore, that the more information-orientation advances, the more the tendency increases; to be left out of a list is to be regarded as not being in existence. In contrast to the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of differences does not take the attitude of forgetfulness of the other, but revolts against oblivion. It makes us consider the problems of the existing system.

Lyotard also exemplifies these two inhumanities in terms of 'rapid reading' and 'writing and reading,' the second is namely thinking. Rapid reading is beneficial for saving time, because 'to go fast is to forget fast, to retain only the information that is useful afterwards'. It is profitable for the system in order to increase productivity. However, writing and reading take time, because they incite people to pause to think.⁴¹⁵ The latter is not concerned with the forgetfulness of the system but often concerned with making criticisms of the system. These different approaches to time keep the two inhumanities separate, and Lyotard deems that the disparity between them has tended to widen with the development of technology. In relation to 'postmodern,' he owns that his intention in using that term is to indicate the transformation of technology and its

⁴¹⁵ The irony of 'saving time' is often found in Lyotard's writing. In *Differend*, he writes, cynically: 'Reflection is not thrust aside today because it is dangerous or upsetting, but simply because it is a waste of time. It is "good for nothing," it is not good for gaining time. For success is gaining time. A book, for example, is a success if its first printing is rapidly sold out' (1988, p. xv).

influence on the understanding of those inhumanities: 'We have to try to understand this transformation, without pathos but also without negligence...The term postmodern has been used, badly rather than well if I judge by the results, to designate something of this transformation.'⁴¹⁶ In his thought, being more inhuman on the second meaning is the task for us in this techno-industrialised society, in terms of escaping from the forgetfulness of something that is not represented within that organisation.

Therefore, Lyotard's attitude toward technology is ambivalent. As regards the inhumanity of the system, he warns that people are reduced to computerised codes, which are ordered and systematised. Seemingly, he is suspicious of the result that computer technology may bring rather than simply evaluating these results. He expresses a negative opinion of making a person connect with computer systems and the separation of thought from the body.⁴¹⁷ He considers that the 'rewriting' of information occurs in these media by which any mode of information is transformed into a calculable unit. To convert expressions to digital signs is to erase 'all traces left in a text of unexpected and 'fantasy' association'.⁴¹⁸ Things that have errors or that cannot be reduced to an On-and-Off system are rejected by this technology. Only a correctly written program can run in computer based communication. This is his caution with regards to the computerised world, and I also understand it as a warning of the dangerous aspect of these media. Information which has previously belonged to different classes such as the visual, musical, written, economic, and political is now being transformed into the same sort of digital code. If this technology is employed as the ultimate method of storing information, things that are not suitable to this method

⁴¹⁶ Lyotard (1991, p. 5).

⁴¹⁷ See, Lyotard, (1997, 'Can Thought go on without a Body?,').

⁴¹⁸ Lyotard (1991, p. 35).

might suffer fundamental changes or be ignored, forgotten, or eliminated. This technology thus may work to promote standardisation of things in digital code.

However, when I think about the interaction between technology and our physical conditions today, I feel that the role of technology can be thought about more flexibly. In relation to the combination of the inhumanity of differences and technology, Stuart Sim mentions Dana Haraway's 'cyborg', a representative of the second inhumanity. For Haraway, the cyborg, which is a hybrid of machine and organism, provides a powerful image to promote a different style of living. Haraway proclaims that 'a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints'.⁴¹⁹ The eastern tradition has provided certain distinctions between human beings and animals, humans and machines, within the social system. Haraway criticises the traditional structure and attempts to disturb the boundaries of this structure in terms of her feminist theory. She proposes the concept of a cyborg as an idea that demolishes that boundary and that crystallises the gender-problem as well.⁴²⁰

In the concept of a cyborg, dualisms of mind and body, of animal and machine, and of idealism and materialism are attacked, and the distinction between the thought as an organic work and the machine as an inorganic tool is disturbed. This deep involvement in technology as a self-conscious strategy to be used against the existing system opens the way for the idea that the inhumanity of differences can be positively highlighted through technology. Haraway's discussion is founded in her study of feminism. Lyotard places his stress on the deviation from the system, but he appears not

⁴¹⁹ Haraway (1991, p. 154).

⁴²⁰ For more detailed examples, Haraway proposes a list of the transfigurations from the old hierarchical dominations to new networks of information technology (Ibid., p. 161).

to consider the discussion of differences in feminism so much.⁴²¹ Although we do not have the space for more discussion of this point, I would like to leave this as a hint of further study of the concept of identity at present. It might offer a chance to depict this issue from a new angle, along with the critique of traditional Western thought. We do not dominate machines and machines do not dominate us, but they are already part of our daily life. Cyborg imagery is concerned not with the re-production of universal theory but rather with its dissolution. I suggest that it is of value to discuss the status of technology by means of which we acquire the opportunity to view the foundations of our society in a new light.⁴²²

To sum up, the dissolution of identity is a prevalent topic in postmodern thought, and it is sometimes criticised as leading to the renunciation of liability for and lack of concern for others. I do not agree with these opinions, and have tried to demonstrate that postmodern discourse as a manner of thought does not need to locate the unity of a subject at the centre of discussions. Moreover, even if postmodern thought related to the dissolution of a person more than to its unity, it would not necessarily imply aloofness with regards to the future. Through being more 'impersonal,' we will be able to reduce the height of the fence between ourselves and others. It will show us a different style of morality, especially with regards to future generations.

In addition, although I pick up technology as a significant factor that made the dissolution of a person accelerated, technology is concerned with both the acceptance and denial of differences. The discrimination between the inhumanity of the system and the inhumanity of differences is necessary for us to sharpen our sense of the different

⁴²¹ For example, Fraser and Nicholson (1988, pp. 373-394), Poster (1990, p. 145).

⁴²² Haraway's idea is, of course, not the only way to treat this issue. For a caution against too much involvement in this type of feminism, see Gillis (2004), Andermahr, Lovell, and Wolkowitz (2000).

activities performed under the name of technology and science. These prospects can be considered without establishing the concept of personal identity, or as I would rather say, they are seeking a way to go as far as possible from the modern concept of personal identity. This is an answer to the question of whether or not the postmodern can be actively concerned with the present social system and human actions, and my answer to this question is positive. The media in which we are involved today have made weak the borderline between simulation and reality, in our sense. The concept of personal identity cannot be irrelevant to this movement, and I suggest that we now face the dissolution of the concept of a person that has been thought as a unified being. To depict this feature was the main topic of this chapter. Although the idea that different media have different influences on people is already stressed by MacLuhan, his discussion does not go far enough to emphasise the impact of electronic media. He presents transformations of human perception brought about by the media, but the unity of a person as the subject that supervises perception is not questioned enough in his thought. Thus, we need to go further than his argument in order to characterise transformations of the concept of personal identity at present.

We have referred to behaviours, which are typical to computer mediated communication, as examples that show the dissolution of identity. The computer mediated communication is effective in showing the estrangement between phrases and their subjects, and we shall review this point. It is often mentioned by recent writers, for instance, Slavoj Žižek eagerly discusses the influence of the media on the forms of human thought. He indicates that because everyone knows that phrases on the Internet are not believed entirely, we can express our minds freely, as a patient can say anything

to a psychotherapist. The patient knows that the psychotherapist does not get angry in the session, because the psychotherapist does not react to the conversation as his or her personal matter. Communication in the digital media is compared to that idea, in order to examine the relation between the subject of desire and its object, examine the concept of a person at present.⁴²³ I interpret this as referring to the moment at which we are spread about into phrases, and at which differences in a person reveal themselves. We at present should reconsider the meaning of identity and differences if we are not to return to the modern or the classic. In this regard, I insist that computer based communication has the potential to be an interesting experimental medium for examining the phenomenon of the diffused self in the postmodern age.

Moreover, if the Internet has any significance in its use, it is also in the method of making a link: Lyotard asks that 'From the different phrases which are actually possible, one will be actualised; and the actual question is: which one?' Until a link is made, a phrase is open to opportunities in multiple discourses, so it can be a weighty task to decide on a phrase to link with. The description of the fall of, or memory of, modern Ideas will not help to answer the question, 'which one?,' because it does not then become a question. The decision as to which genre a phrase has to belong, is already provided to the modern Ideas, because they hold up the ideals which will be achieved in the future, and any phrase must follow that ideal. Indeed, Lyotard claims that 'this is why the word *postmodernity* is able to embrace such conflicting perspectives'.⁴²⁴ If the modern promotes fixed links that bring about its ideal in the goal, the postmodern would have no fixed purpose but would attempt to produce an unknown presentation. If there

⁴²³ Žižek (1996).

⁴²⁴ Lyotard (1992, p. 41).

is any possibility that computer based communication could contribute to research into the concept of identity in the postmodern, it would be in its activity as an experimental device through which users adopt unpredictable styles of discourse in the digital world.

In my discussion, I should make clear a point in order to avoid misunderstanding: The electronic media are an interesting place to practice postmodern thought, but we should not regard them as the ideal media for the realisation of the postmodern movement. On one view, it is an appealing experimental device to delineate links between phrases, but on another view it strengthens the system that reduces persons to digital records. A positive side of electronic media can be described thus: 'computer writing is the quintessential postmodern linguistic activity. With its dispersal of the subject in nonlinear spatio-temporality, its immateriality, its disruption of stable identity, computer writing institutes a factory of postmodern subjectivity, a machine for constituting non-identical subjects.'⁴²⁵ However, if the systematic side of the media rose to predominance, a person would be reduced to pieces of data on records such as date of birth, gender, nationality, address, job, bank account number, or family structure. These data are often accepted as more credible information than that which states who we are. This systematic understanding produces routine links that are content with the existing system, and Lyotard rejects this as the inhumanity of the system. Even though the electronic media possess the potential to betoken postmodern thought, we should be careful of their negative aspect of impairing differences.

In conclusion, I regard the present age as the time in which the matters of differences are paid more attention than before. In the modern era, the establishment of identity was focused upon for the development of society, and residues were those

⁴²⁵ Poster (1990, p. 128).

things that had to be removed for the sake of preserving the stability of the system. I do not deny the achievement of the modern in giving us an opportunity to liberate our lives more than before, but it is also true that we cannot now simply follow the modern project without reviewing it. Differences become an issue in this reconsideration, and we need a new perspective to discuss this idea. Even if identity and differences are not separate groups of thought but corresponded to each other, differences would not be grasped on the same basis as is identity. We can use the term 'personal identity' when we ask about the continuity of a person over time, but we cannot, correspondingly, say 'personal differences', because differences have no subject with which they can be identified in the sphere of a person. They lack the origin which makes subjects of identity unified, and this absence is a way to allow phrases to survive not as pieces of the unity but as differences themselves.

If I can be allowed to mention Michel Foucault's thought, I would say that the concept of personal identity today is not a determinate issue through all spatio-temporal conditions, but that it is a periodical notion that arose in early modern times in Western traditions. Therefore, it is possible that this concept is attacked when another notion has gained power: 'As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date...If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, ...man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.'⁴²⁶ The understanding of a person in modern thought was once effective, but it may have arrived at its boundary and face the time of reconsidering its credibility. This is my basic argument in the study of personal identity, and I have undertaken to depict this idea from several angles, concerned with memory, narrative, media history, and the postmodern. To predict the

⁴²⁶ Foucault (1970, p. 387).

future is beyond my capacity, so I have tried to depict the present situation, what is happening to us, and using this picture I have also attempted to describe the necessity of reassessing our understanding of the concept of personal identity in this century.

CONCLUSION

Personal Identity, Memory, and Narrative

We asked one question throughout this thesis; what is personal identity for us? This leads firstly to the discussion of the way in which we form our concept of personal identity, and we pursue it in the work of the reconstruction of memory. That issue then unfolds a further question of whether or not there are elements that cannot be resolved in this way. This question is considered by examining the status of the identity in the postmodern age. Here, we shall restate the points that we have dealt with in this thesis, and will discuss the concept of identity and differences a little more. I defined personal identity as a network of memory that arises when we grasp experiences from our own perspective. In this network, even if each episode were not exactly the same, it would be regarded as a factor that consists of the concept of personal identity. This is called the unity relation by Perry, and we apply it to the reconstruction of memory with the modification that memories are organised not from a neutral position but from a person's particular perspective.

This account of personal identity is compared to the narrative form, which works to provide a proper explanation of an action in accordance with the longer-context of a personal history. Thus, even if there are great gaps between temporally separate descriptions, they would be regarded as belonging to the same person as long as we can find an adequate relation between them. In MacIntyre's example, even though the

description ‘The prisoner of the Chateau d’If’ and ‘The Count of Monte Cristo’ do not show any immediate similarity, we would not hesitate to regard them as the same person in the context of that man’s history. Personal identity is, MacIntyre claims, the identity that corresponds to the unity of one’s character that is disclosed by the unity of narrative.⁴²⁷ In this regard, the narrative understanding through which a plausible relation is made between episodes is crucial in terms of forming the concept of personal identity.

However, although the narrative form plays an important role for organising the concept of personal identity, I also insist that that form is not necessary to cover the whole of life from its beginning to end. The narrative form concerned with the concept of personal identity in this thesis is defined as the method that bridges temporally distant episodes in the framework of a person, and that is all. We thus separate from MacIntyre’s discussion at this point. In his thought, the unity of narrative is inseparable from the achievement of virtue in life, so it includes the evaluation of lifestyle; narrative consistency is important to establish a virtuous life. That evaluation is, nevertheless, not brought in our discussion, so the necessity of a life story fitting in with long-term intentions can be avoided with regard to the reconstruction of memory.

This point is mentioned by Galen Strawson as different types of narration in his discussion of the self. He asserts that some people may be good at remembering personal history, and others may have poor memory of that — not only this, but such people may not be seriously affected by their past experiences when they think about the future. He suggests that those differences influence the way in which people grasp and envisage their lives.

⁴²⁷ MacIntyre (1984, pp. 217-218).

Some people live deeply in narrative mode: they experience their lives in terms of something that has shape and story, narrative trajectory. Some of them are self-narrators in a stronger sense...and knit up their lives with longer term projects. Others are quite different. They have no early ambition, no later sense of vocation...no tendency to see their life in narrative terms or as constituting a story...They live life in a picaresque or episodic fashion.⁴²⁸

Strawson does not judge which narrative style is more adequate for our existence, though he is basically more eager to attack the notion that the consistency of narrative is necessary for the organisation of a good life. His opinion is that long-term continuity is not a necessary condition for making the sense of the self, but that we can still have that sense even within the episodic form of life. He criticises recent studies that stress the importance of narrative consistency for our lives, and insists that that consistency is not indispensable to the analysis of human experiences.⁴²⁹ I do not intend to abandon the work of narrative completely, since it is certainly effective in making sense of our past. However, I also accept his idea that neither the evaluation nor the long-term intention is necessary for depicting our experiences.

That is a brief overview of the relation between the narrative form and life in chapter two. In later chapters, we then moved on to seek the minimum of this approach for analysing the concept of personal identity. This takes the form of a criticism of the idea of the stability of identity, especially that associated with the modern ideal of a person and identity. This was specifically considered in relation to media history.

Printing Technology and the Modern

⁴²⁸ Strawson (2003, p. 353).

⁴²⁹ Strawson (2004, p. 1).

In order to clarify the character of the concept of personal identity at present, I paid attention to features of that concept in different ages, as characterised by different media. Poster also focuses on media history in order to depict how a person is characterised in different modes of information. He divides media history into three stages; the oral, printing, and electronic. In the oral, he suggests that 'the self is constituted as a position of enunciation through its embeddedness in a totality of face-to-face relations'.⁴³⁰ I include the medium of oral and of hand writing in this notion, and depict this stage as that in which people rely on collective identity that is strongly associated with their own community.

In the age of printing, Poster holds that 'the self is constructed as an agent centred in rational/imaginary autonomy'.⁴³¹ The acts of writing and reading are notably changed by the rise of printing technology. They acquired great popularity in comparison to the Middle Ages, and individual thought obtained a place to be expressed through the development of that medium. I count those as necessary changes for founding the modern concept of personal identity. Poster's third stage is represented by electronic technology, in which 'the self is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous instability'.⁴³² This is what I regard as the peculiarity of the postmodern age, in which the traditional view of identity is questioned, and the dissolution of the unity of a person is discussed more than before.

I insisted that in media history printing plays a great part in the modernisation of our thinking style. It plays an important role in founding the modern idea of an individual, in which rationality and the abstract sense have been strengthened. For

⁴³⁰ Poster (1990, p. 6).

⁴³¹ Ibid.,

⁴³² Ibid.,

instance, when we at present study philosophy, to tackle an issue by oneself silently is usual, though oral discussion is also greatly valued. Our style of studying, learning, and thinking, are deeply involved with silent reading today, and this would not be actualised if books had not become objects of mass-production by means of the development of printing. Elizabeth Eisenstein asserts the power of printing for changing the circumstances of religion: 'Intellectual and spiritual life were profoundly transformed by the multiplication of new tools for duplicating books in fifteenth-century Europe.'⁴³³ Narasimhan also mentions that printing contributes to the transformation of Western cultures, and he counts it as one of three factors that alter the role of literacy conceptually and socially.⁴³⁴ Printing technology, which started with Gutenberg's invention, has been very much bound up with the intellectual life of Western society. The concept of personal identity is cultivated in this tradition, in which a person is regarded as an independent agent who takes responsibility for his or her own action by the use of rationality.

This concept is however attacked by the postmodern as a monochromatic and authorised view of a person. I examine this issue in its relation to the electronic media. This latest communication technology contributes to changing the sense of space and distance through the immediate connection to others.⁴³⁵ Nonetheless, some people may ask if they are really worth considering, and assert that the influence of computer mediated communication may be overestimated today. I also disagree with seeing cyberspace as an ideal tool that can resolve many problems. However, I still find

⁴³³ Eisenstein (1979, p. 704).

⁴³⁴ Others show 'Concern with the interpretation assignment process that is involved in assigning meaning to a text' and 'Concern with schooling and the instructional process'. (Narasimhan, 1991)

⁴³⁵ Hetherington (1988), Morley and Robins (1995).

remarkableness in it as a manifestation of the postmodern tendency, and insist that electronic media deserve to be discussed for the sake of understanding our present communication style. The observation of human behaviour in cyberspace can be effective for depicting how the concept of a person and identity is grasped in this era.⁴³⁶

It is the discontinuity between the modern and the postmodern, which is stressed in chapter four. In relation to this issue, it is worthwhile to mention the following point: As is generally known, modernism firstly appeared as defiance against the existing system. According to Fredric Jameson, early modernism was 'an oppositional art; it emerged within the business society of the gilded age as scandalous and offensive to the middle-class public – ugly, dissonant, bohemian, sexually shocking...an offence to good taste and to common sense'.⁴³⁷ Modernism struck the former generation as shocking, and 'decorous' people frowned on its newness. It was thus once intended to be a revolt against authority. Nevertheless, from the postmodern viewpoint, the radicalness of modernism is hushed and modernism is counted as another form of authority over others. Hence, modernism seems to have lost its air of danger to the existing order in society.

The above view of modernism is specifically observed in the case of art in modern times, which occurred as a reaction against Victorian 'polite society,' as Jameson claims. Our discussion of the modern covers a wider range than that, but in relation to this point, modernism not as radical any more but as warranted, can be accepted as its common

⁴³⁶ Gordon Graham criticises the Internet as beneficial but having no impact in order to truly transform human nature and condition. His caution is partly directed towards those who devote themselves to it as a dream invention through which diverse problems can be resolved (1999). I agree with him in that sense, but still insist that it can influence our concept of personal identity and a person. For further discussion, see chapter five.

⁴³⁷ Fredric Jameson (1987, pp. 123-124).

feature. The modern becomes popularised in culture to the degree that people almost forget its radical side, and I assume that this is one of the reasons why the postmodern has arisen as a criticism of the modern. Some researchers may pursue the modern ideology as far as it can be carried, but Lyotard writes that the mourning process for the modern has been completed. We do not need to start it all over again, and 'That is what the postmodern world is all about. Many people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative'.⁴³⁸ The postmodern does not participate in retrospect or the re-establishment of the lost narrative, or in the return to the classic. We do not need to restore the modern Ideas in the manner in which people once tried to do, but it will be necessary for us to find the method by which we will survive following present-day scepticism of modern achievements.

Lyotard calls the act of seeking the postmodern discourse 'rewriting modernity' in one article. It is not a matter of revealing the failure of the *modern and correcting it*. If 'rewriting modernity' was understood in this way, it would be merely 'writing again, and making real, modernity itself'.⁴³⁹ We must not be led into repeating the same error when we rewrite modernity, so the postmodern is not ascertaining the track of the modern, but resisting being interpreted as the complement of the modern.

The Status of Differences in Postmodern Thought

I symbolise postmodern thought concerned with identity by the term 'differences'. In the case of the modern, the concept of identity is thought to be a matter of synthesis, and it works to make our experiences understandable. In the case of the postmodern, I

⁴³⁸ Lyotard (1984, p. 41).

⁴³⁹ Lyotard (1991, p. 28).

consider the limitation of that modern idea, because that explanation cannot include elements that stray from its system. I wanted to consider something that is regarded as needless for that system, needless for the establishment of a universal idea. Some recent arguments that do not belong to this seeking for the unity of identity seem to advocate this point in their own ways. They represent the search not for the way that things are identified with their origin or subject, but for the way that differences can be traced. Among them, for instance, I think Foucault's discussion of 'archives' may be comparable with the 'differences' discussed in this thesis.

The archive is not a real collection of things but is defined as the law of statements; there are conditions in which statements can be made to appear, and the archive is the system that makes the statements and discourses (which are a set of statements) possible. For instance, Cervantes's *Don Quixote* is written as the negative of the chivalry of the Renaissance. In order to generate that type of story, there must be an agreement as to what chivalry is, and there must be a tendency to regard it as out-of-date. I also include the condition that the chivalry story would not be innocently narrated after Cervantes, and that is how *Don Quixote* is accepted in the context of literary history (it is counted as the indication of modern literature in Western tradition). There is a web of thoughts from which a unique event arises, and that is the function of the archive. It cannot be reduced to the accumulation of sentences, cultural conditions, or the movement of the period itself, but is the system that produces particular events in a particular period of time. This notion of the archive is used in relation to the idea that any description (the self, history, reason, and so on) is one of many possible variations that can be realised, so the description is not an absolute establishment but is founded in differences of discourses. Thus, Foucault's archive multiplies differences rather than

forming identity:

[I]t deprives us of our continuities...In this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that we are differences, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and make.⁴⁴⁰

On this notion, the establishment of the synthesis or the unifying function of a subject is denied, but the dispersion of a person is stressed. Foucault does not consider history as a linear sequence of events but sees the discontinuity in it. I assume that this idea marks a similarity to our discussion in that I depict a person as a temporal existence to which phrases come and go, and through that interaction the framework of the existence can be modified. The web of phrases and discourses is not identified with their source or origin, but expands in diverse ways through seeking another condition of linkage.

I insist that narrative consistency and phrases, or the unity of identity and differences, are irreconcilable thoughts, but not that one has to be conquered by the other. As the concept of identity discloses the shortcomings in order to grasp our experiences fully, so differences are not enough for us. We tend to make order out of experiences, and this organisation is partly effective to our comprehension of ourselves. However, there are always frayed parts in that organisation, and the endeavour to trace the differences is the main topic of our later discussion. If I can compare the frayed, the differences, to Kakuzo Okakura's study of aesthetics, the act of differences are, metaphorically, symbolised: 'In leaving something unsaid the beholder is given a chance to complete the idea and thus a great masterpiece irresistibly rivets your

⁴⁴⁰ Foucault (1989, p. 131).

attention until you seem to become actually a part of it.’⁴⁴¹ Since there is an incomplete part of the work, there is a space for imagination that people complete by themselves. It is the quest for the representation of something that has not yet been expressed, and how to accept it positively is an issue concerned with the matter of differences.

This is the postmodern explanation of identity and difference. Although I have argued for the collapse of the modern concept of personal identity, I do not wish to be entirely involved in talking about something’s end. The end of modern ideologies has already been strongly asserted by researchers.⁴⁴² In place of taking part in discussing this supposed end, I would like to turn our attention to the act of opening. Research into differences in identity may provide the opportunity to reconsider the concept of personal identity from a different angle. The question of what attitude we should take to new technology is always a pressing issue for us. I have considered the method by which we grasp our discontinuity within the excesses of our information society. To track the mutability of our status was the theme here, and the concept of personal identity was the central topic of this consideration.

⁴⁴¹ Okakura (1919).

⁴⁴² For example, Fukuyama (1992), Bloom (1987), Lyotard (1984).

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